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I. INTRODUCTION
At common law, defamation was a strict liability tort. A defen-
dant could be held liable for publishing a false and defamatory
statement absent any evidence that the defendant suspected the
statement's falsity or even its defamatory potential, and despite
the fact that the defendant used reasonable care in attempting to
ascertain the truth.1 The plaintiff only had to prove fault by the
publisher when the plaintiff was attempting to overcome a quali-
fied privilege 2 or establish the liability of a secondary publisher
such as a news vendor.' Since the United States Supreme Court's
decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, however, proof of fault
has become a central element in many defamation cases. In the
landmark Sullivan case, the Court held that the first amendment
requires a plaintiff who is a public official to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant published the defamatory
statement with "actual malice." The Sullivan Court defined actual
malice as knowledge of the falsity of the statement or reckless dis-
regard for its truth.5
In St. Amant v. Thompson' the Court indicated that the focus
of the actual malice standard was subjective in nature and that, in
order to establish "reckless disregard for the truth," the plaintiff
must show that the defendant published the defamatory statement
1. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 804 (5th ed.
1984); L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 5, at 14-15 (1978).
2. See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 1, § 93, at 508-09. To defeat a qualified privilege, the
plaintiff might have had to establish that the defendant's publication went beyond the
scope of the privilege, or was made with reckless disregard for the truth, or with ill will, or
with negligence, depending upon the particular privilege and jurisdiction.
3. Id. § 45, at 234-35.
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. Id. at 279-80. The Court's unfortunate characterization of its standard of proof as
"actual malice" resulted in much unnecessary confusion with the traditional common-law
concept of malice as ill will. See, e.g., Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965). Because the
term is still used with sufficient frequency, however, "actual malice" will be employed in the
course of this Article as a convenient shorthand reference to the Sullivan standard of fault.
6. 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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in spite of serious doubts as to its truth. The focus on the defen-
dant's fault became even more pronounced in 1967 when the Court
extended the actual malice standard from public officials to public
figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.7 Finally in 1974, in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.,s the Court held that a state may not permit
a plaintiff who is neither a public official nor a public figure9 to
recover in a defamation action against the press 10 absent proof that
the defendant was at fault." Although Gertz did not explicitly in-
dicate, lower courts and commentators have assumed that, at the
very least, the fault requirement pertains to the defendant's failure
to discover the falsity of the statement, 2 although it may extend
7. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The companion case of Associated Press v. Walker addressed
the same issue. Id.
8. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
9. In Gertz the Court explained that private figures are entitled to greater protection
against defamatory falsehoods than public figures because they have not voluntarily entered
the public eye and because generally they do not have as much access to the media for
purposes of responding to the charge. Id. at 342-45.
While Gertz suggested that a person may become a public figure for all purposes as a
result of power and influence or become a public figure involuntarily, the Court acknowl-
edged that typically a person would become a public figure for a limited purpose by thrust-
ing himself into the vortex of a specific public controversy to influence its resolution. Id. at
344-45; see also id. at 351-52 (Court's application of its public figure analysis to the facts).
For further elaboration on the public figure/private figure distinction, see Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 165-68 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111, 134-36 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-56 (1976). See also Waldbaum
v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980)
(thoughtful attempt to elaborate on and clarify public figure analysis).
10. By its terms the Gertz analysis was limited to the press as defendants. There has
been much debate over whether the Court's modifications of defamation law apply to
nonmedia defendants as well. The better and majority view would have courts apply the
same standard because the threat to first amendment values exists in the private context as
well. See Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976), for a useful discus-
sion of this controversy. The issue is presently under consideration by the United States
Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d
414, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 389 (1983).
11. In the interim between Butts and Gertz the plurality opinion of Justice Brennan
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), held that the first amendment re-
quired extension of the actual malice standard beyond public figures to publications con-
cerning matters of public interest. Id. at 43-44. The Gertz Court explicitly rejected this
position, but did indicate that states were free to adopt the Rosenbloom plurality approach
as a matter of state law. 418 U.S. at 346-47. A few states have adopted the Rosenbloom
approach. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
Gertz also modified the law of damages as traditionally applied in the area of defama-
tion by holding that the plaintiff could only recover for actual proven injuries and the Court
suggested that punitive damages would not be recoverable on a plaintiff's showing of mere
negligence. 418 U.S. at 349-350.
12. See Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, 642 F.2d 371, 375 (6th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 454 U.S. 962 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 580B comment c (1976).
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to the failure to appreciate the defamatory nature of the statement
as well. 13 Likewise, Gertz did not specify the degree of fault that
must be shown although most states have assumed that, at a mini-
mum, a state must require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
was negligent.14 Since Gertz proof of fault has become a significant
issue in virtually any defamation case against the press once a
prima facie case is otherwise established.
In both New York Times v. Sullivan1 5 and Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc."0 the Court injected the element of fault into defama-
tion law in order to protect first amendment values. Concluding
that a certain amount of error is inevitable in reporting and pub-
lishing, the Court determined that when the allegedly defamatory
statements concerned a public official or public figure, constitu-
tional protection was necessary to ensure the press sufficient
"breathing space" and thereby diminish the potential for self-cen-
sorship that might result from fear of liability or, arguably, from
the threat of sustained litigation. When the defamatory statements
concerned a private individual, the Court concluded in Gertz that
the state's interest in protecting reputation was entitled to greater
deference and, hence, the application of the "actual malice" stan-
13. The Gertz majority noted: "Our inquiry would involve considerations somewhat
different . . . if a State purported to condition civil liability on a factual misstatement
whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory
potential." 418 U.S. at 348.
14. See Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, - Va. -, 325 S.E.2d 713, 726 n.3 (1985) (recent
compilation of the states opting for a negligence standard). A few states have adopted the
Rosenbloom plurality approach of requiring proof of actual malice with respect to defama-
tory statements regarding matters of public interest. See, e.g., Aafco Heating & Air Condi-
tioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 679, 321 N.E.2d 580, 586
(1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976). Initially, Colorado adopted the Rosenbloom public
interest approach but held that the concept of "reckless disregard for the truth" would be
measured by an objective common-law standard instead of the subjective focus of St.
Amant. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 97-99, 538 P.2d 450, 456-57,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975). Recently, however, Colorado replaced the objective stan-
dard with the subjective St. Amant approach, thereby returning to the Rosenbloom plural-
ity approach. Diversified Management v. Denver Post, 653 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Colo. 1982).
New York applies its own unique standard of fault in cases concerning private individu-
als when the content of the published matter is "arguably within the sphere of legitimate
public concern." Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341
N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975). The New York courts require plaintiffs to
prove that the "publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration
for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by respon-
sible parties." Id. Basically, this is a gross negligence test, somewhat similar to that pro-
pounded by Justice Harlan as the proper standard for public figure cases in Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). See infra notes 348-55 and accompanying text.
15. 376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964).
16. 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974).
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dard was not warranted. The media's need for "strategic" protec-
tion, however, required the elimination of strict liability even in an
action by a private plaintiff.17
From the outset the reaction to the requirement of an element
of fault in the law of defamation has been mixed. On the one hand,
some judges and commentators have argued that anything short of
an absolute privilege is insufficiently protective of the press", while
others have maintained that the subjective actual malice test
places an all but insurmountable barrier in the path of the defama-
tion plaintiff.19 Few critics have questioned the wisdom of applying
the actual malice standard to public officials although some have
argued that the standard is too stringent when applied to public
figures.20 Likewise, one Supreme Court Justice contended that the
introduction of the negligence concept into defamation law should
be considered a major setback for plaintiffs2' while other justices
and some critics have maintained that the negligence standard is
actually a blow to the press and first amendment values.22 This
latter thesis is based on the proposition that a negligence standard
will provide insufficient clarity and certainty to avoid self-censor-
ship by the press because there are no developed legal standards of
due care in journalism, and negligence analysis, by its very nature,
is ad hoc and factually oriented, thereby maximizing the unreview-
able discretion of the jury.23 If the press must fear ad hoc, arbi-
17. Id. at 348-55.
18. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring);
id. at 299 (Goldberg, J., concurring); T. EMERSON, THE SYsTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
537 (1970); see also Policy Statement of the American Civil Liberties Union on Defamation
Liability (1982), discussed in Cranberg, ACLU: Second Thoughts on Libel, COLUM. J. REv.,
Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 42.
19. See, e.g., L. ELDREDGE, supra note 1, § 51, at 270-71.
20. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (Harlan, J.);
Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 905 (1984); cf. Blasi, The Checking Value
in First Amendment Theory, 1977 A. BAR FoUND. RESEARCH J. 521, 581-82 (affording
greater protection for reputation of public figures than for that of public officials is not
inconsistent with the checking value theory of the first amendment).
21. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 375-76 (1974) (White, J.,
dissenting).
22. See id. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 366-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting); An-
derson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TeX. L. Rav. 422, 425, 460, 464 (1975); Frakt,
Defamation Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.; The Emerging Common Law, 10 RuT. CAM.
L.J. 519, 549 (1979); Franklin, What Does Negligence Mean in Defamation Cases?, 6 CoM./
ENT. L.J. 259, 276-81 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Franklin, Negligence]; Kalven, The Rea-
sonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267,
301-02.
23. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also L. TRNE, AMERICAN
CONsTrrUTIoNAL LAW §§ 12-13, at 642-46 (1977); Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in
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trary, irrational, and quite possibly punitive jury verdicts, the very
threat of protracted litigation along with frequent substantial dam-
age awards will be sufficient to chill aggressive reporting and
thereby impede the flow of information to the public."'
Others have disagreed with the above analysis, however, and
have contended that injection of the negligence standard into defa-
mation litigation, along with the Gertz Court's adjustments to re-
coverable damages,25 constitutes a reasonably good accommodation
of the first amendment free press values with the state interest in
protecting reputation.2 6 Thus, in the immediate wake of Gertz, one
commentator argued that the negligence standard would function
effectively in the journalism context, that some guidance already
existed based on professional standards, and that further guide-
lines could be developed on a case by case basis so long as the
courts made an effort to articulate their reasoning clearly when
ruling on summary judgment or reviewing the sufficiency of the ev-
idence on the negligence issue.2 7
Twenty years have passed since Sullivan and ten since Gertz.
There has been a great deal of defamation litigation during this
period with no sign of abatement.28 Several recent cases concerning
the proof of fault issue, including litigation brought by William
Tavoulareas,2 ' General Westmoreland, 0  and General Sharon31
Constitutional Policymaking, 61 MiNN. L. REV. 645, 673 (1977).
24. Anderson, supra note 22, at 430-41; Ashdown, supra note 23, at 673.
25. See supra note 11.
26. Several state court decisions have applauded the Gertz reasoning on the proof of
fault issue. See, e.g., Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, - Va. _, 325 S.E.2d 713, 724-26 (1985);
Miami Herald v. Ane, 458 So. 2d 239, 242 (Fla. 1984); Troman v. Wood, 62 IMI. 2d 184, 192-
99, 340 N.E.2d 292, 296-99 (1976); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 448-
49, 546 P.2d 81, 86-87 (1976); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wisc. 2d 636, 651-54, 318 N.W.2d 141,
148-50, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982). See generally Robertson, Defamation and the
First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 Tex L. REv. 199, 250-68
(1976) (arguing that a simple negligence standard is both appropriate and practical).
27. Robertson, supra note 26, at 250-68.
28. See, e.g., Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 Ai. BAR
FOUND. REsEARcH J. 795 [hereinafter cited as Franklin, Litigation]; Franklin, Winners and
Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 A. BAR FouND. RESEARCH J. 455
[hereinafter cited as Franklin, Winners]; Henry, Journalism Under Fire, Tun, Dec. 12,
1983, at 76; Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of
Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 1-4 (1983); Kaiser, When Reporters Go Too Far, NEwSWEEK, Oct.
25, 1982, at 94; Lauter, Libel Suits: New Wave is Predicted, NAT'L LJ., June 21, 1982, at 1;
Tybor, The Libel War Escalates, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 21, 1980, at 1; Carley, As TV News Gets
More Aggressive, It Draws More Suits, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
29. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985). For a discussion
of Tavoulareas, see Hanson, What Went Wrong at the Washington Post, COLUM. J. REv.,
Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 31; Pack, Inside the Washington Post, WASmNTONLAN, Dec. 1982, at 144;
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have received widespread publicity. The time is ripe to examine
this growing body of case law to determine how the courts are han-
dling the issue of proof of media defendants' fault.32
Part II of this Article analyzes the relatively large body of pre-
cedent addressing the issue of proof of actual malice. For ease of
analysis, the various factors that courts have relied on in finding or
rejecting an inference of actual malice will be considered and eval-
uated individually. Part II concludes with an attempt to discern
some common factual patterns emerging from the case law and an
evaluation of the development of the precedent to date. Part III of
this Article employs factor by factor analysis to the case law ad-
dressing proof of negligence as well as those cases addressing proof
of gross irresponsibility under the New York standard.33 In addi-
tion, because negligence analysis presupposes that the factfinder
will take into account the defendant's efforts to conform to a rea-
sonable care standard, reference is made to the journalism profes-
sion's practices and customs pertaining to discovery and publica-
tion of accurate information as these practices relate to developing
case law issues. Part III also concludes with an attempt to discern
common factual patterns in the case law and an evaluation of the
present state of the law.
Brill, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington Post Libel Trial, Am. LAW., Sept. 1981, at
1,32.
30. See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); see also Press, Westmoreland Takes on CBS, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 1984, at 60; Bruck,
The Soldier Takes the Stand, AM. LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 13; Bruck, The Mea Culpa De-
fense, Am. LAw., Sept. 23, 1983, at 82. General Westmoreland decided to drop his suit prior
to submission to the jury. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1985, at 1, col 6.
31. See Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Kaplan, The
Judge's Postmortem of the Sharon Libel Case, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 18, 1985, at 1; Brill, Say It
Ain't So Henry, Ax LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 1. The jury found that the statement in issue
was false and defamatory but that it was not published with actual malice. N.Y. Times, Jan.
25, 1985, at 1, col.2.
32. This Article makes no attempt to analyze the distinct problem of proving fault of a
nonmedia defendant in defamation litigation. For preliminary surveys of the treatment of
proof of media fault following New York Times v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
see R. SACK, Lmax., SLANDER AND RELATED PROnLEMs 210-26, 252-60 (1980); Frakt, supra
note 22, at 537-49, 554-60; Spencer, Establishment of Fault in Post-Gertz Libel Cases, 21
ST. Louis U.L.J. 374 (1977); see also Franklin, Negligence, supra note 22, (recent discussion
of proof of negligence).




A. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Proof of actual malice may be distinguished from proof of neg-
ligence in that actual malice must be established by "clear and
convincing evidence" while negligence need not be. Arguably, when
the Supreme Court spoke of "convincing clarity" in New York
Times v. Sullivan,3 4 it was merely emphasizing that the appellate
courts must review the records carefully in public official defama-
tion cases, given the threat to first amendment values. Most courts
now, however, also require the plaintiff to prove, to the initial
factfinder, the existence of actual malice by "clear and convincing
evidence" to justify a verdict." In other words, "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" is an increased burden of proof that the plaintiff
must satisfy. Presumably, this burden falls somewhere between
proof by a preponderance of the evidence and proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.3 6 An instruction on clear and convincing evidence
may mean very little to a jury.3 7 The difference the heightened
burden of proof makes to a judge sitting as factfinder or to an ap-
pellate court is difficult to determine. There are many cases in
which a decision against the plaintiff seems to have been influ-
enced by this standard, in that the court indicated that the plain-
tiff perhaps came close to establishing a jury issue on actual malice
but certainly not to a clear and convincing degree,38 or at least that
the convincing clarity standard significantly increases the plain-
34. 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
35. See R SACK, supra note 32, at 225.
36. Id. at 225-26.
37. Id. at 225.
38. See, e.g., Long v. Arcell, 618 F.2d 1145, 1148 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirming j.n.o.v. for
defendant because credibility conflict could support verdict for plaintiff by preponderance
but not by clear and convincing evidence), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981); Buckley v.
Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 895 (2d Cir. 1976) (district court's interpretation of allegedly libelous
document was permissible but not by "clear and convincing evidence"), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977); Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712, 721 (5th Cir.) (reversing verdict for
defendant when record failed to show proof of reckless disregard by "clear and convincing
proof greater than a preponderance"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972); Miss America Pag-
eant, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280, 1287 (D.N.J. 1981) (editor's question-
ing may suggest an awareness that story contained false statements about plaintiff but not
clear and convincing proof); Lexington Herald Leader v. Grave, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1065, 1071 (Ky. 1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when plaintiff's "evidence lacks the




tiff's burden.3 9 The Supreme Court recently reendorsed "clear and
convincing" evidence as the constitutionally mandated standard of
appellate review of the record in public figure defamation cases in
Bose v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.4 However
uncertain its operation, the clear and convincing standard does ap-
pear to provide the defendant with a significant advantage in a fair
number of cases.
B. Knowledge of Falsity
New York Times v. Sullivan defined actual malice as "knowl-
edge that [a statement] was false or reckless disregard for whether
it was false or not. ' 41 The clearest showing of fault under the New
York Times standard would be proof that the publisher knew that
a defamatory statement was false but published it despite such
knowledge and without qualification. A court, however, seldom is
able or willing to find knowledge of falsity to a clear and convinc-
ing degree. Doubtlessly, this failure reflects the fact that it is quite
unusual for the press to publish a statement with knowledge of its
falsity.42 Moreover, it is difficult for a plaintiff to establish clearly
the state of the defendant's knowledge with respect to the truth of
the statement except in those rare instances in which there has
been some objective contemporaneous indication. Finally, in even
the most egregious cases, it is simply easier for the court to con-
clude that the evidence clearly supports a finding of reckless disre-
gard for the truth than to label the defendant an outright liar.
If any record is capable of supporting an inference that the
39. See Tucci v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co., 464 A.2d 161, 166 (Me. 1983) ("Plain-
tiff's burden is a heavy one; actual malice must be proved with 'convincing clarity.' "); Whit-
more v. Kansas City Star Co., 499 S.W.2d 45, 51 (Mo. App. 1973) (plaintiff did not come
close to meeting "weighty burden of 'clear and convincing' proof"); Fremont Energy v. Seat-
tle Post-Intelligence, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1569, 1574 (W.D. Wash. 1982) ("no evidence
that comes even near to showing with convincing clarity" that article was published with
serious doubts as to the truth); McMurray v. Howard Publications, Inc., 612 P.2d 14, 18
(Wyo. 1980) ("A subjective awareness of probable falsity cannot be demonstrated under the
standard of 'clear and convincing' evidence by showing that the publisher and the plaintiff
disagreed with respect to their perceptions of events which they both observed.").
40. 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (1984). In Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., the majority
argued that Bose requires an appellate court to apply the clear and convincing evidence
standard only to the ultimate conclusion of "actual malice" rather than to each preliminary
finding of fact. 759 F.2d 90, 107-09 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Judge Wright disagreed in dissent. Id.
at 146-50.
41. 376 U.S. 254, 280-81 (1964).
42. See F. BASKWMr, J. SISSORS & B. BROOKS, THE ART oF EDITING 134 (3d ed. 1977)
("Few libels are deliberate. Nearly all result from erroneous reporting, misunderstanding of
the law or careless editing.").
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defendant published the defamatory statements with knowledge of
their falsity, it is the record established in Carson v. Allied News
Co.43 In Carson the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that there was sufficient evidence of actual malice to with-
stand summary judgment for the defendant when the plaintiff
showed that the defendant tabloid had completely fabricated de-
famatory quotations and had printed defamatory allegations that
were flatly contradicted by a prior publication which had served as
the sole source for defendant's article.4 Even on this record, how-
ever, the Carson court seemed hesitant to conclude that the evi-
dence established knowledge of falsity as opposed to reckless disre-
gard for the truth." On remand the district court granted
summary judgment for the plaintiff in heavy reliance on the Sev-
enth Circuit's conclusions. ' Cases of this nature47 are among the
43. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
44. Id. at 212-13.
45. Id. at 213.
46. 482 F. Supp. 406, 408 (N.D. Il1. 1979). Although the district court concluded that
"[the pretrial affidavits, depositions and other documentary evidence clearly show that de-
fendants maliciously fabricated the libelous matter stated in the National Insider article,"
the court characterized the defendants' conduct as "reckless disregard of whether the inac-
curate matters published were false or not." Id.
47. See Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 896 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirming verdict for plain-
tiff when defendant admitted that he did not believe that plaintiff had engaged in the type
of conduct that he had alleged in his book), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Goldwater v.
Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 339 (2d Cir. 1969) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when among other
things, defendant wrote that plaintiff, presidential candidate, was mentally ill, with knowl-
edge that statement was false), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
v. Church, 24 Ariz. App. 287, 300, 537 P.2d 1345, 1358 (1975) (affirming verdict for plaintiff
when defendant knowingly misrepresented attorney general's proposal for "people's coun-
cils" as a communist technique), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 908 (1976); Burnett v. National En-
quirer, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 999, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209-210 (1983) (affirming verdict for
plaintiff when defendant published highly defamatory statements despite complete inability
to verify), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984); Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 52
N.Y.2d 422, 437-38, 420 N.E.2d 377, 383, 438 N.Y.S.2d 496, 502 (1981) (affirming denial of
summary judgment for defendant when defendant editor discovered that serious allegations
in hardback book were false but failed to correct prior to publication of paperback edition);
Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 73 A.D.2d 276, 285, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 282 (1980) (jury could
find that reporter wrote false and defamatory headline stating that plaintiff legislator said
development corporation could do without support of blacks despite knowledge that plain-
tiff made no such statement); Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 690
(W. Va.) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when defendant wrote headlines implying that the
plaintiff candidate had engaged in unethical real estate transactions with knowledge that
implication was false), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975).
The unusual case of Davis v. Shucat, 510 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975), should also be
noted. In a slander action, the Davis court found that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to conclude that defendant, a self-proclaimed "investigative reporter," stated that the
plaintiff had been convicted of a felony, with knowledge that the statement was false, during
the course of a telephone conversation with a potential source in an effort to "get a re-
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least controversial defamation decisions because publishing defam-
atory statements with knowledge of their falsity is inconsistent
with the primary values that the first amendment implements 4 as
well as with the recognized standards of the journalism
profession.49
sponse." The court was unwilling to find that this practice was an essential element of the
investigative reporter's craft. Id. at 733-34.
Finally, unique problems are posed when the actual malice standard is applied to defa-
mation claims arising from fictional works. In the controversial case of Bindrum v. Mitchell,
a California court of appeals concluded that the knowledge of falsity aspect of the New York
Times standard was easily met when a purportedly fictional character was allegedly
modeled after the plaintiff. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 72-73, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 35, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 984 (1979). The court reasoned that, almost as a matter of definition, the author must
have realized that his work of fiction did not accurately reflect reality and thus, to the ex-
tent that a character was partially patterned after the plaintiff, the author deliberately pub-
lished false statements about the plaintiff because the character was also given features that
the plaintiff did not share. Id. As the dissent and many of the commentators have pointed
out, this analysis can place authors in a precarious position because almost as a matter of
necessity, fictional characters are partially based on actual individuals encountered by the
author. See id. at 84-87, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44 (Files, J., dissenting). Arguably, the issue
should be that of identifiability, not a strict application of the actual malice standard. If the
actual malice standard is to be used, perhaps the relevant question should be whether the
author created the fictional character with knowledge or reckless disregard: (1) that the in-
formed reader would perceive the character to be a representation of the plaintiff and (2)
that the character possesses attributes of a disreputable nature that the plaintiff does not
share. See generally Franklin & Trager, Literature & Libel, 4 CoMM./ENr. L.J. 205 (1982);
Silver, Libel, the "Higher Truths" of Art, and the First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REv.
1065 (1978); Smolla, supra note 28, at 86-89; Note, "Clear & Convincing" Libel: Fiction and
the Law of Defamation, 92 YALE L.J. 520 (1983).
Defamatory jokes raise similar problems. See, e.g., Embrey v. Holly, 48 Md. App. 571,
592-93, 429 A.2d 251, 265 (1981), aff'd, 293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966 (1982) (affirming verdict
for plaintiff when radio announcer knew that defamatory statement made in jest was false
and realized that many listeners would assume that it was true).
48. The Gertz Court noted that there is no first amendment value in either the inten-
tional lie or the careless error resulting in a false statement of fact. The careless error, how-
ever, may be entitled to some protection to avoid an undue chilling effect. 418 U.S. 323, 340
(1974). In certain contexts, however, scholars have defended protection for deliberately false
speech on the ground that it will aid in illuminating the truth. J.S. MILL, ON LmERTY 21
(London 1859); see T. EMMnSON, supra note 18, at 530. To a certain extent, this "illumina-
tion" view assumes that the truth will catch up with and vanquish the lie in the information
market place, at least in the long run. See Wellington, On Freedom of Speech, 88 YALE L.J.
1105, 1130 (1978). Given the influence of the printed word, defamation litigation may be a
useful means for helping to ensure that the lie is effectively challenged in the short run as
well. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (1984) ("False statements of
fact harm both the subject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement. New Hamp-
shire may rightly employ its libel laws to discourage the deception of its citizens." (emphasis
in original)).
49. See infra note 365.
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C. Reckless Disregard for the Truth
Because the plaintiff rarely will be able to prove that the de-
fendant published the defamatory statement with knowledge of its
falsity, most actual malice cases will turn on proof of "reckless dis-
regard for the truth." In New York Times v. Sullivan the Court
did not define reckless disregard but did seem to indicate that the
inquiry was subjective in nature when it observed that there was
no showing that the defendants whose names appeared on the al-
legedly defamatory advertisement were aware that any statements
in the ad were false.50 A year after Sullivan in Garrison v. Louisi-
ana,51 the Court confirmed the subjective nature of the mens rea
inquiry when it concluded that "only those false statements made
with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity ...
may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions." 52 The
Court addressed the nature of the reckless disregard standard
again in St. Amant v. Thompson.5 3 The St. Amant Court, in the
course of reversing a jury verdict against a defendant who had read
an allegedly defamatory statement on a television program, ob-
served that "'[r]eckless disregard' . . . cannot be fully encom-
passed in one infallible definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be
marked out through case-by-case adjudication."5'4 The Court then
discussed Sullivan and Garrison and concluded that these cases
stood for the proposition that in order to support a finding of reck-
less disregard, "[t]here must be sufficient evidence ... that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication. '55 The Court recognized that such an approach might
place a "premium on ignorance, ' 56 but pointed out that a defen-
dant could not escape liability simply by testifying that he believed
the statement to be true, at least when there was sufficient circum-
50. 376 U.S. 254, 286-87 (1964). Regarding the New York Times itself, the Court noted
that, at most, the newspaper was negligent in failing to verify the advertisement. Id.
51. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
52. Id. at 74.
53. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
54. Id. at 730.
55. Id. at 731. See Kalur, Exploration of the "Outer Limits". The Misdirected Evolu-
tion of Reckless Disregard, 61 DEN. L.J. 43 (1983) for the argument that the Court erred in
adopting a subjective standard and that the Court should replace the St. Amant standard
with an objective "reckless disregard" standard. Arguably, an objective standard would
strike a fairer balance between the plaintiff's right to reputation and freedom of the press. It
might also simplify problems of proof. Because there is no reason to believe that the Su-
preme Court would consider such a policy change favorably, this Article addresses the issue
of proof of fault under the law as it stands.
56. 390 U.S. at 731.
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stantial evidence to contradict such self-serving testimony.57 For
instance, the Court noted that "[p]rofessions of good faith will be
unlikely to prove persuasive. . . where a story is fabricated by the
defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on
an unverified anonymous telephone call."'58
St. Amant made at least three important points for proof of
reckless disregard of the truth. First, the primary focus of the stan-
dard is subjective. Second, there is no litmus test to determine
whether the defendant published with the requisite state of mind.
Last, courts frequently will be required to consider objective cir-
cumstantial evidence to determine whether subjective doubt as to
the truth of the statement may be inferred.59
The Supreme Court reemphasized the case by case nature of
this inquiry recently in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc., when it pointed out:
The common law heritage of the [actual malice] rule itself assigns an espe-
cially broad role to the judge in applying it to specific factual situations ....
[T]he content of the rule is not revealed simply by its literal text, but rather
is given meaning through the evolutionary process of common law adjudica-
tion .... 10
For the most part, lower courts have analyzed the reckless disre-
gard issue with these principles in mind. In determining whether
an allegedly libelous statement was published with reckless disre-
gard for the truth, courts have considered a variety of factors.
1. u Will
Following Sullivan the Court clearly established that actual
malice was quite different from common-law malice and, hence,
57. Id. at 732.
58. Id.
59. As the Michigan Supreme Court recently noted, "given the very subjective nature
of the test for actual malice, circumstantial evidence may be the only kind available on the
issue." Steadman v. Lapensohn, 408 Mich. 50, 55, 288 N.W.2d 580, 583 (1980); see also
Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See Kalur, supra note 55, at
60-64 for the argument that objective evidence of recklessness logically does not prove any-
thing about the defendant's state of mind. Even so, courts have been unwilling to permit the
defendant to erect a shield of immunity when scienter is at issue merely by swearing that he
proceeded in good faith. Moreover, in the extreme case, proof that the defendant published
an article despite a bevy of objective indications of falsity may tend to show that he must
have doubted the article's truth. Circumstantial evidence cannot prove to a certainty that
the defendant must have doubted the truth-presumably, nothing short of truth serum
could. Yet even in an actual-malice case, the plaintiff's burden is not unduly heavy. "Clear
and convincing" evidence is not an easy standard to satisfy but it does not require the
plaintiff to reveal the defendant's actual state of mind to a certainty.
60. 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1960 (1984).
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the New York Times standard could not be satisfied merely by
proving that the defendant published the defamatory statements
with spite, hostility, ill will, or the intention to harm the plaintiff.6
Because the fact that the defendant may have disliked the plaintiff
does not show that he was aware that the defamatory statement
was probably false, a few courts have posited that the defendant's
ill will is completely irrelevant to the issue of reckless disregard.2
Most courts that have considered the question, however, have con-
cluded that proof of the defendant's hostility to plaintiff in a given
case may be one of several factors supporting an inference of reck-
less disregard." The relevance of ill will evidence perhaps was ex-
plained best in Indiana Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields,e an opinion
affirming a jury verdict for plaintiff by an equally divided court in
which Justice DeBruler noted:
Appellant's estimate of the probability of falsity of its publications was not
derived with mathematical exactness from purely objective factors. It was
certainly influenced by various considerations one of which might very well
have been appellant's hatred for appellee. Ill will evidence might also tend to
61. Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
62. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Daily Banner-News Publishing Co., 274 Ark. 145, 153-54,
622 S.W.2d 671, 675-76 (1981) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when plaintiff
testified that defendant editor held a grudge against him); McHale v. Lake Charles Am.
Press, 390 So. 2d 556, 566 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (declining to consider evidence of ill will when
there was other evidence of reckless disregard), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Shutt v.
Harte-Hanks, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2559, 2562 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (granting summary
judgment for defendant despite evidence that defendant disliked plaintiff because ill will is
irrelevant to actual malice); Ferguson v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2502, 2505-06 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (affirming summary judgment for defendant despite evi-
dence of ill will toward plaintiff); cf. McQuoid v. Springfield Newspapers, Inc., 502 F. Supp.
1050, 1057 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (rejecting claim for punitive damages when reporter admitted
he did not like plaintiff but put personal feelings aside in writing story).
63. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 329, 340 (2d Cir. 1969) (affirming
verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, author wrote letter to potential source re-
questing information for article about "your old enemy"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970);
Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 548, 561-63, 372 N.E.2d 1211, 1220-
22 (1978) (reversing summary judgment for defendant when there was evidence that re-
porter deliberately attempted to elicit false and defamatory information regarding plaintiff);
Hellman v. McCarthy, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1789, 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (denying
summary judgment for defendant when evidence showed author had made defamatory
charges on prior occasion); Weaver v. Pryor Jeffersonian, 569 P.2d 967, 970, 974 (Okla. 1977)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, there was evidence
of hostility between defendant publisher and plaintiff's attorney, a rival publisher); Stevens
v. Sun Publishing Co., 270 S.C. 65, 71, 240 S.E.2d 812, 815 (affirming verdict for plaintiff
when, among other things, reporter admitted to a witness that the newspaper did not like
plaintiff and was going to print something "juicy" about him), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945
(1978).
64. 254 Ind. 219, 259 N.E.2d 651, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970).
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prove that appellant published in spite of its estimate of a probability of
falsity6
For the most part, evidence of ill will is a minor factor that
may provide some illumination on the defendant's state of mind or
perhaps tip the balance in a close case. A finding of reckless disre-
gard should not be based solely or even substantially upon proof of
defendant's ill will toward the plaintiff." While proof of ill will can
assist in establishing that defendant proceeded to publish despite
serious doubts as to the truth, this proof frequently will be of no
probative value whatsoever. Its utility will depend upon the partic-
ular facts before the court. In Goldwater v. Ginzburg, for instance,
the defendant informed a potential source that he was preparing to
write an article attacking the plaintiff and that he would appreci-
ate any negative information that the source could produce.67 In
the context of Goldwater, in which there was extensive evidence
that the defendant had published a large amount of defamatory
information about the plaintiff in a highly misleading manner, ill
will evidence tended to show that defendant's defamatory state-
ments were more probably the result of design than of careless-
ness. Likewise, in Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspaper, Inc.,"" the
fact that defendant reporters had indicated a willingness to delib-
65. Id. at 251, 259 N.E.2d at 664. Justice DeBruler concluded that there was sufficient
proof of reckless disregard even absent the ill will evidence. Id.; see also Tavoulareas v.
Washington Post Co., 759 F.2d 90, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("it is beyond question that one who
is seeking to harm the subject of a story-whether motivated by simple ill will... or parti-
san political considerations ... or otherwise laudable concern for the safety of the nation
... or a mere desire to attract attention and boost circulation-is more likely to publish
recklessly than one without such motive."); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 584
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying summary judgment for defendant with the observation that
"[e]vidence of bias cannot establish actual malice. . .. [b]ut it may provide a motive for
defaming someone or explain apparently illogical leaps to unsupported conclusions.");
Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 79 Wash. 2d 816, 831, 490 P.2d 101, 111 (1971) (court noting
that evidence that the defendant newspaper had frequently supported candidates opposed
to those supported by plaintiff tended to indicate "an atmosphere infected with a disposi-
tion to ignore known falsehoods or serious doubts as to the truth of that which is pub-
lished"); Smolla, supra note 28, at 80 ("evidence of ill will ... may be highly probative of
whether the speaker knew the communication was false or was so blinded by spite as to act
recklessly" (emphasis in original)).
66. Herbert v. Lando 596 F. Supp. 1178, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (granting partial sum-
mary judgment for defendant TV producer despite the fact that he came to dislike plaintiff
intensely during the course of producing documentary); Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc.,
118 Mich. App. 608, 626, 325 N.W.2d 511, 519 (1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff despite
evidence of reporter's political animosity toward plaintiff); Sills v. New York Times, 8 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 1460, 1462 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (evidence of in will does not itself establish
reckless disregard), aff'd mem., 90 A.D.2d 1004 (1982).
67. 414 F.2d 324, 328-29, 337, 340 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
68. 175 Ind. App. 548, 562, 372 N.E.2d 1211, 1221 (1978).
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erately elicit and publish false and defamatory information about
plaintiff suggested that the defendants may well have had reason
to doubt another false and defamatory charge that they did pub-
lish, given that they were unable to cite any source of factual sup-
port. These are extreme cases, however, and as is to be expected,
they are rare.
Cases in which there is evidence that a reporter or an editor
was allegedly "out to get" the plaintiff can be more troublesome. 9
Typically, the plaintiff will be a public official or candidate who
alleges that the newspaper used its power and influence to have
him removed from office or defeated at the polls. It is scarcely irre-
sponsible journalism for a newspaper to maintain an editorial opin-
ion on a public issue. If, after investigation of the facts, a member
of the press concludes that a public official is unworthy of office or
that one candidate is not as qualified as another, the newspaper
arguably is under a professional obligation to convey that opinion
to its readers.70 It is a different matter entirely, however, if a news-
paper or broadcaster engages in a vendetta against an individual in
utter disregard of the facts.7 1 Consequently, evidence of a press de-
69. See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 759 F.2d 90, 118-120 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (reversing judgment n.o.v. for defendant when, among other things, there was evi-
dence of a plan by reporters "to get" plaintiff); Cape Publications, Inc. v. Adams, 336 So. 2d
1197, 1199-1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when among other
things, there was testimony that reporter was "going to get" plaintiff and "put him in jail"),
cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 945 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977); Tagawa v. Maui Pub-
lishing Co., 50 Hawaii 648, 651-56, 448 P.2d 337, 340-42 (1968) (affirming summary judg-
ment for defendant when plaintiff testified that a reporter had told him "you know I can
blast you"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 822 (1969); Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, 254
Ind. 219, 249, 259 N.E.2d 651, 663-64 (affirming by an equally divided court a verdict for
plaintiff when defendant reporter threatened "to get" plaintiff and to keep him on the front
page if he remained uncooperative), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970); Sills v. New York
Times, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1460, 1461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (denying summary judgment for
defendant when reporter allegedly told plaintiff public official "I will get you"), aff'd mem.,
90 A.D.2d 1004 (1982).
70. See, e.g., AMRucAN SocIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES art.
v (1975) ("To be impartial does not require the press to be unquestioning or to refrain from
editorial expression. Sound practice however, demands, a clear distinction for the reader
between news reports and opinion."); SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETH-
Ics, ACCURACY & OBjc'rIY No. 7 (1973) ("Journalists recognize their responsibility for
offering informed analysis, comment, and editorial opinion on public events and issues.");
ASSOCIATED PRESS MANAGING EDITORS, CODE OF ETHICS, RESPONSIBILITY (1975) ("The news-
paper should be a constructive critic of all segments of society. It should vigorously expose
wrongdoing or misuse of power, public or private. Editorially it should advocate needed
reform or innovations in the public interest.").
71. See SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETHICS, ACCURACY & OBJECTIV-
ry No. 6 (1973) ("Partisanship in editorial comment which knowingly departs from the
truth violates the spirit of American journalism.").
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fendant's intent to harm the plaintiff should be considered, if at
all, with caution. A plaintiff's mere perception that the press was
out to get him should be of no evidentiary significance. A person
who has been criticized in the press quite commonly perceives that
the editor or reporter must have acted out of spite or an intention
to harm. Ordinarily, this perception will be erroneous. Moreover,
the plaintiff's perception says nothing probative of the defendant's
state of mind. Objective proof that the defendant bore a grudge
against the plaintiff can be considered by the factfinder, but only
after the judge has clearly explained that ill will is relevant only to
the extent that it tends to show that the defendant published the
false and defamatory statement despite serious doubts as to truth.
The factfinder must be informed that the mere fact that a newspa-
per did not like plaintiff or affirmatively desired to harm him is
irrelevant to its legal culpability. Given the potential for undue
prejudice and confusion when ill will evidence is presented to the
jury, a case can be made for exclusion. Total exclusion, however,
might prove unfair to plaintiffs. Given the heavy burden of the
clear and convincing evidence standard, plaintiffs should be per-
mitted to "pile on" proof even if portions of it are marginally
probative.
2. Failure to Investigate or Verify
In St. Amant v. Thompson the Court stated that "failure to
investigate does not in itself establish bad faith," s or, more pre-
cisely, serious doubt as to the truth. Sullivan also is authority for
this proposition in that the newspaper's editors could have discov-
ered the falsity of some of the allegations in the advertisement by
checking newspaper files-yet the Court noted that this failure was
insufficient proof of reckless disregard. 4 Consequently, the defen-
dant will prevail if the plaintiff attempts to predicate a finding of
reckless disregard on little more than an investigative failure,7 5
72. See Casper v. Washington Post Co., 549 F. Supp. 376, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("A
newspaper and its reporters do not lose their First Amendment protections merely because
plaintiffs sincerely believe that they are biased.").
73. 390 U.S. 727, 733 (1968).
74. 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964); see also Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S.
81, 84-85 (1967) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when defendant arguably failed to investigate
charges).
75. See, e.g., Hardin v. Santa Fe Reporter, 745 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1984) (af-
firming dismissal of complaint when reporter failed to discover unreliability of source);
Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when
publisher did not independently investigate incidents described by author), cert. denied,
[Vol. 38:247
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such as when an editor fails to verify a letter from a reader prior to
publication .7  The investigative-failure principle extends even to
the case in which a headline writer fails to read the underlying
article. 7
The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that failure to in-
vestigate can be probative of reckless disregard of the truth in cer-
tain circumstances. In St. Amant the Court explained that the de-
434 U.S. 834 (1977); Casano v. WDSU-TV, Inc., 464 F.2d 3, 4-5 (5th Cir. 1972) (affirming
directed verdict for defendant when reporter may have failed to use due care in investigat-
ing relationship between plaintiff and organized crime); Baldine v. Sharon Herald Co., 391
F.2d 703, 707 (3d Cir. 1968) (affirming judgment n.o.v. for defendant when publisher failed
to verify accuracy of political advertisement); Reveley v. Berg Publications, 601 F. Supp. 44,
46 (W.D. Tex. 1984) (granting summary judgment for defendant when writer relied on recol-
lection of unverified statements in earlier article); Robertson-Taylor Co. v. Sansing, 10 ME-
DIA L. REP. (BNA) 2495, 2496 (D.D.C. 1984) (granting motion to dismiss when plaintiff al-
leged mere failure to investigate); National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F.
Supp. 1299, 1317-19 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (granting summary judgment for defendant when
newspaper failed to verify charges set forth in editorial that it relied on); Fremont Energy
Corp. v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1569, 1574 (W.D. Wash. 1982)
(granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter failed to corroborate whether
convicted individuals were officers of plaintiff); Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F.
Supp. 600, 605 (D.D.C. 1977) (granting summary judgment for defendant when writer relied
on "vague recollections" and "overly broad generalizations"), afl'd mem., 578 F.2d 442 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Woods v. Hearst Corp., 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1548, 1550 (D. Md. 1977) (grant-
ing summary judgment for defendant when reporter failed to verify allegations); Alpine
Constr. Co. v. Demaris, 358 F. Supp. 422, 424 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (granting summary judgment
for defendant when author failed to discover that article he relied on had been retracted);
Tagawa v. Maui Publishing Co., 50 Hawaii 648, 654, 448 P.2d 337, 341 (1968) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant when reporter could have learned story was false by mak-
ing a simple phone call to an obvious source), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 822 (1969); Capital-
Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 445 A.2d 1038 (affirming directed verdict
for defendant when editor failed to contact all principals in event, despite apparent discrep-
ancies), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982); Hackworth v. Larson, 83 S.D. 674, 684-87, 165
N.W.2d 705, 710-11 (1969) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when reporter failed
to verify information regarding plaintiff's resignation); Mellor v. Scott Publishing Co., 10
Wash. App. 645, 659-60, 519 P.2d 1010, 1019 (1974) (affirming summary judgment for defen-
dant when defendant failed to investigate truth of statements made at public meeting);
O'Brien v. Tribune Publishing Co., 7 Wash. App. 107, 124, 499 P.2d 24, 34 (1972) (granting
partial summary judgment for defendant when editor conducted careless investigation and
relied heavily on memory and clippings furnished by candidate).
76. See Moriarty v. Lippe, 162 Conn. 371, 380-81, 294 A.2d 326, 331-32 (1972) (revers-
ing verdict for plaintiff); Retty v. Sattin, 11 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1097, 1098 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1984) (granting summary judgment for defendant); Nash v. Keene Publishing, 10 MEDIA L.
REP. (BNA) 2281, 2285 (N.H. Super. Ct. 1984) (granting summary judgment for defendant
when editor only made slight effort to verify letter); Pasculli v. Jersey Journal, 7 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2574 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (granting summary judgment for defen-
dant), cert. denied, 89 N.J. 424, 446 A.2d 152 (1982); Safarets, Inc. v. Gannett Co., 80 Misc.
2d 109, 361 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct.) (granting summary judgment for defendant), afl'd, 49
A.D.2d 666, 373 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1975); El Paso Times, Inc. v. Trexler, 447 S.W.2d 403, 406
(Tex. 1969) (affirming summary judgment for defendant).
.77. Shutt v. Harte-Hanks, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2559, 2562 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
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fendant could not necessarily defeat the plaintiff's attempt to
prove actual malice simply by testifying that he published the arti-
cle in good faith, because there could be situations in which the
circumstances would tend to contradict this assertion.78 The Court
gave as examples a story based on an anonymous telephone call or
other situations in which "there are obvious reasons to doubt the
veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports. '79 In other
words, the publication of defamatory matter under circumstances
which would strongly indicate that such information might be un-
true, without further verification, can support a conclusion, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant must have rec-
ognized its potential inaccuracy. For this proposition, the St.
Amant Court" cited Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, in which the Chief Justice explic-
itly based a finding of reckless disregard on the defendant's failure
to investigate the charges despite a denial by the plaintiff. In line
with St. Amant, lower courts frequently have recognized that, in a
particular factual context, a failure to investigate may indeed pro-
vide some evidence of a defendant's predisposition to publish de-
famatory matter despite serious doubts as to the truth. 1 Under
78. 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968).
79. Id. at 732.
80. Id. at 732 n.3 (citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162, 169-70
(1967) (Warren, J., concurring)).
Writing for the Court in Butts, Justice Harlan also would have affirmed the judgment
for the plaintiff relying in part on the defendants' investigative failures. Harlan affirmed the
judgment, however, applying an objective and purportedly less stringest "gross irresponsibil-
ity" standard. Butts, 388 U.S. at 157-58. To a certain extent, Justice Harlan's analysis re-
mains relevant to the application of the actual malice standard in that Justice Warren
seemed to incorporate by reference Justice Harlan's more extensive development of the rec-
ord into his own opinion. Id. at 169 (Warren, J., concurring).
81. See, e.g., Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363, 1370-71 (N.D.
Cal. 1977) (granting verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, reporter failed to investi-
gate), aff'd, 623 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Fulton v.
Advertiser Co., 388 So. 2d 533, 539-40 (Ala. 1980) (denying summary judgment for defen-
dant when reporter failed to investigate charges made at press conference), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1125, 1131 (1981); Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 315, 319
(Colo. 1981) (reinstating verdict for plaintiff "when, among other things, reporter failed to
investigate charges of corruption against public officials); McHale v. Lake Charles Am.
Press, 390 So. 2d 556, 565-66 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when,
among other things, publisher failed to verify questionable allegations by consulting adver-
tisements run in its own newspaper), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Ammerman v. Hub-
bard Broadcasting, Inc., 91 N.M. 250, 254, 572 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Ct. App.) (use of investiga-
tive failure to establish reckless disregard depends on state of the record), cert. denied, 91
N.M. 249,,572 P.2d 1257 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978); Stevens v. Sun Publishing
Co., 270 S.C. 65, 71, 240 S.E.2d 812, 815 (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among other
things, publisher failed to verify, despite knowledge that sources were biased against plain-
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what circumstances does the defendant's failure to investigate sug-
gest that it published defamatory material with reckless disregard
as to truth? While there can be no definitive answer, there are sev-
eral relatively obvious factors that should be considered.
(a) Lead Time
A failure to investigate may be probative of reckless disregard
only to the extent that there was time for the defendant to have
investigated. Almost by definition, news remains news for only a
short period of time. Consequently, when faced with deadline pres-
sure, a failure to investigate or to verify may say very little about
the publisher's concern for the truth of the matter.8 2 On the other
hand, it does not necessarily follow that a failure to investigate an
item that is not "hot news" sheds any light on the publisher's
doubts as to its truth.s3 The amount of lead time, therefore, may
tiff), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978); see also Sills v. New York Times, 8 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1460, 1462-64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (denying summary judgment for defendant and at-
tempting to devise guidelines for the use of investigative failure as evidence of reckless dis-
regard), aff'd mem., 90 A.D.2d 1004 (1982).
82. See Trapp v. Southeastern Newspapers Corp., 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1985, 1995-
96 (S.D. Ga. 1984) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter rushed "hot
news" story into print without adequate investigation); Bryant Associated Press, 595 F.
Supp. 814, 818 (D.V.I. 1984) (granting summary judgment for defendant when wire service
editor made a mistake working against a deadline); Bellamy v. Arno Press, 8 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1420, 1422 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (granting summary judgment for defendant when copy
editor made inadvertent error in preparing headline under deadline pressure); Martin Mari-
etta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 953-54, 960-61 (D.D.C. 1976)
(granting summary judgment for defendant when editor failed to verify details following
denial of charges hours before deadline); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196,
1204 (D.D.C. 1975) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporters failed to ver-
ify court proceedings while operating under "severe time restraints"); McFarland v. Hearst
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 746, 749 (D. Md. 1971) (granting summary judgment for defendant
when reporter failed to resort to extensive verification prior to publication of "hot news"
concerning judicial proceeding); Perkins v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 241 So. 2d 139, 143
(Miss. 1970) (affirming judgment n.o.v. for defendant when newspaper published photo-
graphs of recently arrested klan member without verification); Glover v. Herald Co., 549
S.W.2d 858, 860 (Mo.) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when rewrite man misread his notes
while "working on a deadline"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977); cf. National Ass'n of Gov't
Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 396 N.E.2d 996, 1003 (1979)
(reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant when talk show host commented on
charge by caller shortly after it was made), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980).
83. See Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726, 733 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing verdict for plain-
tiff when author failed to verify single sentence in lengthy book despite absence of deadline
pressure); Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1227, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant when reporter failed to verify, despite time and resources to do so,
in view of reliance on trustworthy source); Torres v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 7 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1182, 1186 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (granting summary judgment for defendant when editor
failed to further verify article that was not "hot" news but when "deadlines were structured
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be relevant to the question of reckless disregard in that it may re-
move one explanation for a failure to investigate in a context in
which some investigation would seem to have been in order.,
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and the companion case of
Associated Press v. Walker 5 presented the Supreme Court with
bookend examples of the significance of lead time in the reckless
disregard calculus. In Walker the reporter was attempting to re-
port a fast breaking news story under emergency circumstances;
indeed, he was attempting to cover a riot."6 In Butts, on the other
hand, the reporter was working on a feature story with no immedi-
and tight"); Belli v. Curtis Publishing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 384, 400, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122, 133
(1972) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when editor failed to verify allegations
in article despite the absence of deadline pressure); Nash v. Keene Publishing, 10 MEDA L.
REP. (BNA) 2281, 2285 (N.H. Super. Ct. 1984) (granting summary judgment for defendant
despite fact that letter to editor was not "hot news").
84. See Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 759 F.2d 90, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (revers-
ing judgment n.o.v. for defendant when, among other things, "[t]here was no significant
deadline pressure"); Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 645 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding
sufficient evidence of reckless disregard when, among other things, editor failed to investi-
gate charges by arguably biased author despite absence of deadline pressure, but reversing
on other grounds); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir. 1976) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant when publisher failed to verify defamatory allegations
despite adequate time for investigation); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 339 (2d Cir.
1969) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, editor failed to verify serious
charges despite absence of deadline pressure), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Burns v.
McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1361-62 (Colo. 1983) (affirming verdict for
plaintiff when, among other things, reporter failed to verify allegations by obviously biased
source despite lack of deadline pressure); Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing Co., 637
P.2d 315, 319 (Colo. 1981) (reinstating verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, re-
porter failed to investigate allegations despite adequate time to do so); Stone v. Essex
County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 869, 330 N.E.2d 161, 174 (1975) (denying verdict
for plaintiff when editor failed to corroborate surprising charges in article by inexperienced
reporter despite fact that publication of story was delayed for a day); Nevada Indep. Broad-
casting Corp. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 415, 664 P.2d 337, 345 (1983) (affirming verdict for
plaintiff when interviewer failed to investigate charges prior to program); Stevens v. Sun
Publishing Co., 270 S.C. 65, 72, 240 S.E.2d 812, 815, (affirming verdict for plaintiff when
article that was not "hot news" and was based on biased sources was published after denial
without further verification), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978); Miller v. Argus Publishing
Co., 79 Wash. 2d 816, 832, 490 P.2d 101, 111 (1971) (sufficient evidence of reckless disregard
when defendant failed to verify serious charges by unreliable source despite lack of deadline
pressure but reversing verdict for plaintiff on other grounds); O'Brien v. Tribune Publishing
Co., 7 Wash. App. 107, 122, 499 P.2d 24, 33 (1972) (reversing summary judgment for defen-
dant when item was not "hot news" and defendant was advised that it was false prior to
publication); cf. Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 340, 160 N.W.2d 1,
9 (1968) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when editor failed to verify serious allegations by
arguably unreliable source despite lapse of six days-arguably applying objective reckless
disregard standard).
85. The Supreme Court considered these two libel cases together on appeal.
86. 388 U.S. 130, 140-41, 158-59 (1967).
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ate deadline pressure.8 7 Applying an objective gross negligence
standard, Justice Harlan considered the difference in lead time be-
tween the two cases to be of some significance, in the course of
affirming a judgment for the plaintiff in Butts and reversing a
judgment for the plaintiff in Walker.18 Because Chief Justice War-
ren incorporated Justice Harlan's discussion of the record into his
own analysis employing an actual malice standard,89 Butts and
Walker may be read as an indication that lead time should be con-
sidered a relevant factor in present reckless disregard analysis.
The significance accorded to lead time depends largely on the
existence of other factors such as the improbability of the defama-
tory allegations or the reliability of the source. This is no more
than recognition that investigation and verification can be time
consuming and costly and that while accuracy is the paramount
goal, some accommodation must be made between deadline pres-
sure and the probabilities of error. A failure to investigate, even
when there is sufficient time, should not bolster an inference of
serious doubt as to the truth of the matter if there is little reason
to believe that the effort would increase the accuracy of the
material.
The degree of deadline pressure often will be dictated by the
nature of the subject itself. An editor should not be able to boot-
strap what would otherwise be a typical feature story into a "hot
news" item simply by deciding to publish it immediately."0 On the
87. Id. at 157-58.
88. Id. at 156-59.
89. Id. at 169.
90. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 538 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming punitive
damage award when, among other things, editor shortened editorial process on feature story
from several weeks to a few hours in order to place article in current issue), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1226 (1983). On a somewhat related issue, two courts have reached opposite conclusions
on whether conducting a radio talk show without a tape delay device is evidence that the
station published defamatory comments by callers with a reckless disregard for the truth. In
Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp., 251 So. 2d 405, 410-11 (La. Ct. App.), applica-
tion denied, 259 La. 887, 253 So. 2d 217 (1971), the court affirmed a judgment for plaintiff
reasoning that the failure to use a tape delay device constituted an open invitation to listen-
ers to make false and defamatory comments. In Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555
P.2d 556, 564-67 (Wyo. 1976), however, the court affirmed a summary judgment for defen-
dant on similar facts, reasoning that the station had simply deprived itself of the ability to
investigate the truth of any allegations made and that such a failure to investigate did not
constitute reckless disregard. The Adams approach is more sensible. While the failure to
utilize a tape delay device may constitute a negligent broadcasting practice, it is difficult to
understand how the defendant can be considered to have harbored serious doubts of the
truth of allegations until it has heard them and had a moment to reflect on them, absent an
established pattern of false or defamatory comments from listeners.
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other hand, a publisher may find that a story, which might well
have been developed more leisurely, has been transformed sud-
denly into a "hot news" item because a competitor is preparing to
"break" the same story.9' The need for prompt publication is basi-
cally a journalistic judgment and the courts should defer largely to
the media on the matter.2 Finally, the very decision to publish a
story while it is timely cannot give rise to an inference of reckless
disregard even though this decision foreseeably may increase the
adverse effect on the plaintiff's reputation.9 3
(b) Seriousness of the Charge
In Washington Post Co. v. Keogh 4 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that a serious allega-
91. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 952,
959 (D.D.C. 1976) (author released expose to several other newspapers for publication). Re-
cently, in Tavoulareas v. Washington Post the court stated that
The dissent asserts that the defendants were under substantial time pressure to pro-
duce the story because a congressional committee would soon release some information
and there was a possibility that the rival New York Times might come out with the
story. . . . But this sort of self-generated time pressure-the fear that someone else
will preempt the 'scoop'--almost always exists. To hold that it was exculpatory would
exalt the time pressure excuse into an absolute defense in every case. It would also
reward the least responsible journalists, permitting them regularly to scoop their more
careful colleagues, making the scoop itself the justification for their recklessness and
generally debasing the journalistic coinage.
759 F.2d 90, 131 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original). The court is correct when the
fear of a scoop by a competitor is based on nothing more than speculation. When the news-
paper is aware that a competitor is actively pursuing the same story or when the story is so
obviously newsworthy and timely that competitors must be developing it, then the reasoning
of Martin Marietta should control.
92. See Lexington Herald Leader v. Graves, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1065, 1071-73
(Ky. 1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when editor concluded that story was "hot news"
and needed to be published promptly even though reporter disagreed), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 2342 (1984).
93. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when magazine published critical story about company
immediately prior to the company's public securities offering).
94. 365 F.2d 965, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (reversing denial of summary judgment for de-
fendant), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967); see also Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221,
1223 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when television station
broadcast charges that public official had accepted bribes); Murray v. Bailey, 11 MzD. L.
REP. (BNA) 1369, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (granting summary judgment for defendant with
the observation that the "heat of the report" does not give rise to a duty to investigate);
Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 707, 459 P.2d 8, 17 (1969) (reversing verdict
for plaintiff when charges suggested that public officials' jobs were in jeopardy), cert. de-
nied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970); cf. Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 65 Hawaii 430, 441, 653 P.2d 1145, 1152
(1983) (reversing summary judgment for plaintiff because defamatory character of allega-
tions regarding connection between plaintiff and organized crime was not sufficient evidence
of reckless disregard as a matter of law); Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 56 (D.C. 1979)
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tion alone does not suggest that the defendant published it despite
serious doubts as to its truth. Indeed, as the court further found, in
certain contexts such as press coverage of public officials when
there is a particularly strong public need for information, there
may be good reason to avoid deterring the publication of serious
charges.9 5 Arguably, the seriousness of the charge still may be rele-
vant to proof of reckless disregard in certain circumstances.9 6 A se-
rious allegation may suggest that the publisher should have con-
ducted a more thorough investigation. A factfinder might infer
that the publisher failed to investigate the serious charge because
the publisher was already aware that the charges possibly were
false, and simply did not care,97 or because the publisher suspected
(seriousness of allegations does not by itself show reckless disregard), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1078 (1980).
95. See Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967); see also Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d
369, 380-81, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1306-07, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 950-51, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1977).
96. See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 759 F.2d 90, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(reversing judgment n.o.v. when, among other things, charges were serious and likely to
harm plaintiff). Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming
punitive damage award for plaintiff when editor "made virtually no effort to check the va-
lidity of statements that were defamatory per se"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Cape
Publications, Inc. v. Adams, 336 So. 2d 1197, 1199-1200 (Fla. Dist. App.) (affirming verdict
for plaintiff when, among other things, editorial staff published allegations of bribery with
little support and with knowledge of seriousness), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977); Durso v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 33 Ill. App. 3d 300, 305, 337
N.E.2d 443, 447 (1975) (evidence of reckless disregard when author conducted only cursory
investigation while writing expose linking political figure to organized crime); Meadows v.
Taft Broadcasting Co., 98 A.D.2d 959, 960, 470 N.Y.S.2d 205, 208 (1983) (affirming denial of
summary judgment for defendant when reporter implied plaintiff may have murdered a per-
son to prevent her from testifying); cf. Widener v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 75 Cal. App. 3d
415, 435, 142 Cal. Rptr. 304, 315 (1977) (reversing judgment n.o.v. for defendant when per-
son wrote letter to television station making serious charges against plaintiff absent investi-
gation or deadline pressure), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978).
97. In Mahnke v. Northwestern Publications, 280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968), the
Minnesota Supreme Court took account of the seriousness of the charges when a newspaper
published an article alleging that the plaintiff, a police detective, refused to arrest a man
guilty of sexually molesting a child. Id. at 340-42, 160 N.W.2d at 9-10. The court noted that
the editor was at least partially motivated to publish the charges because he knew that they
would stir up indignation, create a continuing controversy, and presumably boost newspaper
sales. While this evidence did not show that the editor was aware that the charges might
have been false, it did explain why he may have published the charges despite an awareness
of their falsity or may have failed to investigate the charges more thoroughly when there
was room for doubt. Arguably, the court did not appreciate fully the subjective nature of the
St. Amant test. Even though the Mahnke opinion was published shortly after St. Amant
was decided, the majority did not refer to it. Instead, it relied heavily on the Harlan opinion
in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and at one point even spoke of the defendant's obvious
negligence. Id. at 338, 343, 160 N.W.2d at 8, 10-11. The dissent argued that, in view of St.
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that the charges were false and did not wish to have its suspicion
confirmed.9 8
The difficulty with reliance on the seriousness of the charge is
that the link between the seriousness of the charge and the defen-
dant's awareness of its falsity is quite tenuous. The defendant's
recognition that serious charges, whether true or false, might cause
significant harm to a plaintiff's reputation does not tend to indi-
cate that the defendant probably was aware that the charges were
false." By itself, a serious defamatory allegation could never estab-
lish reckless disregard by clear and convincing evidence. In cases in
which the courts have relied on the seriousness of the charge, such
as Goldwater v. Ginzburg, there has been significant additional ev-
idence of reckless disregard. 100 As with ill will evidence, plaintiffs
should not be wholly precluded from emphasizing the seriousness
of the defamatory charge despite limited probative value given
that plaintiffs are required to hurdle the heavy burden of the clear
and convincing evidence standard. The seriousness of the charge
can provide additional support for an inference of reckless disre-
gard of the truth in a particular case.
Amant, the majority misunderstood the nature of the reckless disregard standard. Id. at
352-53, 367-70, 160 N.W.2d at 16, 25-27 (Peterson, J., dissenting). Nevertheless the court's
reasoning regarding the significance of the seriousness of the charges still could be of proba-
tive value under a subjective oriented standard.
98. Apparently the Second Circuit considered the severity of the criminal charges in
Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970), when
it observed that "the appellants were very much aware of the possible resulting harm; the
seriousness of the charges called for a thorough investigation but the evidence reveals only
the careless utilization of slipshod and sketchy investigative techniques ..... " See also
Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 79 Wash. 2d 816, 832, 490 P.2d 101, 111 (1971) (sufficient
evidence of reckless disregard when defendant failed to investigate "transparently disparag-
ing" charges against plaintiff by biased author, but reversing verdict for plaintiff on other
grounds).
99. In the course of concluding that there was a sufficient showing of reckless disre-
gard in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), Justice Warren observed:
[L]ittle investigative effort was expended initially, and no additional inquiries were
made even after the editors were notified by respondent and his daughter that the
account to be published was absolutely untrue. Instead, the Saturday Evening Post
proceeded on its reckless course with full knowledge of the harm that would likely
result from the publication of the article. This knowledge was signaled by the state-
ments at the conclusion of the article that "Wally Butts will never help any football
team again" and "careers will be ruined, that is sure."
Id. at 169-70. Presumably, Justice Warren was suggesting that the defendant's decision to
publish despite the seriousness of the charge, coupled with the defendant's reason to believe
that it might be false, tended to indicate its affirmative disregard for the truth.
100. 414 F.2d 324, 339-40 (2d Cir. 1969) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when defendant
published defamatory allegations despite no source, contradictory information, ill will, lack
of expertise, and imbalance), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
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(c) Inherent Improbability
The inherent improbability of a defamatory charge may sug-
gest that the defendant must have had serious doubts as to its
truth, at least in the absence of further investigation. The Supreme
Court recognized this inference in St. Amant v. Thompson.1°1 Cer-
tainly there must come a point at which charges are so outlandish
that no one would believe them, absent verification. On the other
hand, news by its very nature frequently involves the reporting of
the unusual. Thus, the mere fact that defamatory statements are
out of the ordinary or surprising should not by itself establish that
they were published despite serious doubts as to their truth.
Few cases explicitly have based an inference of reckless disre-
gard on the improbability of the allegations. In Stone v. Essex
County Newspapers, Inc.'0° the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
concluded that there was sufficient evidence of reckless disregard
with respect to an editor who authorized publication of a story
written by an inexperienced reporter alleging that a citizen well
known to and respected by the editor had been charged in a nar-
cotics case.10 3 The court emphasized that the editor had testified
that he was surprised by the report.0 Presumably most people
would be surprised if told that a respected acquaintance was
charged in a serious criminal case. Most people would not want to
believe the charges and would assume a mistake had been made.
It, therefore, is strange that the editor would approve such a story
absent verification when, as in Stone, there was ample time for fur-
ther investigation. 0 5 Serious criminal charges, however, are not so
inherently improbable as to inspire disbelief in any absolute sense.
Respected citizens occasionally are charged in narcotics cases. 1 6
Still, when coupled with other evidence, an unlikely criminal
charge properly may raise a sufficient inference of reckless disre-
gard to get to the jury.
By way of contrast, the charges at issue in Hunt v. Liberty
Lobby10 7 seem more inherently improbable on their face and hence
closer to the type of charges concerning the Supreme Court in St.
101. 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968).




106. See, e.g., Delorean's Day in Court, NEwsWEEK, Mar. 12, 1984, at 85; Medich Gets
Probation, Fine, Dallas Morning News, Mar. 9, 1984, at 7B.
107. 720 F.2d 631 (11th Cir. 1983).
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Amant. In Hunt the defendant magazine published, without signif-
icant verification, an article alleging that the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) was preparing to cover up its role in the Kennedy
assassination by revealing that E. Howard Hunt of Watergate no-
toriety had been involved without official approval.108 While not
wholly beyond the realm of possibility, the charge seemed bizarre
and dubious, especially because defendant's editor was aware that
the author of the charge was a party to bitterly contested litigation
with the CIA.10 9 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
considered the inherent improbability of the charges a significant
factor supporting its conclusion that there was sufficient evidence
of reckless disregard of the truth, although it reversed the verdict
for the plaintiff on other grounds.110 While Hunt is not the most
extreme case imaginable, in context, the Eleventh Circuit was cor-
rect in concluding that the improbability of the charges was a fac-
tor that could give rise to an inference of serious doubt.1 Improb-
ability of the allegations is, of course, a double-edged sword-as
well it should be. The unsurprising nature of published charges
may properly be used by the defendant to undermine an inference
of serious doubt in the face of an inadequate investigation.
1 2
108. Id. at 634-36, 645-46.
109. Id. at 645-46.
110. Id. On remand a jury found that the article did not libel the defendant. 11 MEDIA
L. REP. (BNA), News Notes, Feb. 19, 1985.
111. The charges in Weaver v. Pryor Jeffersonian, 569 P.2d 967 (Okla. 1977), also
could readily be characterized as inherently improbable. In Weaver the defendant newspa-
per published absent verification a letter from a person with whom it was unfamiliar, alleg-
ing among other things that she had evidence that plaintiff, a sheriff, would "fix" a charge
for someone who would do him a political favor, that he had embezzled money, and that his
treatment of prisoners was reminiscent of Hitler. Id. at 969 & n.1. As in Hunt v. Liberty
Lobby, the defendant was aware of the author's possible bias in that she explained that her
son was one of the allegedly abused prisoners. In addition, there was evidence of ill will
between defendant publisher and the plaintiff who was running for re-election. Ironically,
the ill will might suggest that the publisher was more inclined to believe the improbable
charges against the plaintiff because he already held him in low esteem. Because it would
also be possible to infer that the publisher might be more likely to print improbable defam-
atory charges against a political enemy despite the existence of serious doubt for personal
reasons, resolution of the matter was best left to the jury.
112. See, e.g., Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978) (granting sum-
mary judgment for defendant when television station alleged that public official had ac-
cepted bribe); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing verdict for
plaintiff when author alleged that Ernest Hemingway had low opinion of plaintiff who had
been Hemingway's companion), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Coughlin v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting and Cable, 603 F. Supp. 377, 387 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (granting summary judgment
for defendant when reporter's observations and crime commission report tended to support
possibility of police corruption); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, Co., 417
F. Supp. 947, 958 (D.D.C. 1976) (granting summary judgment for defendant when newspa-
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(d) Awareness of Inconsistent Information
An inference of reckless disregard may arise when the defen-
dant was aware of reliable information that directly contradicted
the defamatory statement. For instance, in Curran v. Philadelphia
Newspapers,11 3 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an in-
ference of reckless disregard was permissible when a reporter wrote
that the United States Attorney made certain derogatory remarks
about plaintiff at a press conference, despite the fact that the re-
porter had attended the press conference and no such statements
had been made.11' An additional twist was added in Airlie Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.11 5 in which the defen-
dant wrote that the plaintiff foundation Was covertly financed and
supported by the CIA. Following defendant's initial publication,
the director of the CIA emphatically denied the truth of these alle-
gations." 6 The defendant then republished the initial allegations
along with the additional false statement that the director of the
CIA had declined to comment. On this record, the district court
quite properly concluded that sufficient evidence of reckless disre-
gard existed because the defendant not only republished the alle-
gations in the face of strong contradictory information but
fabricated additional details in order to bolster the apparent credi-
bility of the initial statements. In so holding, the court pointed out
that "while it is well established that a failure to investigate, with-
out more, is insufficient to give rise to liability, once one has under-
taken to conduct an investigation he should not be permitted to
ignore with impunity the fruits of that investigation.' 1 7
per article alleged that plaintiff defense contractor provided prostitutes at a party for de-
fense department personnel given that the Secretary of Defense had stated that stag parties
were common in the defense industry); Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 56 (D.C. App.
1979) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when columnist questioned well-known
consumer advocate's reputation for truth and accuracy), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980);
Lexington Herald Leader v. Graves, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1065, 1068 (Ky. 1982) (revers-
ing verdict for plaintiff when article alleged that candidate understated property holding),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2342 (1984); Doubleday & Co. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex.
1984) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when book alleged that optometrist who was indicated
three times for practicing without license had been appointed to state optometry board).
113. 497 Pa. 163, 182-83, 439 A.2d 652, 661-62 (1981).
114. Id.
115. 337 F. Supp. 421 (D.D.C. 1972).
116. Id. at 428.
117. Id. at 427-28 (footnote omitted); cf. Carey v. Hume, 390 F. Supp. 1026, 1030
(D.D.C. 1975) (denying summary judgment for defendant when columnists arguably dis-
torted or misrepresented information obtained from source), aff'd mem., 543 F.2d 1389
(1976).
1985] .275
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:247
If there is little or no support for the defamatory allegation
and the contradictory material is indeed reliable, an inference that
the defendant published the material with serious doubts as to its
truth very well might be warranted.118 Publishing in the face of
contradictory information, however, should not automatically give
rise to an inference of reckless disregard. So long as the reporter
has some source or support for the information, he still may con-
118. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 759 F.2d 90, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (reversing
judgment n.o.v. for defendant when, among other things, reporter made allegation denied by
source); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1578 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (partially
reversing summary judgment for defendants when publication accused plaintiff of favoring
"forced deportation" though source referred to "voluntary repatriation"); Carson v. Allied
News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 1976) (reversing summary judgment for defendant
when defamatory allegations were flatly contradicted by writer's main source); Beech Air-
craft v. National Aviation Underwriters, 11 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1401, 1414 (D. Kan. 1984)
(denying summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, reporter described
test results critical of plaintiff despite having been informed that test was "worthless"); Her-
bert v. Lando, 596 F. Supp. 1178, 1212-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (partially denying summary judg-
ment for defendant when author wrote that individual did not have a son despite fact that
he testified that he had told author that he did); Green v. Northern Publishing, 655 P.2d
736, 742-43 (Alaska 1982) (reversing summary judgment for defendant when writer was
aware of information contradicting as well as supporting the truth of its statements), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3539 (1983); Reed v. Northwestern Publishing, 11 MED. L. Rm'. (BNA)
1382, 1387 (IMI. App. 1984) (reversing summary judgment for defendant when reporter had
read grand jury report inconsistent with story and admitted that he was uncomfortable with
story); Newell v. Field Enters., Inc., 91 Ill. App. 3d 735, 756, 415 N.E.2d 434, 451 (1980)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant when defamatory allegations were inconsistent
with legal complaint relied on by reporter); Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, 11
Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1738, 1740 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1985) (granting verdict for plaintiff when re-
porter ignored information contradictory to allegations); McHale v. Lake Charles Am. Press,
390 So. 2d 556, 559, 568 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among
other things, editor published statement that "no bond buyer would buy a nickel's worth of
securities on [plaintiff city attorney's] opinion" although he was aware that bond issues ap-
proved by plaintiff did sell), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Nevada Indep. Broadcasting
Corp. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 416, 664 P.2d 337, 345 (1983) (affirming verdict for plaintiff
when television commentator implied that candidate personally wrote a bad check when
defendant was aware that it was written by advertising agency for candidate's campaign);
Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 73 A.D.2d 276, 285, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 282 (1980) (affirming
verdict for plaintiff when there was evidence that reporter wrote false and defamatory head-
line stating that plaintiff legislator said development corporation could do without support
of blacks, despite knowledge that plaintiff made no such statement); Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 65 Ohio App. 143, 148, 416 N.E. 2d 662, 666-67 (1976) (reversing directed ver-
dict for defendant when allegations in article were inconsistent with findings in recent judi-
cial proceedings), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 966 (1980); cf. Appleyard v. Transamerican Press,
Inc., 539 F.2d 1026, 1029 (4th Cir. 1976) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when plaintiff testi-
fied that, contrary to allegations in article, he had opposed change by defendant in legal
defense fund), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Burnett v. National Enquirer, 144 Cal.
App. 3d 991, 999, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209-10 (1983) (affirming reduced punitive damage
award for plaintiff when newspaper published article implying that plaintiff was drunk
when source "'specifically emphatically"' said she was not), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct.
1260 (1984).
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clude that it is correct and the contradictory matter is false, espe-
cially if the latter appears less reliable.119 When the contradictory
information seems to be credible, however, the issue ordinarily
presents a question for the jury.
(e) No Source
While there may be no general duty to investigate, the publi-
cation of specific factual allegations beyond the realm of common
knowledge without any source support may lead readily to an in-
ference of reckless disregard. 120 For instance, in Kuhn v. Tribune-
119. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 596 F. Supp. 1178, 1209 (S.D.N.Y 1984) (granting
partial summary judgment for defendant when producer relied on interviews that were
somewhat inconsistent with earlier statements given by the same individuals); Roberts v.
Dover, 525 F. Supp. 987, 993 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (granting summary judgment for defendant
when reporter found citizen's complaint regarding police misconduct more persuasive than
officer's denial but printed both sides of the story); Colombo v. Times-Argus As'n, 135 Vt.
454, 458, 380 A.2d 80, 84 (1977) (affirming directed verdict for defendant when reporter was
informed by plaintiff and chief of police that story was "far-fetched" and "unfounded"); see
also Foster v. Upchurch, 624 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. 1981) (reversing denial of defendant's
plea of privilege when plaintiff relied solely on inconsistencies in article); Holly v. Cannaday,
669 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (reversing denial of defendant's plea of privilege
when plaintiff relied solely on internal inconsistencies in article); cf. Oliver v. Village Voice,
Inc., 417 F. Supp. 235, 238-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (granting summary judgment for defendant
when reporter claimed source purported to credit information provided by third party and
source denied having done so).
120. Golden Bear Distrib. Sys., Inc. v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944, 950 (5th Cir.
1983) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when author knew that plaintiff company was com-
pletely separate from company with similar name involved in fraud but wrote that they
pursued same business practices, despite absence of any information to that effect); Carson
v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 211-12 (7th Cir. 1976) (reversing summary judgment for
defendant when newspaper published specific defamatory alllegations regarding plaintiff's
marriage with no source support); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 332, 336, 340 (2d
Cir. 1969) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when writer alleged that presidential candidate was
suffering from mental disorders without any source), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970);
Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 577-78, 584-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying summary
judgment for defendant when, among other things, writer and editor based serious charges
on little more than speculation); Beech Aircraft v. National Aviation Underwriters, 11 Med.
L. Rep. (BNA) 1401, 1416 (D. Kan. 1984) (denying summary judgment for defendant when
editor wrote article with no apparent source for critical information); Shockley v. Cox En-
ters., 10 MEDMA L. REP. (BNA) 1222, 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (denying summary judgment for
defendant when author had no basis for statement that plaintiff's voluntary sterilization
plan had previously been utilized by the Nazis); Holter v. WLCY T.V., Inc., 366 So. 2d 445,
456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (reversing judgment for defendant when allegations on broad-
cast concerning governmental impropriety were totally fabricated); Peisner v. Detroit Free
Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 166, 266 N.W.2d 693, 699 (1978) (reversing summary judg-
ment for defendant when plaintiff alleged that reporter had admitted prior to publication
that there was no basis for allegations concerning plaintiff); Deloach v. Beaufort Gazette,
S.C. - , 316 S.E.2d 139, 141 (affirming verdict for plaintiff when police officer denied
telling reporter that plaintiff had been arrested and charged and reporter failed to check
arrest docket), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 384 (1984); Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211
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Republican Publishing Co. 2' a reporter wrote that a city agency
provided a ski resort with a specific amount of business and, in
turn, agency officials received free ski passes, although the reporter
apparently had no source for the charges that turned out to be
false. Obviously, when someone makes a statement of this specific-
ity with no way of knowing whether it is true or false, he is engag-
ing in deliberate fabrication and an inference of actual knowledge
of falsity would be warranted. Perhaps because the defendant
could believe that his fabricated charges might coincidentally turn
out to be true, the courts are content to dispose of such cases as
instances of reckless disregard for the truth.
Likewise, an inference of reckless disregard might be drawn,
when the evidence established that, in the course of the publica-
tion or broadcast, the defendant fabricated other nondefamatory
statements or charges. Admittedly, this inference does not prove
directly that the defendant knew or had good reason to believe
that the defamatory charges were false. If, however, there is any
showing at all that the defendant should have suspected the falsity
of the defamatory allegations, evidence of the defendant's general
disdain for truth and accuracy with respect to plaintiff and the
subject matter of the defamation is probative and should not be
ignored.
(f) Obvious Reason to Doubt Source
In St. Amant v. Thompson the Court observed that "reckless-
ness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the
veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." '122 Reli-
ance on a patently unreliable source may give rise to serious
doubts as to the truth of the information. A source might be con-
sidered unreliable for a variety of reasons. The reporter may be
aware that the source's reputation for veracity is tainted. In Pep v.
Newsweek, Inc.,123 for instance, a federal district court held that
S.E.2d 674, 688 (W.Va.) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when newspaper had no source for
innuendo of impropriety by public official), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975); cf. Burnett v.
National Enquirer, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 999, 101-02, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209, 219 (1983)
(affirming reduced punitive damage award for plaintiff when publisher had no source for
allegations that plaintiff was intoxicated in public), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1260
(1984); Beamer v. Nishiki, - Hawaii _ _ 670 P.2d 1264, 1275-76 (1983) (denying
summary judgment for defendant when reporter's only source provided no support for de-
famatory allegations).
121. 637 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981).
122. 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (footnote omitted).
123. 553 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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an inference of serious doubt as to the truth could be drawn when,
among other problems, there was evidence that the defendant
magazine knew that its primary source was "a convicted felon, a
swindler and a self-described 'pathological liar'" yet failed to cor-
roborate the source's defamatory charges. 124  Even when the
source's reputation for veracity has not been challenged directly,
reliance on a source with a criminal record or generally unsavory
background is one factor that may be properly taken into account
on the reckless disregard issue.12 5
On the other hand, as the Louisiana Supreme Court noted in
Kidder v. Anderson, 26 "newspaper investigation of reports of cor-
ruption must often obtain first-hand corroboration from those pre-
sent in the barrooms or gambling houses, rather than from citizens
who spend their time only at home, in church, or at work in less
colorful occupations."'12 7 Reporters covering a story in shady areas
124. Id. at 1001-02. The defendant argued that it had found the source worthy of be-
lief despite the source's background. Newsweek ultimately prevailed on a jury verdict that
the charge was not substantially false. 10 MEMIA L. REP. (BNA) 1288, News Notes, Mar. 6,
1984; see also Liberty Lobby Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1566, 1574-75 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(reversing a partial summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on article despite
knowledge that plaintiff had previously obtained favorable settlement to libel action con-
cerning same article); Burnett v. National Enquirer, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 999-1000, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 206, 210 (1983) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when editor failed to corroborate allega-
tions by source that it knew to be untrustworthy), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984).
The Burnett case will be retried because the plaintiff refused to accept the appellate court's
reduction of punitive damages. See Lauter, Burnett Case Going into Reruns, NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 5, 1984, at 3.
125. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157 (1967) (defendants' failure
to corroborate source's allegations although aware source was on probation for bad check
charge was one of several factors supporting a finding of highly unreasonable conduct); id. at
169-70 (Warren, J., concurring) (incorporating by reference Harlan's discussion of defen-
dant's fault as a predicate for finding reckless disregard); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post
Co., 759 F.2d 90, 129-30 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (reversing judgment n.o.v. for defendant, when,
among other things, reporter was aware source had been involved in dishonest business
practices); Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(granting verdict for plaintiff when source's source was a notorious underworld figure re-
puted to be a "liar" and "name dropper"), aff'd, 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1101 (1981); Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 251, 259 N.E.2d
651, 664 (affirming verdict for plaintiff by equally divided court when, among other sources,
reporter relied on "petty criminal" with "an unsavory reputation" who "was obviously mak-
ing a deal to gain his freedom"), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970); Luper v. Black Dispatch
Publishing Co., 675 P.2d 1028, 1031, 1034 (Okla. 1983) (reversing summary judgment for
defendant when, among other things, editor knew source was an ex-convict and ex-mental
patient).
126. 354 So. 2d 1306 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
127. Id. at 1309; see also Barry v. Time, 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(dismissing complaint when magazine relied on source who was convicted of assault and
failed to pass lie detector test but revealed his background in article); cf. Pritchard v. Times
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may have to take their sources as they find them-warts and all.
While a reputation for untrustworthiness or a serious criminal rec-
ord may give rise to an inference that the reporter had serious
doubts about the truth of the information, the courts should not
dismiss the possibility that the reporter convinced himself of the
particular source's veracity, in spite of the source's bad reputation.
Such a conviction may seem unbelievable, however, when the re-
porter is aware of the source's lack of credibility and still fails to
employ readily available means of verification. Ordinarily the
choice of competing inferences should be left to the factfinder.
An inference of reckless disregard also may arise when the re-
porter has placed primary reliance on a source that he knows to be
biased against the plaintiff, such as an estranged spouse,128 a per-
sonal enemy,12 9 a political opponent,130 or someone who was simply
Southwest Broadcasting, 277 Ark. 458, 459, 642 S.W.2d 877, 878 (1982) (affirming directed
verdict for defendant when, in writing article pertaining to grand jury investigation of sher-
iff, reporter relied on two sources who had been indicted).
128. Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1361-62 (Colo. 1983) (af-
firming verdict for plaintiff when reporter relied on former spouse in reporting on breakup
of marriage); Luper v. Black Dispatch Publishing Co., 675 P.2d 1028, 1034 (Okla. 1983)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, editor knew source
was "embittered ex-husband" and tone of information was "venomous" and "nearly hysteri-
cal"); Stevens v. Sun Publishing Co., 270 S.C. 65, 69-70, 240 S.E.2d 812, 814-15 (affirming
verdict for plaintiff when publisher relied on former sister-in-law known to be biased against
plaintiff), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978).
129. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 759 F.2d 90, 128-31 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (revers-
ing judgment n.o.v. for defendant when, among other things reporter relied on former son-
in-law of one plaintiff and former business partner of other, both of whom were bitter to-
ward plaintiffs); Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 645 (11th Cir. 1983) (sufficient evi-
dence of reckless disregard when, among other things, publisher knew author was involved
in litigation against CIA, which was derogatorily depicted in article; court reversed and re-
manded on other grounds); Beech Aircraft v. National Aviation Underwriters, 11 Med. L.
Rep. (BNA) 1401, 1415 (D. Kan. 1984) (denying summary judgment for defendant when,
among other things, reporter relied on insurer sources who had a pecuniary interest in criti-
cizing the design of plaintiff's airplane); Cape Publications, Inc. v. Adams, 336 So. 2d 1197,
1199-1200 (Fla. App. 1976) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, source
and plaintiff had "a running feud" because plaintiff once had source arrested), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 943 (1977).
130. News Publishing Co. v. Deberry, 321 S.E.2d 112, 114 (Ga. App. 1984) (affirming
verdict for plaintiff when reporter relied on commissioner who had attempted to have plain-
tiff warden fired twice); Lyons v. New Mass Media, Inc., 390 Mass. 51, 453 N.E.2d 451, 456
(1983) (denying summary judgment for defendant when reporter based story on sources who
were involved in "serious, acrimonious" union dispute with plaintiffs); Miller v. Argus Pub-
lishing Co., 79 Wash. 2d 816, 833, 490 P.2d 101, 111 (1971) (sufficient evidence of reckless
disregard when, among other things, defendant published disparaging article by a political
adversary of plaintiff without verficiation but reversing verdict for plaintiff on other
grounds); cf. Grebner v. Runyon, 132 Mich. App. 327, 347 N.W.2d 741 (1984) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, reporter allegedly placed sole
reliance on partisan political opponent of plaintiff's).
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angry at the plaintiff."' 1 Reliance on a biased source will not give
rise to an inference of reckless disregard, however, when the allega-
tions are independently corroborated because there is no reason to
believe that the reporter entertained serious doubts concerning the
truth.132 Moreover, as with an otherwise untrustworthy source, reli-
ance on a biased source may not necessarily give rise to an infer-
ence of reckless disregard even in the absence of independent ver-
ification, because the reporter may have had reason to believe the
source in any event. 33
An inference of reckless disregard also is permissible when the
defendant was aware that a source had made a series of highly im-
probable charges in the past. In Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Interna-
131. Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 342, 160 N.W.2d 1, 11
(1968) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, reporter relied on source
who was admittedly angry at plaintiff) (arguably applying objective reckless disregard stan-
dard); Weaver v. Pryor Jeffersonian, 569 P.2d 967, 970, 974 (Okla. 1977) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant when, among other things, publisher failed to investigate letter crit-
ical of plaintiff sheriff from mother of boy jailed by plaintiff).
132. See, e.g., Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 150-51, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701,
715-16 (affirming nonsuit against plaintiff when reporter relied on two sources for every
statement, some of whom may have been biased against plaintiff), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899
(1980); Lexington Herald Leader v. Graves, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1065, 1071 (Ky. 1982)
(reversing verdict for plaintiff when reporter attempted to independently verify allegations
made by plaintiff's political enemies), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2342 (1984); Tucci v. Guy
Gannett Publishing Co., 464 A.2d 161, 167-68 (Me. 1983) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant when reporter corroborated memorandum from source biased against plaintff);
Holy Spirit Assoc. v. Sequoia Elsevier Publishing, 75 A.D.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978)
(granting summary judgment for defendant when statements made by questionable sources
were corroborated by more reliable sources).
133. See Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing verdict for
plaintiff when publisher was aware of author's bias against plaintiff but had reason to be-
lieve that author was in position to observe the incidents in question first hand), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Loeb v. New Times Communications Corp., 497 F. Supp. 85, 92
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (granting summary judgment for defendant despite alleged reliance on bi-
ased sources); Lins v. Evening News, 342 N.W.2d 573, 580-81 (Mich. App. 1983) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant despite defendant's failure to verify information provided
by biased source); Pelzer v. Minneapolis Tribune, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2507, 2509 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. 1981) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on tip from
candidate opposing plaintiff that was arguably reliable because source incriminated self); cf.
Dowd v. Calabrese, 589 F. Supp. 1206, 1213 (D.D.C. 1984) ("[Clollaboration between indi-
viduals with an axe to grind and reporters eager for a story is not uncommon; rather, it is
the way the news media frequently operate."); Gaynes v. Allen, 339 N.W.2d 678, 683 (Mich.
App. 1983) (affirming directed verdict for defendant when reporter knew that source had
been involved in litigation against plaintiff pertaining to subject matter of defamatory alle-
gations but had been informed that source was trustworthy); Rye v. Seattle Times, 37 Wash.
App. 45, 678 P.2d 1282 (1984) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter
relied on two sources that he knew to be hostile to plaintiff but believed nonetheless because
they seemed to be incriminating themselves).
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tional, Ltd.134 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that there was sufficient evidence to indicate that
defendant must have realized that its primary source was of dubi-
ous reliability given his prior record of bizarre allegations concern-
ing various international conspiracies. This realization, in turn,
could support an inference of reckless disregard because defendant
failed to verify the information, despite good reason to question
the source's credibility.1 5 This holding follows as a matter of com-
mon sense so long as the defendant is aware of the source's ques-
tionable prior conduct.
As the Supreme Court observed in St. Amant, an inference of
serious doubt may arise when a reporter relied exclusively on an
anonymous telephone call or letter.1 3 6 Although a source's refusal
to reveal its identity may indicate fear of reprisal, the refusal also
may suggest an unwillingness to stand behind allegations. At the
very least, anonymity normally should raise a red flag in the re-
porter's or editor's mind thus permitting an inference that the de-
fendant doubted the truth of the allegations. Similarly, an infer-
ence of serious doubt may arise when the source was not
anonymous, but the defendant was aware that there was reason to
believe that the source, even if trustworthy, may have been mis-
taken. For instance, in Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc. 1 7 a
134. 691 F.2d 666, 672 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024 (1983); see also
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1982) (sufficient evidence of
reckless disregard to affirm punitive damage award when, among other things, editor was
aware that author had accused various well-known people of being communists, including
Richard Nixon and John Foster Dulles), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
135. 691 F.2d at 671.
136. 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968); see also Holter v. WLCY T.V., Inc., 366 So. 2d 445, 456
(Fla. App. 1978) (reversing judgment for defendant when, among other things, reporter re-
lied on anonymous telephone call but told editor that he knew the source); Mehau v. Gan-
nett Pac., 66 Hawaii 133, 658 P.2d 312, 321-22 (1983) (reversing summary judgment for
defendant when wire service relied on anonymous allegations published in sensational tab-
loid); Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 91 N.M. 250, 258, 572 P.2d 1258, 1263
(1977) (reversing summary judgment for defendant when, among other sources, defendant
purported to have relied on a combination of anonymous telephone calls and confidential
sources), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978); cf. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d
1563, 1578 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (partially reversing summary judgment for defendant when re-
porter based defamatory allegations on single telephone conversation with source that he
knew nothing about).
137. 430 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affd, 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); see also Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 339 (2d Cir.
1969) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, editor continued to rely on
polling practices after having been warned by reputable professionals that the practices
lacked validity), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Carey v. Hume, 390 F. Supp. 1026, 1030
(D.D.C. 1975) (denying summary judgment for defendant when reporters were aware that
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federal district court properly noted that an inference of reckless
disregard could be grounded in part on the fact that the defen-
dant's primary source based his allegations on some rather vague
memories of a second hand report of events that took place several
years earlier. A reporter may be more skeptical when faced with an
apparently confused or ill-informed source than with a biased
source. A biased source, despite his prejudice, still may be telling
the truth. A confused source in spite of his good faith, very well
may be mistaken.
(g) Failure to Consult an Obvious Source
Although failure to investigate, alone, does not establish reck-
less disregard, it may be taken into account when the defendant
fails to consult an obvious source, 13 8 including the plaintiff, 13 9 at
source had not witnessed alleged misconduct); Akins v. Altus Newspapers, Inc., 609 P.2d
1263, 1266-67 (Okla. 1977) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when reporter based story largely
on overhearing one side of telephone conversation and casual conversations and then mis-
represented extent of verification to editor), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1010 (1980); cf. Stone v.
Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 869, 330 N.E.2d 161, 174 (1975) (sufficient
evidence of reckless disregard when, among other things, editor was aware that reporter
covering trial was inexperienced); Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328,
342, 160 N.W.2d 1, 11 (1968) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, evi-
dence indicated that reporter was aware that source obtained information second hand from
person who was upset and angry) (arguably applying objective standard).
138. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157 (1967) (Harlan, J.)
(sufficient evidence of highly unreasonable conduct to affirm verdict for plaintiff when,
among other things, defendant failed to verify the information with three obvious sources
despite reason to doubt primary source); id. at 170 (Warren, J. concurring) (incorporating
by reference Harlan's factual analysis in finding sufficient evidence of reckless disregard);
Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 645 (11th Cir. 1983) (sufficient evidence of reckless
disregard for jury when, among other things, publisher doubted the accuracy of allegations
regarding lawsuit but failed to verify with author, with court records, or with newspaper file;
court reversed on other grounds); Pep v. Newsweek, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (denying summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, author failed to
contact three obvious sources, though aware that its primary source might be unreliable);
Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 315, 319 (Colo. 1981) (reinstating
verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, defendant failed to corroborate allegations
with most obvious source, despite lack of deadline pressure); Costello v. Capital Cities Com-
munications, 11 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1738, 1740 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1985) (granting verdict for
plaintiff when reporter failed to check with individuals present at board meeting); Mahnke
v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 342, 160 N.W.2d 1, 11 (1968) (affirming
verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, reporter failed to contact several obvious
sources despite reason to doubt primary source) (arguably applying objective standard);
Sills v. New York Times, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1460, 1464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 90
A.D.2d 1004 (1982) (sufficient evidence of reckless disregard when defendant added material
to story based on subjective impression that could readily have been checked with standard
reference work); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio App. 2d 143, 145-46, 416 N.E.2d
662, 665 (1979) (reversing summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, re-
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least when the defendant had some reason to suspect that the in-
formation might not be true. Arguably, when there is some reason
to question the accuracy of the information, a reporter's failure to
consult an obvious and readily available source suggests that he
did not wish to have his suspicions confirmed.140 Such an inference
is particularly strong when, as in Alioto v. Cowles Communica-
tions, Inc., the defendant actually interviewed the most obvious
and credible source and studiously avoided asking him whether the
defamatory allegations were true.141
As a general rule, failure to question an obvious source is only
of slight relevance to the reckless disregard issue. A failure simply
may suggest that the defendant was lazy, thoughtless, or negligent,
but not necessarily that the defendant was proceeding to publish
porter wrote article about matter adjudicated in pretrial hearing without reading tran-
script), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 966 (1980); cf. Carey v. Hume, 390 F. Supp. 1026, 1028-29
(D.D.C. 1975) (denying summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, re-
porter declined to verify allegations with eyewitness); Nevada Indep. Broadcasting v. Allen,
99 Nev. 404, 416, 664 P.2d 337, 345 (1983) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among other
things, television commentator deliberately avoided asking plaintiff about bad check until
live interview). But see Heritage Publishing Co. v. Cummins, 124 Cal. App. 3d 305, 311, 177
Cal. Rptr. 277, 281 (1981) (reversing verdict for plaintiff even though defendant failed to
verify with three most obvious sources), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
139. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. 691 F.2d 666, 672 (4th Cir. 1982) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant when writer failed to contact plaintiff despite good reason
to question reliability of source), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024 (1983); Dixson v. Newsweek,
Inc. 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1977) (affirming verdict for plaintiff, when, among other
things, defendant failed to question plaintiff about defamatory allegations during interview);
Pep v. Newsweek, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying summary judg-
ment for defendant when, among other things, author failed to question plaintiff about de-
famatory allegations, despite strong reasons to doubt source); Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican
Co., 637 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Colo. 1981) (reinstating verdict for plaintiff when, among other
things, reporter failed to question plaintiff public officials regarding allegations of improper
conduct); cf. Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 341, 160 N.W.2d 1, 10
(1968) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, defendant failed to inter-
view plaintiff) (arguably applying objective standard).
140. Pep v. Newsweek, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1000, 1002-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
141. 430 F. Supp. 1363, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981). In Alioto the defamatory allegations concerned an alleged
meeting between plaintiff and certain underworld figures. Defendant interviewed a presum-
ably honest individual who supposedly had attended the meeting, yet defendant failed to
ask him about it. See also Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 637 F.2d 375, 377, 382 (5th Cir.)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, reporter interviewed
source but failed to ask him about key defamatory allegation), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 964
(1981); Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1977) (affirming verdict for
plaintiff when, among other things, reporter failed to question plaintiff about defamatory
statements during prepublication interview); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 576,
584-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying summary judgment for defendant when, among other
things, reporter failed to question source about contents of secret appendix arguably out of
fear that it might undermine his own hypothesis).
284
MEDIA DEFAMATION LITIGATION
with a probable awareness of falsity. In New York Times v. Sulli-
van, for instance, the Court was unwilling to infer reckless disre-
gard simply because the defendant could have discovered the fal-
sity of some of the allegations by checking its own files.142
Consequently, evidence of failure to verify through an obvious
source should be considered only in the most extreme cases and
even then it should be considered only when there is some inde-
pendent evidence of serious doubt. In other words, evidence of fail-
ure to verify through an obvious source may serve as the extra de-
gree of proof that allows the plaintiff to establish his case to the
requisite clear and convincing degree, however, such evidence
should not constitute the basic predicate for the showing of reck-
less disregard.
(h) Failure to Consult an Expert
An inference of serious doubt may be supported by evidence
that a reporter wrote about a complex or technical matter that he
admittedly did not understand, yet failed to seek expert assistance.
This evidence does not show necessarily that the reporter seriously
doubted the truth of his story but may at least suggest that he was
aware that he did not fully understand what he was reporting but
was not sufficiently concerned about the truth to obtain assistance.
In Goldwater v. Ginzburg, for instance, defendant purported to
psychoanalyze the plaintiff despite his lack of training in psychia-
try and failure to consult experts in that field. 48 Similar situations
142. 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964); see also Otepka v. New York Times Co., 379 F. Supp.
541, 544 (D. Md. 1973) (granting summary judgment for defendant even though reporter
failed to check his own files), af'd, 502 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1974); Hurley v. Northwest
Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967, 974 (D. Minn. 1967) (granting summary judgment for
defendant even though reporter failed to interview plaintiff about allegations in legal com-
plaint filed against him), af'd, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968); Reader's Digest v. Matin
County Superior Court, 37 Cal 3d 244, -, 208 Cal. Rptr. 137, 146, 690 P.2d 610, 619
(1984) (reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant despite failure to contact
plaintiff); Tagawa v. Maui Publishing Co., 50 Hawaii 648, 654, 448 P.2d 337, 341 (1968)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant when reporter erroneously concluded that con-
struction work was being conducted on plaintiff's property at public expense and failed to
verify conclusion with county officials), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 822 (1969); McCarney v. Des
Moines Register and Tribune Co., 239 N.W.2d 152, 156-57 (Iowa 1976) (reversing denial of
summary judgment for defendant when editor failed to check own files); Capital-Gazette
Newspaper, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 445 A.2d 1038, 1045 (affirming directed verdict for
defendant when reporter failed to attempt to confirm allegations with plaintiff), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982); Doubleday Co. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex. 1984), rev'g
644 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex. App. 1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when court of appeals
had relied on author's failure to contact obvious source).
143. 414 F.2d 324, 332-33, 339 (2d Cir. 1969) (sufficient evidence of reckless disregard
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could arise with respect to the reporting of scientific, legal, or busi-
ness affairs. Before an inference may be drawn from the defen-
dant's failure to consult an expert, however, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant was aware of his own ignorance regarding
the particular subject and that expert advice was available. If the
reporter was too ignorant to recognize his own ignorance, there is
no reason to infer reckless disregard. 144 Even when the reporter ap-
preciates his own ignorance, evidence of failure to consult an ex-
pert must be utilized with care because the inference it creates
generally will only carry the plaintiff part way home. A person who
realizes that he does not fully understand what he is talking about
presumably holds some doubt of the truth of his statements but
not necessarily serious doubt. Hence by itself, evidence of failure
to consult an expert should not be enough to carry a plaintiff to
the jury under the clear and convincing evidence standard. 14 5 Cou-
pled with other evidence of serious doubt, however, failure to con-
sult an expert is probative and will help the plaintiff carry his
heavy burden.
(i) No Further Verification Following Denial
An inference of reckless disregard also may arise when the
plaintiff or a third party with reason to know the truth of the mat-
ter, denied the charges and the defendant published or republished
them without further verification. For instance, in Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts Chief Justice Warren relied on defendant's failure
to conduct further inquiries, after plaintiff and his daughter em-
phatically denied the charges prior to publication, as one factor
supporting a finding of reckless disregard. 146 The inference of reck-
to support verdict for plaintiff), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); see also Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 158-59 (1967) (Harlan, J.) (sufficient evidence of highly un-
reasonable conduct to support verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, reporter wrote
about plot to fix football game though reporter was not a football expert and failed to check
with any football experts); id. at 169-70 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (sufficient evidence of
reckless disregard on record as detailed by Harlan).
144. Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 540, 343 A.2d 251, 269 (1975) (reversing ver-
dict for plaintiff when defendant did not consult education experts before preparing rating
system for evaluating high school principals), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
145. Lexington Herald Leader v. Graves, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1065, 1070-71 (Ky.
1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when reporter was aware that he probably did not un-
derstand fully financial and legal documents on which he based article), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 2342 (1984). But see id. at 1072, (Stephenson, J., dissenting) (argument that the evi-
dence supported an inference of reckless disregard).
146. 388 U.S. 130, 169-70 (1967); see also Levine v. CMP Publications, 738 F.2d 660,
675 (5th Cir. 1984) (partially affirming punitive damages for plaintiff when plaintiff specifi-
[Vol. 38:247
1985] MEDIA DEFAMATION LITIGATION
less disregard is stronger when the charge is denied by a trustwor-
thy and knowledgeable third party,14 7 as in Cape Publications, Inc.
cally informed defendant that he had not been convicted of criminal offense before defen-
dant published the allegation); Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363,
1371 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afl'd, 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming verdict for plaintiff
when, among other things, reporter failed to verify after plaintiff denied some of the defam-
atory allegations), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Church of Scientology v. Dell Publish-
ing Co., 362 F. Supp. 767, 770 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (denying summary judgment for defendant
when publisher republished book in paperback form without further investigation, despite
receipt of signed statement by person named in book denying certain allegations pertaining
to him); Buckley v. Esquire, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 1133, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (denying sum-
mary judgment for defendant when defamatory allegations were published following denial
by plaintiff); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 74, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 36 (partially
affirming verdict for plaintiff when publisher failed to investigate further, prior to publica-
tion of paperback edition after an emphatic denial by plaintiff's attorney), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 984 (1979); Holter v. WLCY T.V., Inc., 366 So. 2d 445, 456 (Fla. App. 1979) (reversing
judgment for defendant when, among other things, reporter failed to corroborate story after
an emphatic denial by plaintiff); McHale v. Lake Charles Am. Press, 390 So. 2d 556, 564
(La. App. 1980) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, editor's interview
with plaintiff contradicted allegation in issue); Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc.,
91 N.M. 250, 259, 572 P.2d 1258, 1264 (1977) (reversing summary judgment for defendant
when plaintiff's associate denied charges prior to publication), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906
(1978); Luper v. Black Dispatch Publishing Co., 675 P.2d 1028, 1034 (Okla. 1983) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant when plaintiff informed editor that allegations were false
prior to second publication); Braig v. Field Communications, 310 Pa. Super. 569, 456 A.2d
1366, 1376-77 (1983) (reversing summary judgment for defendant when plaintiff denied alle-
gations prior to rebroadcast), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2341 (1984); Stevens v. Sun Publishing
Co., 270 S.C. 65, 72, 240 S.E.2d 812, 815 (affirming verdict for plaintiff when newspaper
published without further verification after a warning of falsity), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945
(1978); Nobles v. Eastland, 678 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. App. 1984) (reversing summary judg-
ment for defendant when plaintiff denied allegations prior to second publication); Chase v.
Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wash. 2d 37, 44, 515 P.2d 154, 158 (1973) (reversing summary judg-
ment for defendant when plaintiff denied specific charges prior to publication); Miller v.
Argus Publishing Co., 79 Wash. 2d, 816, 834, 490 P.2d 101, 111 (1971) (sufficient evidence of
reckless disregard when defendant republished libelous allegations without further verifica-
tion after a denial by plaintiff but reversing verdict for plaintiff on other grounds); O'Brien
v. Tribune Publishing Co., 7 Wash. App. 107, 123, 499 P.2d 24, 33 (1972) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for defendant when it failed to verify after a denial by plaintiff), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 906 (1973); cf. Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 637 F.2d 375, 377 (5th Cir.)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, plaintiff's attorney
told reporter, prior to publication, that plaintiff "flatly denies" gist of defamatory allega-
tion), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 964 (1981); Gleichenhaus v. Carlyle, 226 Kan. 167, 170, 597 P.2d
611, 613 (1979) (reversing summary judgment for defendant when reporter was informed
that allegations were false prior to publication); Russo v. Padovano, 84 A.D.2d 925, 446
N.Y.S.2d 645, 648 (1981) (reversing summary judgment for defendant when plaintiff alleged
that he informed reporter of his true credentials prior to publication of article misstating
them).
147. Airlie Found., Inc. v. Evening Star Newspapers, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 421, 425
(D.D.C. 1972). In Airlie the Director of the CIA denied the claim that the plaintiff organiza-
tion was funded by the agency. Given the necessarily clandestine character of the CIA's role,
Airlie would seem to be an instance in which a denial by a third party, probably should not
be accepted at face value. An inference of serious doubt still was warranted, however, be-
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v. Adams, 148 in which the Florida Court of Appeals found sufficient
evidence of reckless disregard to affirm a jury verdict for plaintiff
when a newspaper published defamatory allegations despite denial
of the charges by three knowledgeable sources.149
An inference of reckless disregard should not follow automati-
cally from the defendant's mere failure to corroborate following a
denial by the plaintiff. As a federal district court explained in
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Corp.,50 "[i]f
potential plaintiffs in libel suits could cut off a malice defense sim-
ply by calling a newspaper and giving a broad denial of an article,
the first amendment policy embodied in New York Times could be
undermined.'51 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
cently elaborated on this point in Edwards v. National Audubon
Society, Inc., 52 when it observed that proof of reckless disregard
cause the newspaper did not simply ignore the denial but affirmatively misrepresented it by
writing that "the CIA declined to comment on the charges... but government sources said
the charges . . . were untrue." Id. at 426.
In Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, the court distinguished Airlie
on the grounds that in Martin, the defendant newspaper initiated the inquiry, the source of
information was a third party rather than the plaintiff, and the defendant did not misrepre-
sent the denial nor was it aware of any other information indicating that the charges were
false. 417 F. Supp. 947, 960 (D.D.C. 1976); see also Rinaldi v. Village Voice, Inc., 47 A.D.2d
180, 365 N.Y.S.2d 199, 201 (denying summary judgment for defendant when it failed to
investigate or alter advertisement despite being warned by reputable source prior to publi-
cation that certain allegations were false), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975).
148. 336 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. App. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977).
149. Id. at 1199-1200.
150. 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976).
151. Id. at 960 (summary judgment for defendant); see also Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583
F.2d 1221, 1223 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when television
station rebroadcast defamatory allegations following denial by plaintiff's attorney); Davis v.
Costa-Gavras, 595 F. Supp. 982, 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (granting summary judgment for de-
fendant when plaintiffs threatened to sue if book was false and defamatory); Barry v. Time,
Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (dismissing complaint when defendant
printed plaintiff's denial but still published charges); Roberts v. Dover, 525 F. Supp. 987,
992 (D. Tenn. 1981) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter published
citizen's complaint of police misconduct despite denial by officer); Trans World Accounts,
Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (granting summary judg-
ment for defendant when defendant published article following denial by plaintiff); Hurley
v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967, 972 (D. Minn. 1967) (granting summary
judgment for defendant when plaintiff's attorney told reporter that general denial of com-
plaint would be fied), afi'd, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968); Catalano v. Pechous, 69 Ill. App.
3d 797, 811-12, 387 N.E.2d 714, 725-26 (1978) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
when defendant published despite plaintiff's denial); Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc., 497 Pa. 163, 185, 439 A.2d 652, 660 (1981) (partially affirming summary judgment for
defendant when reporter published allegations despite prior denial by plaintiff); Columbo v.
Times-Argus, 135 Vt. 454, 458, 380 A.2d 80, 83 (1977) (affirming directed verdict for defen-
dant when newspaper published contradicted story).
152. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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by clear and convincing evidence "cannot be predicated on mere
denials, however vehement; because such denials are so common-
place in the world of polemical charge and countercharge that, in
themselves, they hardly alert the conscientious reporter to the like-
lihood of error. '153
The above cases do not suggest that an inference of serious
doubt may never be drawn from the defendant's failure to verify
following a denial by plaintiff. Rather, publication without verifica-
tion following a broad and general denial may be insufficient, by
itself, to support a finding of reckless disregard by clear and con-
vincing evidence. Presumably, such an inference would be war-
ranted, however, if the denial was specific and detailed or if, as a
practical matter, the denial tended to disprove the charges. This
inference would be especially appropriate if there were additional
factors indicating that the defendant had reason to doubt the
charges. For instance, in Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin,15 4 the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of defendant's motion
for summary judgment when plaintiff had provided defendant
publisher with a detailed denial of the defamatory allegations prior
to republication of the book in paperback form; defendant's inves-
tigation partially corroborated the inaccuracy of some of the
charges, yet defendant failed to make any changes. 155
3. Reliance on an Inherently Ambiguous Source
Proof that the defendant relied on information that is capable
of more than one interpretation can cut both for and against a
finding of reckless disregard for the truth. On the one hand, the
plaintiff can argue that such evidence tends to establish that the
defendant proceeded with reckless disregard for the truth in that
the very existence of the ambiguity must have indicated to the re-
porter that the conclusion he drew might have been false. On the
other hand, the defendant can argue that the evidence tends to
undermine any showing of reckless disregard because the presence
of the ambiguity suggests that the reporter could have believed
that the inference he drew was correct.
The Supreme Court confronted the issue in Time, Inc. v.
Pape.15 In Pape plaintiff contended that he was defamed by a
153. Id. at 121.
154. 52 N.Y.2d 422, 420 N.E.2d 377, 438 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1981).
155. Id. at 437, 420 N.E.2d at 383, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
156. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
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news story which appeared in defendant's magazine summarizing a
report of the Federal Civil Rights Commission. The article de-
scribed and quoted an account of an alleged incident of police bru-
tality set forth in the report without indicating that the report it-
self was only summarizing the allegations of a complaint filed in a
federal civil rights action. 157 Consequently, the article appeared to
state that the Commission had concluded that the plaintiff had
committed the illegal acts.1 5s The ultimate question before the
Court was whether defendant's failure to specify that the Commis-
sion was only summarizing a legal pleading was sufficient evidence
to permit a jury to conclude that defendant had proceeded with
reckless disregard for the truth. The Court held that under the cir-
cumstances the evidence was inadequate to support such a find-
ing. 59 After scrutinizing the record, the Court observed that
whether the Commission was simply recounting the episodes set
forth in various legal pleadings or endorsing them as accurate ac-
counts of the underlying incidents was unclear.16 0 Consequently,
the Court concluded that:
Time's omission of the word "alleged" amounted to the adoption of one of a
number of possible rational interpretations of a document that bristled with
ambiguities. The deliberate choice of such an interpretation, though arguably
reflecting a misconception, was not enough to create a jury issue of "malice"
under New York Times.81
Time, Inc. v. Pape is an important precedent for the proof of
fault issue, because, as the Court recognized, reporters will often
need to rely on a source's description of what others said or did. 62
When the source's account is unclear, the reporter runs the risk of
inaccuracy if he misunderstands or deliberately chooses one of sev-
eral possible interpretations. The Pape Court doubtlessly was cor-
rect in concluding that an inference of reckless disregard should
not have been permitted under the clear and convincing evidence
standard given the ambiguity present in the Commission Report
157. Id. at 281-82.
158. Id. at 284-85.
159. Id. at 289. The district court granted summary judgment for defendant. The
court of appeals, however, reversed and remanded for trial.
160. Id. at 285-89.
161. Id. at 290. The Court observed, however, that "[n]othing in this opinion is to be
understood as making the word 'alleged' a superfluity in published reports of information
damaging to reputation." Id. at 292.
162. Id. at 286. See Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment: The Case for a
Constitutional Privilege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 469 (1979), for a detailed analysis
of Pape and an argument that the Court should have provided the press with even greater
protection in the reporting of the substance of public documents and proceedings.
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and the absence of any further evidence of reckless disregard.
While possibly the reporter did realize he was affirmatively dis-
torting the report, possibly he believed that his interpretation was
warranted. Absent further proof, the factfinder had no way of
resolving the question.
Many of the lower court cases that have explicitly163 or implic-
itly"' applied the analysis of Time, Inc. v. Pape to find the plain-
tiff's evidence of reckless disregard insufficient have concerned fac-
tually arguable misinterpretations of legal documents or reports of
legal affairs or proceedings. This predominance is not surprising.
In reporting legal affairs, members of the press often must attempt
to decipher arcane and complex documents and proceedings under
deadline pressure.16 5 The potential for misunderstanding is great
as is the potential for damage to reputation. One can easily appre-
ciate how a nonlawyer could rationally but erroneously conclude
that a warrantless search was illegal 6 6 or that an order directing a
163. See Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1112, 1116 (6th Cir. 1978) (reversing
verdict for plaintiff when defendant interpreted charge of "fraud" in indictment as "swin-
dle"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742, 749-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (granting summary judgment
for defendant when author misunderstood complex administrative regulation); Buchanan v.
Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1205 (D.D.C. 1975) (granting summary judgment for
defendant when, among other things, reporters misinterpreted judicial hearing as disclosing
that plaintiff's firm illegally laundered campaign contributions); Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98
Idaho 337, 342, 563 P.2d 395, 399 (affirming summary judgment for defendant when news-
paper erroneously reported that judicial order directing prosecutor to initiate contempt pro-
ceedings against plaintiff had adjudged plaintiff in contempt of court), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 891 (1977); Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing and Printing, 89 N.J. 451, 469, 446 A.2d 469,
477 (reversing verdict for plaintiff when defendant misunderstood source's tip about elec-
tion fraud investigation), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982).
164. See Levine v. CMP Publications, 738 F.2d 660, 675 (5th Cir. 1984) (partially re-
versing award of punitive damages when reporter relied on negative and arguably mislead-
ing remarks of judge); Waskow v. Associated Press, 462 F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant when reporter misinterpreted newspaper story
as stating that plaintiff was sentenced to jail along with three other individuals); Dupler v.
Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St. 2d 116, 413 N.E.2d 1187, 1192-93 (1980) (affirming rever-
sal of verdict for plaintiff when reporter misinterpreted statement that plaintiff had con-
ducted a warrantless search in prior article to mean that the search was illegal), cert. de-
nied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); Post v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 268 Or. 214, 223-24, 519 P.2d
1258, 1262-63 (1974) (reversing judgment for plaintiff when defendant read police APB as
stating that police were seeking plaintiff); see also Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co.
v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 688, 321 N.E.2d 580, 591, (1974) (af-
firming summary judgment for defendant when newspaper published one of several possible
interpretations of fire department report), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1975).
165. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 471, 478-79 (1976) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); see also infra notes 387-96 and accompanying text.
166. Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St. 2d 116, 413 N.E.2d 1187, 1193
(1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981).
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prosecutor to initiate contempt proceedings was equivalent to an
adjudication of contempt'1 7 or that a certain disclosure in a judicial
hearing pertained to campaign contributions rather than expendi-
tures when "almost all the reporters who were present at the
[Watergate-related] hearing were very confused about precisely
what was going on."'' 68 In a given case, such factual misinterpreta-
tions might raise an inference of negligence but without other evi-
dence of doubt for the truth of the allegations they do not tend to
suggest that the reporter was even dimly aware of the error.
There are limits to the Pape principle that misinterpretation
does not prove reckless disregard. In Nader v. de Toledano e9 for
instance, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused to ap-
ply Pape when it was unable to find that the source document was
ambiguous on the point in issue.17 In Nader, defendant columnist
wrote that a senator had "demonstrated conclusively" that plain-
tiff had "falsified and distorted evidence."1'7 The Nader court
found that the document published by the senator explicitly had
determined that plaintiff had acted in good faith and simply had
reached certain erroneous conclusions because he had not had ac-
cess to all of the evidence.17 2 As a matter of abstract principle, the
majority in Nader doubtlessly is correct in recognizing that a false,
defamatory, and unsupportable interpretation of an unambiguous
document properly could give rise to an inference of reckless disre-
gard under the Pape standard. The dissent in Nader argued, how-
ever, that the subcommittee report in issue was far more ambigu-
ous than the majority acknowledged and that, indeed, the crucial
finding of good faith was largely undercut by the body of the
document. 7 3
167. Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 342, 563 P.2d 395, 399, cert. denied, 434 U.S.
891 (1977).
168. Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1204 (D.D.C. 1975).
169. 408 A.2d 31 (D.D.C. 1979) (reversing summary judgment for defendant colum-
nist), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
170. Id. at 51-52.
171. Id. at 37-38.
172. Id. at 52-53.
173. Id. at 59, 64-67 (Harris, J., dissenting). The dissent noted:
[It] may be said, indeed, that the document de Toledano was faced with interpreting
presented a greater problem than mere ambiguity. Specifically, the result the majority
reaches today signals that a few introductory platitudes (in all likelihood motivated by
a simple sense of political etiquette) prefacing an otherwise straightforward and hard-
hitting official investigatory report subsequently may provide the justification for a li-
bel suit. In other words, what may have been intended by the staff as a mere political
shield effectively has been turned by the majority into a sword holding a response wor-
thy of First Amendment protection at bay.
[Vol. 38:247292
MEDIA DEFAMATION LITIGATION
The recent case of Rebozo v. Washington Post Co. 17 4 also may
suggest an inherent limitation of Pape. In Rebozo, a reporter while
investigating charges that plaintiff, a widely known public figure,
had knowingly cashed a stolen stock certificate, had examined a
deposition in which an insurance investigator had been asked
under oath whether he had informed plaintiff that the securities
were "stolen or missing," to which the investigator replied "yes
sir.'" 1 7After reading the deposition the reporter contacted plain-
tiff's attorney and was told that plaintiff "flatly denied" having
been informed by the investigator that the securities were stolen.176
The reporter ultimately wrote a front page story charging that
plaintiff had cashed the securities after having been informed that
they were stolen. 177 A federal district court granted summary judg-
ment for defendant due to insufficient evidence of reckless disre-
gard. Without citing Time, Inc. v. Pape, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded on the ground that the
reporter's "resolution of the obvious ambiguity whether [the inves-
tigator] told [plaintiff] the stock was (a) missing, (b) stolen, or (c)
missing or stolen, in favor of the most potentially damaging alter-
native creates a jury question on whether the publication was in-
deed made with serious doubt as to its truthfulness.' 178 This result
may or may not be inconsistent with Time, Inc. v. Pape depending
upon interpretation of the Rebozo record. In Pape, the source doc-
ument revealed one position-the statements were merely allega-
tions in a complaint-but implied another position-the Commis-
sion believed the allegations to be true. The reporter in Pape
might simply have failed to perceive one of the two possible mean-
ings, If so, there would be no room to infer serious doubt of the
Id. at 66.
Somewhat ironically, the dissent further charged that the defamatory statement itself
was ambiguous and that the majority had misinterpreted it. The dissent argued that the
defamatory statement in issue alleged that the subcommittee report "demonstrates" that
the plaintiff falsified evidence and not that the senator said that he falsified evidence. Id. at
64. The dissent may be correct in detecting a certain amount of ambiguity in the defama-
tory statement. Still, the majority's reading seems more natural, and, more significantly,
either reading of the statement would appear to be unsupported by the subcommittee re-
port, as construed by the majority.
174. 637 F.2d 375 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 964 (1981).
175. Id. at 376.
176. Id. at 377.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 382. In addition, the court pointed out that there was further evidence of
reckless disregard in the form of a memorandum written by the reporter which noted that
there was some uncertainty whether plaintiff or his bank cashed the stock and that if the
bank cashed the stock the lead paragraph of the article would have to be changed. Id.
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truth because at most, the reporter simply made a good faith error.
Alternatively, the reporter might have understood that two differ-
ent conclusions could be drawn from the document and reading it
more carefully, deliberately and rationally chose one over the
other. Again, such a choice would not give rise to an inference of
reckless disregard. This rational resolution seems to explain what
actually occurred in Pape.179 Rebozo may be an example of the
first alternative. The reporter in Rebozo may have read the investi-
gator's response as meaning that he had told plaintiff that the se-
curities "were either stolen or that they were missing." If so, the
reporter may not have spotted the ambiguity because he may not
have realized that the investigator's answer also might have meant
that either he told plaintiff that "the securities were stolen" or
that he told plaintiff that "they were missing," but not both. The
reporter's interpretation was rational as he read, or misread, the
document and, as such, could not give rise to an inference of reck-
less disregard under Pape. Rebozo, however, cannot fit under the
second Pape alternative. If the reporter did comprehend the am-
biguous nature of the deposition question and answer, then the re-
porter may have understood that the investigator's simple answer
of "yes sir" in the deposition could be read as asserting that either:
(1) "I told plaintiff that the stock was stolen"; or (2) "I told Plain-
tiff that it was stolen or missing"; or (3) "I merely told Plaintiff
that it was missing." Unlike Pape, this reading presents an inher-
ent ambiguity that cannot be resolved rationally through a close
reading of the document itself. Rebozo is not simply a case of innu-
endo. If the reporter comprehended the inherent ambiguity yet,
absent further investigation, chose "stolen" over "missing" because
it made a better story, he knew that what he had written very well
might have been false. 8 ' The reporter's interpretation of the docu-
ment was not rational under Pape. Therefore, a jury might well
find the reporter acted with reckless disregard. The Fifth Circuit in
Rebozo seemed to agree with the above reasoning. The Rebozo ra-
tionale is not inconsistent with Pape so long as there is a sufficient
factual predicate for concluding that the reporter was aware of the
179. 401 U.S. at 285.
180. The reporter's subsequent investigation would suggest that there was greater rea-
son to choose an interpretation opposite from that chosen by the reporter because plaintiff's
attorney had "flatly denied" that plaintiff ever had been informed that the securities were
stolen. Following the denial of certiorari, the case was settled. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1983,
at 13, col. 3.
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ambiguity.18' The Rebozo opinion does not clarify whether the re-
porter was aware of the ambiguity. When the record is unclear on
this point, Pape should control because there is a significant possi-
bility that the reporter failed to perceive the ambiguity and no in-
ference of reckless disregard should arise.
Pape plays a significant role in defining reckless disregard in
the limited context of an ambiguous source. Properly read, Nader
and Rebozo are fair attempts at ensuring that the principle of
Pape does not extend beyond its functional limitations.
4. Investigation as Affirmative Evidence
for the Defendant
In Tavoulareas v. Washington Post, a federal district court re-
cently observed that "[a] reporter cannot shield himself from a
charge of reckless disregard merely by showing that he invested a
large amount of time and effort on an article's preparation."''8 2
While this statement is no doubt true, evidence pertaining to the
defendant's efforts to investigate or verify the defamatory charges
is a double-edged sword. Just as evidence that the defendant failed
to investigate or verify, under certain circumstances, can give rise
to an inference of serious doubt, evidence that the defendant did
research and corroborate, in a given case, can effectively establish
that the statements were not published with a high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity. 83 For instance, in Yiamouyi-
181. In reliance on Rebozo, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held in Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co. that a reporter's practice of consistently select-
ing the most damaging and sensational inferences from among several ambiguities consti-
tuted some evidence of reckless disregard. 759 F.2d 90, 121-23 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In dissent,
Judge Wright argued that this was inconsistent with Pape and criticized Rebozo as "illcon-
ceived." Id. at 158 n.15. While it is not entirely clear, the majority opinion seems to suggest
that the defendants were aware of the ambiguities and deliberately chose the most harmful
interpretations. If so, then the court is correct in concluding that such a practice could pro-
vide some evidence of reckless disregard.
182. 567 F. Supp. 651, 658 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The
Court of Appeals quoted this observation with approval. Id. at 132. However, it noted that
evidence of exhaustive research "may . . .merely be evidence of a dogged and thorough
attempt to 'get' the subject." Id.
183. Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726, 732-33 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing verdict for plain-
tiff when author had two reliable sources); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264,
276 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when reporter conducted
thorough investigation); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir. 1972) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant when reporter spent months documenting and corroborat-
ing allegations), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426
F.2d 858, 867 (5th Cir. 1970) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when reporter and
researcher conducted thorough investigation); New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567,
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annis v. Consumers Union of the United States,8  the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for
the defendant observing:
[Defendant] made a thorough investigation of the facts. Scientific writings
576-77 (5th Cir. 1966) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when reporter relied on one or two
sources for every statement); Zimmerman v. Board of Publications, 598 F. Supp. 1002, 1013,
(D. Colo. 1984) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporters conducted ex-
tensive investigation); Joseph v. Xerox Corp., 594 F. Supp. 330, 335 (D.D.C. 1984) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, author spent time researching
to ensure he was correct); Holt v. Cox Enters., 590 F. Supp. 408, 413 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (grant-
ing summary judgment for defendant when newspaper followed accepted research proce-
dures in writing story); Zurita v. Virgin Islands Daily News, 578 F. Supp. 306, 309 (N.D.V.I.
1984) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter and editor confirmed exis-
tence of investigation pertaining to plaintiff and unsuccessfully attempted to contact plain-
tiff); National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1299, 1317 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (granting summary judgment for defendant when editor consulted several reliable
sources); Wynberg v. National Enquirer, 564 F. Supp. 924, 930 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when author sought verification from more sources than
usual in writing article); Casper v. Washington Post Co., 549 F. Supp. 376, 378 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (granting directed verdict for defendant when reporter conducted thorough investiga-
tion); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star Tribune Co., 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1078-84 (N.D. Ind. 1976)
aff'd, 557 F.2d 107, 109 (7th Cir.); (granting summary judgment for defendant in view of
extensive documentation by reporter), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Lancaster v. Daily
Banner-News Publishing Co., 274 Ark. 145, 151, 622 S.W.2d 671, 673 (1981) (affirming sum-
mary judgment for defendant when reporter had more than 13 sources for the information);
DiLeo v. Koltnow, 200 Colo. 119, 613 P.2d 318, 324 (1980) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant when reporter conducted thorough investigation and had reliable sources); Fink
v. Combined Communications Corp., 679 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Colo. App. 1984) (affirming sum-
mary judgment for defendants when, among other things, reporter consulted 50 knowledgea-
ble persons); Catalano v. Pechous, 69 Ill. App. 3d 797, 811, 387 N.E.2d 714, 726 (1978) (af-
firming summary judgment for defendant when there was voluminous evidence that it fully
investigated circumstance surrounding incident); Licavali v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc.,
4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1833, 1834-38 (Ind. Cir. Ct. 1978) (granting summary judgment for
defendant when reporters conducted thorough and systematic investigation relying on mul-
tiple sources); Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 539-42, 445 A.2d
1038, 1041-42 (1982) (affirming directed verdict for defendant when writer undertook sub-
stantial investigation prior to drafting editorial), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1983); Dienes v.
Associated Newspapers, 358 N.W.2d 562, 568 (Mich. App. 1984) (affirming summary judg-
ment for defendant when reporter relied on knowledge of search warrant, comments by at-
torney, and his own personal observations); Pelzer v. Minneapolis Tribune, 7 (BNA) 2507,
2508 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1981) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter ob-
tained affidavits from six people stating that they saw plaintiff at party); Whitmore v. Kan-
sas City Star, 499 S.W.2d 45, 52 (Mo. App. 1973) (affirming directed verdict for defendant
when reporter verified information with several knowledgeable sources); Jurkawski v. Craw-
ley, 637 P.2d 56, 61-62 (Okla. 1981) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when inves-
tigation revealed nothing inconsistent with allegations); Wright v. King Broadcasting, 8 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 1325, 1327 (Or. Cir. Ct. 1981), a/I'd, 59 Ore. App. 409 (1982) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when broadcaster took reasonable steps to investigate and
verify factual allegations); Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 707, 459 P.2d 8, 18
(1969) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when defendant had three reputable sources for infor-
mation), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
184. 619 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
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and authorities in the field were consulted, authoritative scientific bodies
speaking for substantial segments of the medical and scientific community
were investigated. The unquestioned methodology of the preparation of the
article exemplifies the very highest order of responsible journalism; the entire
article was checked and rechecked across a spectrum of knowledge and,
where necessary, changes were made in the interests of accuracy. 5
The absence of serious doubt may be especially clear when the
defendant obtained the information from, or corroborated it by, a
source that it knew to be reliable. A source might be deemed trust-
worthy for a variety of reasons. The reporter may have known the
source personally for an extended period of time,""' or the reporter
may have relied on the source's expertise as in F. & J. Enterprises,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc.,8 7 in which inter-
viewer Mike Wallace consulted a well-respected attorney critic of
the toy industry in constructing a "60 Minutes" segment on defec-
tive toys. 8" Likewise, a source might be considered reliable when
he had an excellent reputation for veracity in the community,18 9 or
when the source had provided accurate information in the past.1 90
185. Id. at 940; see also B. BROOKs, G. KENNEDY, D. MOEN & D. RANLEY, NEWS WRITING
& REPORTING 437 (1980) ("Usually a reporter who has tried diligently to do all possible
research for a story will be able to meet the actual malice test and win a libel action. The
key is verification: checking the information with as many sources as possible.").
186. Grzelak v. Calumet Publishing Co, 543 F.2d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant); see also Baldine v. Sharon Herald Co., 391 F.2d 703, 707
(3d Cir. 1967) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when advertising manager per-
sonally knew that person who submitted political advertisement was "reputable fellow").
187. 373 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
188. Id. at 298 (granting summary judgment for defendant); see also Ryan v. Brooks,
634 F.2d 726, 732 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when author relied on two
secondary sources with excellent reputations); Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of the
United States, 619 F.2d 932, 940 (2d Cir.) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when
writer relied on authoritative scientific sources), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Wolston
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming summary judgment
for defendant when author relied on extensive investigation by the FBI), rev'd on other
grounds, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States,
516 F. Supp. 742, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (granting summary judgment for defendant when
writer of article evaluating automobile relied on automotive experts on defendant's staff);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting summary
judgment for defendant when newspaper relied on opinions of well-known accounting ex-
pert); Reader's Digest v. Main County Superior Court, - Cal. 3d -, -, , 690 P.2d
610, 619, 208 Cal. Rptr. 137, 146 (1984) (reversing denial of summary judgment for defen-
dant when reporters relied on reputable professor who had studied plaintiff organization);
Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 707, 723, 459 P.2d 8, 17 (1969) (reversing
verdict for plaintiff when experts relied on city attorney and assistant chief of police whose
"positions would almost raise a presumption of trustworthiness"), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927
(1970).
189. See Gaynes v. Allen, 339 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Mich. 1983) (affirming directed verdict
for defendant).
190. See Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1259 (5th Cir. 1980) (re-
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Often a source will be considered reliable because he was in an
excellent position to obtain the particular information transmitted,
as in Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc.,191 in which a reporter
based allegations that a movie star's boyfriend was exploiting her
financially on conversations with the movie star's business man-
ager. 192 As the Supreme Court recognized in St. Amant v. Thomp-
versing verdict for plaintiff), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981).
191. 564 F. Supp. 924 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
192. Id. at 930 (granting summary judgment for defendant); see also Liberty Lobby,
Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1575-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (granting partial summary judg-
ment for defendant when reporter relied on persons that were in a position to know about
plaintiff organization); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 276 (3d Cir. 1980)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on Consumer Affairs Bu-
reau regarding complaints about business); Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1229 (3d Cir.
1978) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on veteran congress-
man well acquainted with subject matter of allegations); Walker v. Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681,
684 (6th Cir. 1976) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when editor relied on letter
from prosecutor trying case in issue), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); Cervantes v. Time,
Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 988, 995 (8th Cir. 1972) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
when writer relied on agents from the FBI and the United States Department of Justice for
information regarding plaintiff's connection to organized crime), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 568-73 (5th Cir.) (reversing denial of summary
judgment for defendant when reporter verified allegations concerning organized crime with
Department of Justice attorney), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); Murray v. Bailey, 11
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1369, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (granting summary judgment for defen-
dant newspaper when it relied on author attorney for description of events occurring at his
trial for drunk driving); Herbert v. Lando, 596 F. Supp. 1178, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (grant-
ing partial summary judgment for defendant when television producer relied on accusation
of plaintiff by witness who was allegedly present at incident and was referred to defendant
by plaintiff); Bell v. Associated Press, 584 F. Supp. 128, 129, 132 (D.D.C. 1984) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when reporter verified charges of public lewdness with
police department and municipal court); Bellamy v. Arno Press, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1420, 1422 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter ob-
tained description of incident from persons concerned); Nesbitt v. Multimedia, 9 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1473, 1476-77 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (granting summary judgment for defendant
when reporter obtained information pertaining to recovery of stolen property from police
officer); Ali v. Daily News Publishing Co., 540 F. Supp. 142, 146-47 (D.V.I. 1982) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when reporter interviewed guards involved in prison inci-
dent); Velle Transcendental Research Ass'n v. Sanders, 518 F. Supp. 512, 519 (C.D. Cal.
1981) (granting summary judgment for defendant when author interviewed former members
of cult about its practices); Adams v. Maas, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1188, 1190-91 (S.D.
Tex. 1981) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter verified criminal
charges with FBI and police); Torres v. Playboy Enters., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1182, 1186-
87 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (granting summary judgment for defendant when author confirmed in-
formation pertaining to plaintiff's trial with U.S. Attorney in charge of case); Logan v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (D.D.C. 1978) (granting partial summary judg-
ment for defendant newspaper when reporter obtained medical test results from doctor in
charge of testing); LaBruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979, 981 (W.D. Mo. 1973)
(granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter confirmed organized crime story
with law enforcement officials); Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967,
974 (D. Minn. 1967) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter confirmed
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son, providing information that is self-incriminating or that ex-
poses the source to personal danger also may provide some
indication of reliability. 93 Finally, a reporter may conclude that a
source is reliable based on his overall assessment of the source and
story on lawsuit with parties' attorneys), aff'd, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968); Corbett v. Reg-
ister Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 10, 356 A.2d 472, 476 (Super. Ct. 1975) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on police desk officer for information
pertaining to arrest); Jamason v. Palm Beach Newspapers, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1965,
1966 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1983) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on
sworn statement of police officer regarding bribery investigation); El Amin v. Miami Herald,
9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1079, 1082 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1983) (granting summary judgment for
defendant when reporter relied on police report about altercation involving plaintiff); Sa-
vannah News-Press, Division Southeastern Newspapers Corp. v. Whetsell, 149 Ga. App. 233,
235-36, 254 S.E.2d 151, 153 (1979) (reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant
when reporter confirmed story regarding serving search warrant with deputy who partici-
pated); Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 548, 561, 372 N.E.2d 1211,
1221 (1978) (granting partial summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on per-
sons to whom plaintiffs allegedly made comments in issue); Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So. 2d
1306, 1309 (La.) (reversing judgment for plaintiff when defendant relied on police officer in
position to know about allegations of corruption), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Malerba
v. Newsday, Inc., 64 A.D.2d 623, 623-24, 406 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553-54 (App. Div. 1978) (revers-
ing denial of summary judgment for defendant when reporter confirmed report pertaining to
police misconduct with police commission and complainant's attorney); Championship
Sports, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 887, 888, 336 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959 (Sup. Ct. 1972)
(granting summary judgment for defendant when defendant confirmed report pertaining to
tax seizure with IRS information officer); Cohen v. New York Herald Tribune, Inc., 63 Misc.
2d 87, 94-95, 310 N.Y.S.2d 709, 723 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (granting directed verdict for defendant
when columnist interviewed police officers, prosecutor, and eyewitnesses about murder);
Bukky v. Painesville Tel. & Lake Geauga Printing Co., 68 Ohio St. 2d 45, 46, 428 N.E.2d
405, 406-07 (1981) (reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant when reporter veri-
fied allegations about township purchasing irregularities with township clerk); Henslee v.
Monks, 571 P.2d 440, 444 (Okla. 1977) (affirming verdict for defendant when reporter inter-
viewed police officers and other "authoritative sources" about alleged illegal acts); Curran v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 497 Pa. 163, 170-71, 439 A.2d 652, 659-60 (1981) (affirming
partial summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on highly placed source
within government agency who was likely to know actual reason for plaintiff's resignation);
Times-Mirror Co. v. Harden, 628 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (reversing verdict
for plaintiff when "every challenged statement was traced to an identified source" some of
whom were involved in events that were the subject of the article); Tilton v. Cowles Publish-
ing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 707, 722, 459 P.2d 8, 17 (1969) (en banc) (reversing verdict for plaintiff
when defendant confirmed story about potential lawsuit with attorney and assistant chief of
police), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970); cf. Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500
F.2d 830, 834 (8th Cir. 1974) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when reporter obtained informa-
tion pertaining to plaintiff's business from reliable source); Tucci v. Guy Gannett Publishing
Co., 464 A.2d 161, 168-69 (Me. 1983) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when re-
porter interviewed person who monitored a police promotional examination and was in a
position to know whether plaintiff had been charged with cheating); Moloney v. Tribune
Publishing Co., 26 Wash. App. 357, 362, 612 P.2d 1179, 1183 (1980) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant when newspaper relied on police officer's report of investigation of
death).
193. 390 U.S. 727, 733 (1968).
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his information, as in Roberts v. Dover,194 in which the reporter
testified that he believed a person who called to report an incident
of police misconduct "because he sounded genuinely upset and an-
gry and because [the reporter] thought it would be difficult for
someone to make up such a series of events and relate them so
easily.' 9 5
A court also may reject an inference of reckless disregard if
the reporter based a story on a primary source of information such
as public or official records or documents."9" Failure to trace an
194. 525 F. Supp. 987 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
195. Id. at 992 (granting summary judgment for defendant for insufficient evidence of
reckless disregard).
196. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 285-92, (reversing verdict for plaintiff when
reporter consulted report of Civil Rights Commission), reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 1015 (1971);
Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1090 (3d Cir. 1985) (reversing
verdict and punitive damage award for plaintiff when editors verified criminal charges with
indictment); Brown v. Herald Co., 698 F.2d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant when reporter examined plaintiff's personnel file); Schultz v. News-
week, Inc., 668 F.2d 911, 919 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
when reporter consulted police "rap sheet"); Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d
1227, 1237 (6th Cir.) (affirming directed verdict for defendant when network based drama in
large part on court findings in actual case), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981); Moorhead
v. Millin, 542 F. Supp. 614, 619 (D.V.I. 1982) (granting summary judgment for defendant
when reporter relied on letter written by Lt. Governor criticizing plaintiff's conduct as a
public official); Handelman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1053, 1054-55, 1059
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (denying punitive damages to plaintiff when author relied on original court
documents); Cone v. Phipps Broadcasting, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1972, 1974 (M.D. Ga.
1979) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter checked allegations against
public records); Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967, 972 (D. Minn.
1967) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter consulted complaint and
probate order before writing about legal proceeding), aff'd, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968);
Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d 47, 50-51 (1973) (affirming summary judgment
for defendant when reporter consulted report of law school tenure committee); Weingarten
v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 145-46, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, 713, 716 (Ct. App.) (affirming
nonsuit for defendant when reporter consulted court records and public deeds), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 899 (1980); Russell v. McMillen, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1888, 1891 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1984) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when editor relied on public docu-
ments); Tucci v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co., 464 A.2d 161, 169-70 (Me. 1983) (affirming
judgment for defendant when, in investigating allegations of cheating on civil service exam,
defendant relied on contemporaneous memorandum of city manager and other public docu-
ments); Dawson v. Wright, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2001, 2004 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1982) (grant-
ing summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on public records); Standke v.
B.E. Darby & Sons, Inc., 291 Minn. 468, 469, 480-82, 193 N.W.2d 139, 141, 145-46 (1971)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on grand jury records with
respect to story concerning investigation), cert. dismissed, 406 U.S. 902 (1972); Bierman v.
Pultizer Publishing Co., 627 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (affirming summary judg-
ment for defendant when reporter relied on police records); De Gregorio v. News Printing, 9
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1045, 1047 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (reversing verdict for
plaintiff when reporter based defamatory allegations on information obtained from public
records); Barbarita v. Gannett, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1050, 1052 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981)
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allegation to an official source, however, does not raise an inference
of reckless disregard because the defendant still may have based
his report on a reliable source or may have had sufficient reason to
believe that the information was true.197
Editors and reporters by necessity rely on sources of informa-
tion within the media. Consequently, proof that a reporter relied
on another reporter with a reputation for trustworthiness e8 or that
(granting summary judgment for defendant when reporters relied on public records);
Fotochrome, Inc. v. New York Herald Tribune, Inc., 61 Misc. 2d 226, 231, 305 N.Y.S.2d 168,
173 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (granting summary judgment for defendant when in reporting about
financial status of plaintiff corporation, reporter relied on annual reports and proxy state-
ments); Ferguson v. Dayton Newspaper, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2502, 2505 (Ohio Ct. App.
1981) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when reporters relied on public records);
Drye v. Mansfield Journal Corp., 32 Ohio Misc. 70, 75, 288 N.E.2d 856, 860 (Ct. Com. Pl.
1972) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on official release of
governmental agency); Post v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 268 Or. 214, 219, 519 P.2d 1258,
1263 (1974) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when reporter consulted police APB); cf. Ross v.
News-Journal Co., 228 A.2d 531, 534-35 (Del. 1967) (affirming summary judgment for defen-
dant when reporter checked some though not all relevant public records).
197. Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726, 732-33 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing verdict for plain-
tiff when author relied on trustworthy secondary rather than primary sources); Trapp v.
Southeastern Newspapers, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1985, 1993 (S.D. Ga. 1984) (granting
summary judgment for defendant even though reporter failed to verify charges with state
Ethics Commission findings); Adams v. Maas, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1188, 1191 (S.D. Tex.
1981) (granting summary judgment for defendant when paperback publisher relied on
hardbound version of book by reputable publisher); Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associ-
ated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (granting summary judgment for defen-
dant when reporter relied on agency press release rather than official records); Whitfield v.
Southeastern Newspapers, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1771, 1773 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1984) (grant-
ing summary judgment for defendant even though reporter failed to verify allegations with
court records); Dawson v. Wright, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2001, 2004 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1982)
(granting summary judgment for defendant even though reporter failed to verify charges
with public land records); O'Connell v. Gannett Co., 77 Misc. 2d 344, 348, 353 N.Y.S.2d 144,
149 (City Ct. 1974) (granting summary judgment for defendant even though plaintiff alleged
defendant would have discovered falsity by checking public records); Taylor v. Greensboro
News Co., 57 N.C. App. 426, 430, 437, 291 S.E.2d 852, 854, 858 (1982) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant when reporter relied on newspaper clipping file rather than court
records); Hackworth v. Larson, 83 S.D. 674, 683, 165 N.W.2d 705, 710 (1969) (affirming sum-
mary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on press release rather than official
records). But see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio App. 2d 143, 148, 416 N.E.2d
662, 667 (1979) (reversing directed verdict for defendant when, among other things, reporter
wrote about trial without attending it or consulting transcript), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 966
(1980).
198. See Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024, 1027-28 (5th Cir. 1975) (af-
firming judgment n.o.v. for defendant when reporter relied on another reporter with exten-
sive experience); LaBruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979, 981 (W.D. Mo. 1973)
(granting summary judgment for defendant when allegations were confirmed by veteran re-
porter); Championship Sports, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 887, 888-89, 336 N.Y.S.2d 958,
959-60 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (granting summary judgment for defendant when allegations were
confirmed by a "stringer"); Colombo v. Times-Argus Ass'n, 135 Vt. 454, 380 A.2d 80, 84
(1977) (affirming directed verdict for defendant when reporter relied on another reporter's
302 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:247
the publisher relied on reputable reporters or columnists199 gener-
version of a conversation). But see Keogh v. New York Herald Tribune, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d
888, 893-95, 274 N.Y.S.2d 302, 307-08 (Sup. Ct.) (partially denying summary judgment for
defendant when source reporter testified that information he passed along to defendant re-
porter was nothing more than "courthouse gossip"), aff'd, 246 A.D.2d 218, 285 N.Y.S.2d 262
(App. Div. 1966).
199. See Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1089 (3d Cir.
1985) (reversing verdict and punitive damage award for plaintiff when editors relied on rep-
utation of writer); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(affirming partial summary judgment for defendant when editor relied on reporter); Brewer
v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1258-59 (5th Cir. 1980) (reversing verdict for
plaintiffs when editors relied on prior reliability of reporters, one of whom specialized in the
subject area of the article), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. De-
aner, 623 F.2d 264, 268 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when
editor relied on reporter's "'outstanding reputation for truthfulness and accuracy' ");
Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when
editor relied on excellent reputation of writer), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Firestone
v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712, 719-21 (5th Cir.) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when editors
relied on information provided by reliable and experienced reporter), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
875 (1972); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 971-72 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (reversing
denial of summary judgment for defendant when newspaper relied on nationally syndicated
columnist with good reputation and 35 years of experience), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011
(1967); Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924, 930 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when writer of article was "esteemed journalist on the
national and international news fronts"); Velle Transcendental Research Ass'n v. Sanders,
518 F. Supp. 512, 519 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (granting summary judgment for defendant when
publisher relied on good reputation of author); Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp.
481, 487 (D. Mass. 1980) (granting summary judgment for defendant when newspaper relied
on reputation of nationally syndicated columnist); Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12, 17 (D.
Alaska 1979) (granting summary judgment for defendant when A.P. editor relied on stories
submitted by project team made up of "some of the nation's top investigative journalists");
Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600, 605 (D.D.C. 1977) (granting summary
judgment for defendant when newspaper relied on reputation and expertise of writer on
sports medicine), afl'd, 578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star and Trib-
une Co., 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1081 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (granting summary judgment for defen-
dant when magazine editor relied on writer who appeared thorough and credible), aff'd, 557
F.2d 107, 109 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening
Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 952, 959 (D.D.C. 1976) (granting summary judgment
for defendant when publisher relied on reporter of "proven reliability," especially on topic
of article); Carey v. Hume, 390 F. Supp. 1026, 1029-30 (D.D.C. 1975) (granting partial sum-
mary judgment for defendant when newspaper relied on reputation of nationally syndicated
columnist); Hensley v. Life Magazine, Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 50, 53 (N.D. Cal. 1971)
(granting summary judgment for defendant when magazine's reporter was "dependable and
reputable" and had made long and thorough investigation of the subject matter in issue);
Konigsburg v. Time, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 848, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (granting summary judg-
ment for defendant when editor relied on reporter acknowledged to be credible and knowl-
edgeable of organized crime); Belli v. Curtis Publishing Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 384, 400, 102
Cal. Rptr. 122, 133 (Ct. App. 1972) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when pub-
lisher relied on reporter's reputation); Dienes v. Associated Newspapers, 358 N.W.2d 562,
568 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when reporter per-
sonally observed subject of article); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d
369, 382-83, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 951-52 (reversing denial of summary
judgment for defendant when publisher relied on author's reputation), cert. denied, 434
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ally undermines an attempt to establish reckless disregard. In the
leading case of Nader v. DeToledano,"00 for instance, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected an inference of reckless dis-
regard against a newspaper that failed to verify a column by an
experienced and widely syndicated columnist with a good reputa-
tion for accuracy.2°1 Along the same lines, reliance on previously
reported accounts in reputable publications tends to establish that
the relying reporter did not seriously doubt the truth of the infor-
mation. °2 Courts also virtually presume that members of the press
U.S. 969 (1977); Schwartz v. Time, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 769, 774, 337 N.Y.S.2d 125, 131 (Sup.
Ct. 1972) (granting summary judgment for defendant when magazine relied on experienced
reporter with impeccable reputation for integrity); Fotochrome, Inc. v. New York Herald
Tribune, Inc., 61 Misc. 2d 226, 231, 305 N.Y.S.2d 168, 173 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (granting sum-
mary judgment for defendant when publisher of article pertaining to financial status of cor-
poration relied on reporter with substantial experience in covering business affairs);
Doubleday v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex. 1984) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when
reporter personally observed subject of article); cf. Dowd v. Calabrese, 589 F. Supp. 1206,
1216 (D.D.C. 1984) (dismissing plaintiff's claim when editor relied on "trustworthiness and
integrity of his reporters" in writing letter to plaintiff's superior defending prior article
about plaintiff). But see Pep v. Newsweek, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1000, 1001-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(denying summary judgment for defendant despite publisher's reliance on well-respected
author).
200. 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
201. Id. at 54-55.
202. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (af-
firming partial summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on previously pub-
lished articles); Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1237 (6th Cir.) (af-
firming directed verdict for defendant when network relied, in part, on book by reputable
historian), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981); Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726, 733 (4th Cir.
1980) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when author relied on articles in publications with ex-
cellent reputations); Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir. 1978)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant when author relied on several prior reports
from other published sources); Waskow v. Associated Press, 462 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when wire service relied on newspaper
story); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir.) (reversing denial of summary
judgment for defendant when reporter verified allegations with newspaper morgue clipping
file), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 595 F. Supp. 982, 987
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (granting summary judgment when republisher relied on assurances of prior
publisher); National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1299, 1318 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) (granting summary judgment for defendant when newspaper relied on editorial
in associated newspaper); McQuoid v. Springfield Newspapers, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 1050, 1057
(W.D. Mo. 1980) (denying punitive damages to plaintiff when editors relied on reputable
newspaper that "broke" story); Torres v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1182, 1186 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied
on newspaper article); Handelman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1053, 1056
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (denying punitive damages to plaintiff when editor relied on book,
magazines and newspaper articles); Konigsburg v. Time, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 848, 855
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (granting summary judgment for defendant when magazine relied on prior
published accounts of much of the information); Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio
St. 2d 116, 413 N.E.2d 1187, 1193 (1980) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when
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believe information they obtain from the wire services, given the
services' established reputations for accuracy. °0
If the defendant interviewed the plaintiff about the defama-
tory allegations and was not persuaded that the allegations were
false, this interview may be considered further evidence that the
defendant lacked serious doubt as to the truth.20 4 This evidence
reporter relied on prior newspaper article), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); Taylor v.
Greensboro News Co., 57 N.C. App. 426, 428, 291 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1982) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant when reporter relied on newspaper's own clipping file).
203. See Waskow v. Associated Press, 462 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant when newspaper relied on wire service account of legal
proceeding that did not contain any apparent inconsistency or error); Gay v. Williams, 486
F. Supp. 12, 16-17 (D. Alaska 1979) (granting summary judgment for defendant when news-
paper republished wire service stories dealing with criminal investigation of local interest);
Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 822 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(granting summary judgment for defendant when A.P. reporter relied on prior A.P. dis-
patches); LaBruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979, 981-82, 988 (W.D. Mo. 1973)
(granting summary judgment for defendant when television station based news reports
about local citizens on wire service releases); Mehau v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 66 Hawaii 134,
658 P.2d 312, 322-23 (1983) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when newspaper
relied on wire service news releases); Bannach v. Field Enters., Inc., 5 IlM. App. 3d 692, 693-
94, 284 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1972) (affirming summary judgment for defendant due to insufficient
evidence of reckless disregard to override privilege when newspaper relied on wire service
report of judicial proceeding); McCarney v. Des Moines Register and Tribune Co., 239
N.W.2d 152, 155-56 (Iowa 1976) (reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant when
editor relied on A.P. dispatch). But see infra note 477 and accompanying text (observation
that the press does tend to verify wire service reports when practicable to protect against
potential error).
204. Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 276 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming sum-
mary judgment for defendant when reporter claimed to have interviewed president of plain-
tiff company pertaining to the defamatory allegations prior to broadcast); FoodScience
Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 362, 366 (D. Vt. 1984) (granting summary judg-
ment for defendant when reporter verified allegations with information in plaintiffs press
kit); Trapp v. Southeastern Newspapers, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1985, 1995 (S.D. Ga.
1984) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter contacted plaintiff who re-
plied, "no comment"); Moorhead v. Millin, 542 F. Supp. 614, 617 (D.V.I. 1982) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when reporter asked plaintiff about charges, and he re-
plied, "no comment"); Roberts v. Dover, 525 F. Supp. 987, 994 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when reporter obtained and published plaintiff's side of
the story); Loeb v. New Times Communications Corp., 497 F. Supp. 85, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(granting summary judgment for defendant when reporters interviewed plaintiff); Hensley v.
Life Magazine, 336 F. Supp. 50, 53 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (granting summary judgment for defen-
dant when reporter interviewed plaintiff who "substantially verified the subject matter of
the article"); Fink v. Combined Communications Corp., 679 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984) (affirming summary judgment for defendant for insufficient evidence of reckless disre-
gard when, among other things, plaintiff responded to some of the allegations posed by de-
fendant); Tucci v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co., 464 A.2d 161, 169-70 (Me. 1983) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant when reporter interviewed plaintiff, who denied that he
had cheated on exam but did not deny that he had been charged with cheating); Theckston
v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 100 N.J. Super. 452, 456, 242 A.2d 629, 631 (Ct. App. Div.)
(reversing verdict for plaintiff when reporter interviewed plaintiff and obtained his side of
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will be most effective for the defendant when the character of the
plaintiff's response is not so compelling as to give rise to an infer-
ence that it must have shaken defendant's belief in the truth of the
allegations.2 0 5 Thus, when a reporter has a reliable source for an
allegation and the plaintiff's response is evasive, is a broad and
general denial, or is a mere "no comment," the reporter may be
warranted in concluding that his information is accurate.
In rejecting a finding of reckless disregard, courts occasionally
point out that the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to interview
the future plaintiff. 06 An attempt to speak with the future plain-
tiff says very little about the reporter's subjective belief of the
truth of the information. The attempt may indicate that the re-
porter had an open mind and was interested in confirming the in-
formation by a potentially knowledgeable source, however, it does
not indicate whether the reporter probably believed or disbelieved
the allegations. Just as the New York Times standard imposes no
general duty of verification on the defendant, there also is no spe-
cific obligation to obtain the plaintiff's side of the story.20 7 As
story), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 (1968); Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 301 Pa.
Super. 475, 494, 448 A.2d 6, 16 (1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when reporter inter-
viewed plaintiff, who tended to confirm charges); Brophy v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.,
281 Pa. Super. 588, 603, 422 A.2d 625, 633 (1980) (affirming summary judgment for defen-
dant when reporter corroborated many allegations with plaintiff and his attorney); A.H.
Belo Corp. v. Rayzor, 644 S.W.2d 71, 85 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff
when reporter interviewed plaintiff concerning charges prior to publication); Colombo v.
Times-Argus Ass'n, 135 Vt. 454, 457-58, 380 A.2d 80, 84 (1977) (affirming summary judg-
ment for defendant when plaintiff told reporter that story was "far-fetched").
205. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
206. See Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 993, 497 S.W.2d 47, 51 (1973) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant when reporter attempted to reach school official who
would not return her call); Savannah News-Press, Div. Southeastern Newspapers Corp. v.
Whetsell, 149 Ga. App. 233, 236, 254 S.E.2d 151, 153 (1979) (reversing denial of summary
judgment for defendant when reporter tried to call plaintiff); Times Publishing Co. v. Huff-
stetler, 409 So. 2d 112, 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when
reporter unsuccessfully attempted to contact plaintiff); Mehau v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 66
Hawaii 134, 658 P.2d 312, 322-23 (1983) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when
reporter unsuccessfully attempted to reach plaintiff for comment); Malerba v. Newsday,
Inc., 64 A.D.2d 623, 624, 406 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (1978) (reversing denial of summary judg-
ment for defendant when reporter attempted to contact plaintiff); Richardson v. Signal
Publishing Co., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1593, 1597 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (granting summary
judgment for defendant when reporter requested and plaintiff refused to produce financial
records pertaining to subject matter of article).
207. Loeb v. New Times Communications Corp., 497 F. Supp. 85, 92-93 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter failed to ask plaintiff about
certain relevant matters); Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967, 974 (D.
Minn. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968) (granting summary judgment for defendant
when reporter failed to interview plaintiff, though plaintiff's attorney was contacted).
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noted earlier, there will be cases in which a failure to attempt to
contact a plaintiff who is an obvious source of verification appro-
priately may be considered by the factfinder as one factor support-
ing an inference of reckless disregard. 08 This inference should be
restricted, however, to those instances in which there already exists
some good reason for the reporter to doubt the accuracy of the
allegations in question. In these cases, the defendant's failure at
least to attempt to contact the plaintiff may suggest a desire to
avoid confronting the truth.
Reliance on evidence of the defendant's efforts to investigate
and verify in order to negate a finding of reckless disregard need
not and should not shift the focus of the inquiry from subjective
serious doubt to objective reasonable care. The point of evidence of
investigation is not to establish that the defendant behaved like a
reasonable reporter or editor but to show that the defendant did
not seriously doubt the truth of the allegations. Evidence of inves-
tigation and verification is quite pertinent because it may explain
exactly why the defendant believed that what he wrote or pub-
lished was true. Use of investigation and verification evidence is
acceptable so long as factfinders recognize that the reverse hypoth-
esis necessarily does not follow. In other words, lack of verification
generally does not suggest that the defendant harbored doubts as
to the truth. The reporter still may have believed the statements
to be true. Yet, a failure to investigate occasionally is probative of
doubt as to the truth. At least in the extreme case, when there is
some independent reason for the defendant to suspect that the
charges may be false, a failure to corroborate when corroboration is
neither difficult nor expensive may indicate at the very least that
the defendant did not want to have his worst fears verified. Evi-
dence of failure to corroborate in this context will not subvert the
New York Times subjective standard; indeed it may be essential in
a given case to the standard's proper application. A court, however,
must recognize both the proper purposes as well as the dangers of
such evidence and instruct the jury accordingly.
5. Tone, Style, Editorial Slant, and Language
Occasionally, a plaintiff may be able to prove that a defendant
published a defamatory statement with reckless disregard for the
truth by proving that the defendant engaged in a policy of slanting
208. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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or sensationalizing the material. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts2 0 9
is the leading case on this issue. In Butts Justice Warren, in con-
cluding that plaintiff had presented ample evidence of reckless dis-
regard, emphasized in his concurring opinion that, prior to publica-
tion of the article, defendant Saturday Evening Post had
determined to combat declining advertising revenues by "changing
[its] image" and "embark[ing] upon a program of 'sophisticated
muckracking,' designed to 'provoke people, make them mad.' 210
The Post's policy apparently led the Court to infer that defendant
was interested more in creating controversy than maintaining ac-
curacy. By itself, such an editorial policy should not be sufficient to
establish that the defendant published a particular article with
reckless disregard for the truth.211 Presumably, a newspaper can
publish hard hitting, controversial, investigative stories with the
utmost concern for accuracy and fairness. The "sophisticated
muckracking" policy was of probative value because it helped to
explain the magazine's willingness to press forward in the face of
several red flags and a grossly inadequate investigation-the Post
apparently was desperate for a controversial story, in line with its
new image, to boost circulation.1 In other words, the new policy
209. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
210. Id. at 169 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Justice Harlan relied on
the same evidence in finding that the now outmoded "highly unreasonable conduct" stan-
dard was satisfied. Id. at 155-56.
211. In Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co. the court found that
plaintiff had failed to present evidence to support its contention that defendant, like Curtis,
had engaged in a policy of "sophisticated muckraking" but the court went on to note that
"the court regards this as perhaps the least important factor relied on in Butts, and would
not find it to create a jury question on the malice issue, even if convincingly proved." 417 F.
Supp. 947, 959 (D.D.C. 1976).
212. That "one of its editors had said that what it needed was a "'good juicy libel
case'" could scarcely have helped the magazine's cause. See Wade, The Communicative
Torts and the First Amendment, 48 Miss. L.J. 671, 688 (1977).
Recently, in Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit concluded, in reliance on Butts, that while "a general policy favoring
sensational or muckraking stories does not, in itself, prove that a defendant acted with ac-
tual malice . . ." such a policy could provide a motive for reckless disregard and as such
could constitute evidence of actual malice. 759 F.2d 90, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Tavou-
lareas, there was evidence that Robert Woodward, the Assistant Managing Editor of the
Post encouraged his staff to produce "hard hitting investigative stories" that might cause
the reader to exclaim "holy shit." Id. at 120-22. The court cautioned that it did not intend
to suggest that there was anything wrong with "aggressive investigative reporting." Id. at
121 n.39. In dissent, Judge Wright characterized the majority's consideration of the defen-
dant's muckraking policy as a "deep hostility to an aggressive press" and "directly contrary
to the mandates of the Supreme Court and the spirit of a free press." Id. at 152-54. As is
suggested in the text, the majority would seem to be correct in concluding that a policy of
muckraking or sensationalism may provide some, though certainly not clear and convincing
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tended to show that the magazine had a motive to publish in disre-
gard of the truth.
In Washington Post Co. v. Keough the District of Columbia
Circuit read New York Times v. Sullivan as having established
that "the character and content of [a] publication [is] a constitu-
tionally impermissible evidentiary basis for finding of actual malice
.... "213 Certainly, the Keough court was correct in holding that
an inference of reckless disregard does not arise merely because a
published statement obviously would be defamatory if false and in
fact turned out to be false.2 14 On the other hand, Keough should
not be read to mean that an inference of reckless disregard never
may be drawn from the tone, the style, or the particular language
used in a defamatory publication. Words, after all, are the weapons
of the libelor. On occasion, words may provide the clearest indica-
tion whether the defendant believed what he wrote. Still, judicial
consideration of tone, style, and diction is a sensitive matter. If
such evidence were admitted too freely the risk of unwarranted
self-censorship might be significant. While to avoid covering sub-
jects with a defamatory potential may be difficult for a daily or
weekly newspaper or periodical, the threat of liability based on
tone, style, or diction arguably could coerce writers and editors
into using unduly safe and bland language, thereby sacrificing a
good deal of style and substance.
An inference of reckless disregard properly may arise, how-
ever, when the defendant has employed a sensationalistic style to
attract attention and distorts the truth in the process. Recently, in
Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, before reversing a verdict for plaintiff on
other grounds, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit deter-
evidence of reckless disregard. See also Beech Aircraft v. National Aviation Underwriters,
11 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1401, 1415 (D. Kan. 1984) (denying summary judgment for defen-
dant when, among other things, evidence suggested reporter slanted story against plaintiff
so that it would be more sensational and possibly further her career).
213. 365 F.2d 965, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967); see also
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (errors and inaccu-
racy are not evidence of actual malice); LaBruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979, 985
(W.D. Mo. 1973) (citing Keogh, 365 F.2d at 969); Sellars v. Stauffer Communications, 9
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1398, 1400 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 1983) (granting summary judgment for
defendant when plaintiff's evidence consisted of a long series of allegedly false and defama-
tory news articles about plaintiff).
214. To counter any tendency to overemphasize the falsity of a statement one com-
mentator has argued that "[t]he rules governing admissibility in a defamation proceeding
should exclude all evidence that a plaintiff refused to disclose to the defendant in response
to detailed defamatory charges and that was not otherwise reasonably available at the time




mined that reckless disregard properly could have been inferred
from the employment of false and defamatory headlines such as
"CIA to Nail Hunt for Kennedy Killing" and "They'll Hang Hunt"
when defendant had good reason to doubt that plaintiff was in-
volved in the Kennedy assassination or that the CIA intended to
use plaintiff as a scapegoat.21 The court's conclusion was war-
ranted in view of the blatantly sensationalistic and misleading na-
ture of the headlines coupled with the editor's own admission that
he chose them as a "flareful thing. ' 216 More troublesome, however,
is Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc.,217 another leading case
concerning sensationalistic and misleading headlines. In Sprouse,
the West Virginia Supreme Court found sufficient evidence of
reckless disregard when, in the wake of a major political scandal,
defendant newspaper printed two basically truthful stories but
published them beneath headlines composed of perjorative catch
phrases such as "Land Grab" and "Realty Bonanza" that seemed
designed to convey an impression of impropriety when none in fact
existed.218 Somewhat paradoxically, that the underlying story was
neither false nor defamatory tended to strengthen the inference of
reckless disregard because it suggested that defendant had every
reason to know that the headlines were misleading. Still, one must
question whether the relatively mild innuendoes of Sprouse should
have been sufficient to carry plaintiff's burden by clear and con-
vincing evidence. After all, the purpose of a newspaper headline is
to attract the reader's attention. While recognition of a headline's
value should not create a license to defame, the press ought be per-
mitted to attempt to capture the essence of a story in an eye catch-
ing turn of phrase. The difference between permissible attention
grabbing and the headlines in Sprouse is quite thin.2 9 The sensa-
tional nature or tone of a story or headline is one factor that may
contribute to a finding of reckless disregard 220 but by itself, rarely
215. 720 F.2d 631, 646 (11th Cir. 1983).
216. Id. Although there was other evidence of reckless disregard, the court noted that
the headlines themselves were sufficient. Id.
217. 158 W. Va. 427, 211 S.E.2d 674, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975).
218. Id. at 449, 466, 471, 211 S.E.2d at 690, 699, 701.
219. Sprouse was distinguished in Hodges v. Oklahoma Journal Publishing Co., 617
P.2d 191, 195-96 (Okla. 1980). In Hodges, the court refused to infer reckless disregard from
headlines that stated "Audit Turns Up Big Slush Fund" and "Report Accuses [Plaintiff]."
The court found that, unlike the headlines in Sprouse, the instant headlines were "ambigu-
ous" and capable of bearing an innocent meaning. Id. To the extent that the headlines
falsely implied impropriety, they are easily as sensationalistic and insinuating as those in
Sprouse. If so, Hodges represents a thinly veiled rejection of the Sprouse rationale.
220. Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 637 F.2d 375, 382 (5th Cir.) (reversing summary
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should prove conclusive. Indeed, many courts have taken the posi-
tion that the sensational, glib, or snide tone of an article does not
provide a sufficient basis for inferring reckless disregard, at least
by clear and convincing evidence."2'
Beyond the general sensationalistic tone of an article, the
choice of one or two ambiguous, inaccurate, and potentially defam-
atory words or phrases, on a particular record, can support a find-
ing of reckless disregard. In Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting
Co.,222 the Colorado Supreme Court determined that an inference
of reckless disregard properly could be drawn when an experienced
reporter wrote that plaintiff "deserted" her husband after he suf-
fered severe injuries in an explosion, considering that the reporter
knew there were no grounds for concluding that plaintiff had aban-
doned her husband or left him without just cause. 23 The court ex-
plained that "the use of a term with obvious pejorative connota-
tions without underlying factual support is evidence of recklessness
especially when the reporter has knowledge that the description is
judgment for defendant when, among other things, reporter's resolution of factual ambiguity
against plaintiff turned minor news item into front page story), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 964
(1981); Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 519 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir.) (reversing judg-
ment n.o.v. for defendant when, among other things, writers added sensational and unveri-
fied allegations to story in hopes of selling it to national magazine), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
930 (1975); Mehau v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 66 Hawaii 134, 658 P.2d 312, 321 (1983) (denying
summary judgment for defendant when wire service "strung together" a series of quotes
from a sensational tabloid creating innuendo that plaintiff was underworld godfather).
221. See Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 384-85 (4th Cir. 1971) (affirming sum-
mary judgment for defendant when reporter's description of event in issue was figurative,
vivid, and hyperbole); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(granting summary judgment for defendant despite snide and uncomplimentary tone per-
meating article and alleged "cheap shots" and "jabbing headlines"); Sellers v. Time, Inc.,
299 F. Supp. 582, 585-86 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (granting summary judgment for defendant despite
alleged "flippant" and "smart alecky" style of article), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830 (1970);
Perez v. Times-Picayune, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2388, 2389 (La. Dist. Ct. 1983) (granting
summary judgment for defendant despite insinuations of wrongdoing); cf. Mitchell v. Pitts-
burgh Press, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2152, 2158 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1981) (action for defama-
tion cannot be premised solely on writer's style or utilization of vivid words); Bandelin v.
Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 341, 563 P.2d 395, 399 (affirming summary judgment for defendant
despite fact that article was "unjustifiably sensational"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977);
Dannis v. Panax Newspapers, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1446, 1448 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1982)
(granting summary judgment for defendant when newspaper followed common practice of
using large print type in headlines); Brophy v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 281 Pa.
Super. 588, 604, 422 A.2d 625, 633 (1980) (affirming summary judgment for defendant de-
spite strong and sensational language).
222. 659 P.2d 1351 (Colo. 1983) (en banc).
223. 659 P.2d 1351, 1362 (Colo. 1983) (en banc). Id. at 1362. The court pointed out
that the reporter was aware that plaintiff had filed for divorce prior to her husband's
accident.
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in fact untrue."22 Prior to Burns, in Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican
Publishing Co.,2 5 the same court had held that an inference of
reckless disregard could be drawn when, among other things, a re-
porter wrote that a ski resort had given free passes to plaintiff city
officials personally, instead of to the department for which the offi-
cials worked, to "humanize" the story.226 As these cases correctly
recognize, at some point, stylistic considerations must yield to
accuracy.
227
The threat of self-censorship nonetheless may arise if liability
can follow simply because a reporter or editor chose imprecise or
ambiguous terminology. The California Supreme Court recognized
this problem in Good Government Group, Inc. v. Superior
Court,228 a case that required the court to draw the difficult divid-
ing line between statements of fact and opinion. In Good Govern-
ment, the court concluded that the question whether defendant's
statements that plaintiff "extorted" and "blackmailed" the city
were defamatory fact or constitutionally protected opinion was for
the jury, and, if the jury found them to be factual and false, the
jury could infer reckless disregard from defendant's use of this lan-
guage only if it further found that "defendant either deliberately
cast his statements in an equivocal fashion in hope of insinuating a
224. Id.; see also Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1977) (af-
firming verdict for plaintiff when defendant described plaintiff's practices as "fictitious,"
"phony," and "lying" when defendant knew there was no support for these conclusions);
Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 548, 562, 372 N.E.2d 1211, 1221
(Ct. App. 1978) (partially denying summary judgment for defendant when, among other
things, reporter used ambiguous language that falsely could imply wrongdoing by plaintiff);
McHale v. Lake Charles Am. Press, 390 So. 2d 556, 567-68 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming
verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, reporter was aware that the use of the terms
"bonds" and "securities" was inaccurate in context), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Ne-
vada Indep. Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 416, 664 P.2d 337, 345 (1983) (af-
firming verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, defendant's reference to "your check"
could be taken to refer to plaintiff's personal as opposed to his campaign's check).
225. 637 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981).
226. Id. at 318-19; see also Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wash. 2d 37, 44, 515 P.2d
154, 158 (1973) (en banc) (reversing summary judgment for defendant when newspaper
wrote that plaintiff was requested to make "repayment" of state funds despite that the
newspaper had been informed that he had not taken the funds initially).
227. See Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd, 427
F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970), in which, in concluding that there was sufficient evidence of reck-
less disregard to go to the jury, the court noted that "[a]dmittedly, journalistic flair and
pungency might have been sacrificed, but the law of defamation is not grounded on consid-
erations of whether or not the article in question provides provocative or entertaining read-
ing." Id.
228. 22 Cal. 3d 672, 586 P.2d 572, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961
(1979).
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defamatory import to the reader, or that he knew or acted in reck-
less disregard of whether his words would be interpreted by the
average reader as defamatory statements of fact. '229 The court be-
lieved that this approach was sensitive enough to avoid "a hob-
bling of free speech by the continuing fear of liability for the use of
inexact semantics."230 Whether this approach actually will protect
free speech may turn on the extent courts require the plaintiff to
offer additional extrinsic evidence of reckless disregard, such as a
complete absence of support for the language in issue or reliance
on an obviously biased source. Several courts have concluded that
the use of imprecise or potentially ambiguous and defamatory lan-
guage alone should not give rise to an inference of reckless disre-
gard, at least by clear and convincing evidence. 3'
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States,
Inc.232 a federal district court found clear and convincing evidence
of reckless disregard when a writer edited a critique of plaintiff's
stereo speakers to read "that the instruments tended to wander
about the room" but admitted at trial that "along the wall" proba-
bly would have been more accurate.233 In reaching its conclusion
229. Id. at 684-85, 586 P.2d at 578, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
230. Id. The court further noted that "[t]he First Amendment protects not only the
expression of a political opinion but the choice of words used to convey that opinion." Id.
Given that some of the defendants continued to circulate the article after they knew that it
was false and defamatory, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to permit a
jury to infer reckless disregard. Id. at 685-86, 586 P.2d at 579, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 264-65.
Chief Justice Bird filed a lengthy dissent arguing that the statements were clearly protected
statements of opinion. Id. at 689, 586 P.2d at 581, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
231. See, e.g., Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726, 733 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing verdict for
plaintiff when author arguably described plaintiff's false voucher system inaccurately by re-
porting that plaintiff "extorted" funds); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114 (6th
Cir. 1978) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when reporter characterized securities violation
charges against plaintiff as "fraud"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
when author's imprecise language suggested that plaintiff had been convicted of espionage),
rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Seymour v. A.S. Abell Co., 557 F. Supp. 951,
958 (D.Md. 1983) (granting summary judgment for defendant when reporter characterized
"misappropriation" or "conversion" charges against plaintiff as "theft"); Reader's Digest v.
Marin County Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244, 208 Cal. Rptr. 137, 150, 690 P.2d 610, 623
(1984) (reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant when author arguably used
"literary license" in writing story); DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806, 815 (R.I. 1980)
(affirming judgment for defendant when newspaper used harsh language exaggerating grav-
ity of plaintiff's offense); Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 707, 725, 459 P.2d 8,
18 (1969) (en banc) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when defendant described "unautho-
rized" appropriation as "unlawful"), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
232. 508 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), aft'd, 104
S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
233. Id. at 1276-77. Bose was a cause of action for product disparagement. The courts
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and rejecting defendant's argument that "about the room" and
"along the wall" were synonomous, the district court noted that
the writer "is an intelligent person whose knowledge of the English
language cannot be questioned. It is simply impossible for the
Court to believe that he interprets a commonplace word such as
'about' to mean anything other than its plain, ordinary
meaning. 234
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed,
concluding:
The evidence presented merely shows that the words in the article may not
have described precisely what the two panelists heard during the listening
test. [Defendant] was guilty of using imprecise language in the arti-
cle-perhaps resulting from an attempt to produce a readable article for its
mass audience. Certainly this does not support an inference of actual
malice."35
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and af-
firmed the court of appeals, noting that "[u]nder the District
Court's analysis, any individual using a malapropism might be lia-
ble simply because an intelligent speaker would have to know that
the term was inaccurate in context, even though he did not realize
his folly at the time."23 The approach of the First Circuit and the
Supreme Court is clearly correct. While the district court did take
demeanor evidence into account in reaching its conclusion, the lan-
guage of defendant's article was only slightly inaccurate. The lan-
guage did not appear to sensationalize the evaluation nor did it
appear to be pejorative. At most, the record suggested that defen-
dant's writers were not as clear as they might have been. Lack of
clarity scarcely seems sufficient to permit an inference of reckless
disregard for the truth.23 7 As another court recognized in address-
treated the action as a commercial analogue of defamation, and applied the actual malice
test because plaintiff was concededly a public figure. Id. at 193.
234. Id. at 1276-77.
235. 692 F.2d at 197.
236. 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1966 (1984). In reviewing the evidence the Court explained:
[The editor] displayed a capacity for rationalization. He had made a mistake and when
confronted with it, he refused to admit it and steadfastly attempted to maintain that
no mistake had been made-that the inaccurate was accurate. That attempt failed, but
the fact that he made the attempt does not establish that he realized the inaccuracy at
the time of publication.
Id..
237. Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 38, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975) presented an issue similar to that presented in Bose. In
Montandon a TV Guide editor edited a press release describing a forthcoming program by
deleting a reference to the fact that a masked prostitute would be appearing. Consequently,
the listing for the show, entitled "From Party-Girl to Call-Girl," identified only plaintiff, the
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ing the same issue, "[i]mprecision and ambiguity of expression are
ills that sometimes afflict even careful and well-intentioned writers
including lawyers and judges. 2 3 8
A court, in determining the existence of an inference of reck-
less disregard, quite properly may consider affirmative efforts by
an editor to "tone down" or eliminate potentially defamatory alle-
gations.23 9 Considering that mere ambiguity and imprecision in
language, unlike blatant sensationalizing, often reveals very little
about the defendant's regard for the truth, the generally cautious
and sensitive approach to rejecting an inference of reckless disre-
gard that the courts have followed is appropriate.
6. Balance and Selectivity
Neither the law of defamation nor New York Times v. Sulli-
van imposes an obligation of fairness, balance, or objectivity on the
press.2 40 As a matter of necessity, constraints of time and space as
well as the desire to create an interesting and readable publication
require the press to edit-to select and emphasize some aspects of
the raw data that has been compiled through research and investi-
gation and to omit others. That a reporter was aware of, but failed
author of a book entitled "How to be a Party-Girl," as the scheduled guest. The California
Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict for plaintiff finding sufficient evidence of reckless
disregard because defendants must have recognized the false and defamatory implication of
the listing from its plain language. Id. at 942-44, 948-49, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89, 192-93.
While the defamatory implication doubtless was clearer than in Bose, the case for inferring
subjective awareness of falsity is not stronger. In both cases defendants apparently made
simple editorial error and failed to appreciate its significance. Consequently, defendants
probably also should have prevailed in Montandon.
238. Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
239. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 911-12, 914 (2d Cir.) (reversing verdict
for plaintiff when, among other things, editor toned down or eliminated many statements
pertaining to plaintiff and verified others with author), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977);
FoodScience Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 362, 366 (D. Vt. 1984) (granting sum-
mary judgment for defendant when editor corrected initial inaccuracy); Handeliman v. Hus-
tler Magazine, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (denying punitive damages to
plaintiff when, among other things, editors made changes in article to ensure accuracy and
defuse defamatory potential); Medeiros v. Northeast Publishing, Inc., 8 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2500, 2503 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1982) (granting summary judgment for defendant when
editor attempted to tone down letter to editor).
240. Some commentators have argued, however, that jurors will disregard judicial in-
structions on actual malice and find for the plaintiff if they perceive that a media defendant
has treated tbh plaintiff unfairly in print. See Remarks of Conrad Shumadine, Symposium,
New York Times v. Sullivan, The Next Twenty Years, Mar. 8, 1984, New York, New York.
Likewise, one commentator has suggested that potential plaintiffs rarely will file libel ac-
tions unless they believe they have been treated unfairly. G. HOUGH, NEWSWRMING 181 (3d
ed. 1984).
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to include, information favorable to the plaintiff, in a given in-
stance, may suggest that he was not a responsible journalist,241 but
such failure does not show necessarily that he harbored serious
doubts for the truth of the allegedly defamatory published state-
ments.2 4 2 In Westmoreland v. CBS,243 a federal district court con-
cluded that evidence that the defendant emphasized sources criti-
cal of plaintiff and ignored sources that supported plaintiff to
bolster its own preconceived thesis was not sufficient by itself to
raise an inference of reckless disregard.244 Occasionally, however,
lack of balance or objectivity may help to establish actual mal-
ice.24 5 In Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co.,2 46 the Court of Ap-
241. See infra note 494 and accompanying text.
242. Herbert v. Lando, 596 F. Supp. 1178, 1209-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (granting partial
summary judgment for defendant when documentary questioned the veracity of a statement
by plaintiff and failed to acknowledge that there was independent support for the state-
ment); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when arguably writer selectively omitted information
favorable to plaintiff); Reader's Digest v. Marin County Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244, 208
Cal. Rptr. 137, 147, 690 P.2d 610, 620 (1984) (reversing denial of summary judgment al-
though story failed to present defendant's views); Russell v. McMillen, 8 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1646, 1649 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1982) (granting summary judgment for defendant when
reporter chose to rely on sources whose information was most detrimental to plaintiff), aff'd,
10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1888 (Colo. App. 1984); Theckston v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,
100 N.J. Super. 452, 456, 242 A.2d 629, 631 (Ct. App. Div. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001
(1968) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when article lacked quality of impartiality); Rinaldi v.
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 381, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d
943, 951 (granting summary judgment for defendant when writer may have omitted some
details in admittedly subjective article on the judicial process), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1977); cf. New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567, 576-77 (5th Cir. 1966) (recognizing
that lack of balance and objectivity do not show reckless disregard); McQuoid v. Springfield
Newspapers, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 1050, 1057 (W.D. Mo. 1980) ("assuming arguendo that de-
fendant was aware of the favorable developments achieved by plaintiff, there is no authority
holding that a conscious decision not to publish such events would constitute a reckless
disregard for the truth. . ." (emphasis in original)); Belli v. Curtis Publishing Co., 25 Cal.
App. 3d 384, 398, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122, 132 (1972) ("He who revels and prospers in the lime-
light of publicity may not complain if his failures are highlighted as well as his successes.");
McHale v. Lake Charles Press, 390 So. 2d 556, 562-63 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (prior articles
pertaining to incident lacked objectivity but did not provide evidence of reckless disregard),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981).
243. 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
244. Id. at 1173-74.
245. See Beech Aircraft v. National Aviation Underwriters, 11 Med. L. Rep. (BNA)
1401, 1415 (D. Kan. 1985) (denying summary judgment for defendant when, among other
things, reporter relied on information critical of plaintiff and disregarded favorable informa-
tion); Machleder v. Dias, 538 F. Supp. 1364, 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (denying summary judg-
ment for defendant when reporter excised material favorable to plaintiff from videotape,
arguably to create false impression that plaintiff was responsible for toxic waste dump);
Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (S.D. Fla.) (denying summary judgment for
defendant when editor labeled picture as representing "meeting of Cosa Nostro hoodlums"
without indicating that two of the persons present were lawyers), aff'd, 427 F.2d 219 (5th
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peals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that evidence indi-
cating that the reporter and editors omitted or deleted information
favorable to the plaintiff and "slanted" the story against the plain-
tiff provided some support for an inference of reckless disregard.4 7
Likewise, in Goldwater v. Ginzburg,4 8 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit concluded that the record contained sufficient evi-
dence of reckless disregard when, among other faults, the defen-
dant omitted some information, exaggerated and distorted source
material, and quoted out of context to create an unfavorable im-
pression of plaintiff.249 Goldwater illustrates that courts properly
may draw an inference of reckless disregard when the defendant
has engaged in a pervasive pattern of editorial selectivity and im-
balance that on its face, seems designed to cast a highly misleading
image of the plaintiff. In less egregious cases, however, courts
should be hesitant to treat editorial selectivity as proof of reckless
disregard because mild selectivity reveals little about the editor's
subjective belief in the truth of the story. 50 In a similar vein the
Cir. 1970); Steadman v. Lapensohn, 408 Mich. 50, 55 n.5, 288 N.W.2d 580, 583 n.5 (1980)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, reporter failed to
inform plaintiff that initial article had been completed prior to their discussion and then
reporter printed interview with plaintiff as if it were a response); cf. Indianapolis Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 246, 259 N.E.2d 651, 662, 664 (affirming, by an equally
divided court, verdict for plaintiff, when, among other things, defendant published crucial
fact that witness had repudiated story on only one occasion and failed to mention it in
several subsequent accounts of the incident); McHale v. Lake Charles Am. Press, 390 So. 2d
556, 563-64 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (evidence that editor failed to disclose information favorable
to plaintiff could be considered by jury on issue of reckless disregard), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
941 (1981).
246. 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
247. Id. at 121-25. The district court had concluded that the articles in issue fell "far
short of being a model of fair, unbiased investigative journalism," however that this did not
raise an inference of reckless disregard. 567 F. Supp. 651, 654 (D.D. C. 1983), rev'd, 759 F.2d
90 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
248. 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
249. Id. at 329, 334, 337, 339-40; see also Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631
(10th Cir. 1977) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when there was evidence that reporter knew
that he was taking quote out of context to create misrepresentation).
250. In finding sufficient evidence to support an inference of reckless disregard the
court in Braig v. Field Communications, 310 Pa. Super. 569, 456 A.2d 1366 (1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2341 (1984), placed heavy reliance on the station manager's staged panel
discussion that was biased toward one side of the controversy in issue. Id. at 588-90, 456
A.2d at 1776-77. In context, the Braig facts do not support such an inference. Even if, as the
court suggested, the discussion arguably ran afoul of the fairness doctrine, this does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the station manager doubted the truth of the state-
ments made during the discussion, prior to its rebroadcast. While the imbalance of the
panel is a factor worthy of some consideration on the issue of reckless disregard, the Braig
court's opinion suggests that it may have given more weight to the factor than it deserved.
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court in McIntire v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.1 51 recognized
that defendant's juxtaposition of an unrelated discussion of the
Nazis in an editorial criticizing plaintiff was insufficient to estab-
lish reckless disregard. As the court observed "[t]he defendant was
not constitutionally required to arrange its editorial comments in
such a way as to present the plaintiff in the best possible light and
to treat comment-worthy matters under separate headings. 2 5
As with proof of verification, evidence of the balance and im-
partiality of an article may serve as affirmative proof that the de-
fendant did not publish in reckless disregard of the truth.2 53 De-
fensive use of this evidence is appropriate so long as courts do not
give this factor undue weight. While a balanced article may suggest
that the defendant was attempting to be fair to the plaintiff and
therefore would not have published an allegation pertaining to the
plaintiff if he seriously doubted its truth, the possibility still exists
that the defendant may have doubted a specific statement even if
the article, considered as a whole, was fair and impartial.
7. Editorial Process
In Herbert v. Lando,254 defendant CBS argued that in a defa-
mation action the first amendment should be construed to provide
a privilege against discovery of information pertaining to internal
discussions and conclusions of the press that occur during the edi-
torial process. Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit accepted this argument,25 5 the Supreme Court disagreed, not-
251. 479 F. Supp. 808, 811 (D. Mass. 1979).
252. Id.
253. Ainheiter v. Random House, 578 F.2d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming sum-
mary judgment for defendant when author presented both sides of the controversy pertain-
ing to plaintiff's command of a captured naval vessel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979);
Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (dismissing plaintiff's com-
plaint when magazine published plaintiff's denial and acknowledged questions concerning
character of primary source); Henderson v. Van Buren Pub. School, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1741, 1744 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (granting summary judgment for defendant when defendant
interviewed persons in favor of and opposed to plaintiff and published responses of both);
Dattner v. Pokoik, 81 A.D.2d 572, 573, 437 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (1981) (reversing judgment for
plaintiff when newspaper interviewed plaintiff and printed his response to its allegation that
he took a bribe); Direct Import Buyer's As'n v. K.S.L., Inc., 572 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1977)
(affirming directed verdict for defendant when station reported both sides of controversy
involving plaintiff); cf. Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1224 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming
judgment for defendant when, among other things, defendant broadcast denial by plaintiff's
attorney along with defamatory charges).
254. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
255. 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977); see Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in Defamation
Actions: An Unsolved Dilemma, 7 HOFsTRA L. REv. 655 (1979), for an extended defense of
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ing that other courts consistently have held editorial process
evidence admissible256 and that a discovery privilege would impede
severely the ability of a public official or public figure plaintiff to
establish the prerequisite of actual malice." There is no clear dis-
tinction between the process of investigating and writing an article
and the process of editing it. Whatever distinctions do exist will
vary with the nature and organization of the publication as well as
with the particular story. Moreover, many of the factors discussed
previously, including nature and degree of verification, tone, and
selectivity, often will concern conduct within the editorial process.
Evidence pertaining to the operation of the editorial process itself,
especially when it pertains to the type of partisan selectively dis-
cussed in the previous section, still sometimes will contribute to an
inference of reckless disregard.258
Recently editorial process evidence has played a major role in
the highly publicized federal court decisions in Westmoreland v.
CBS,25 9 Sharon v. Time, Inc.,2 60 and Tavoulareas v. Washington
Post Co. 61 In Westmoreland the district court found that there
was a reckless disregard issue for the jury when plaintiff submitted
evidence that defendant edited an interview to create a false im-
pression, arguably misidentified interviewees, and implicitly mis-
represented the context of interviewees' remarks to create an unfa-
vorable impression of plaintiff.262 While the court concluded that
the Second Circuit's approach by one of the judges who joined the majority opinion.
256. 441 U.S. at 160-65.
257. Id. at 170. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for defen-
dant on nine of eleven defamatory allegations. 596 F. Supp. 1178, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
258. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1982) (af-
firming punitive damage award for plaintiff when, among other things, editor spent only a
few hours attempting to check article and added more defamatory material), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 334-35, 357 (2d Cir. 1969) (af-
firming verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, editor deleted much favorable infor-
mation pertaining to plaintiff and inserted damaging statements in quoted source material),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Beech Aircraft v. National Aviation Underwriters, 11
Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1415 (D. Kan. 1985) (denying summary judgment for defendant when,
among other things, editor made article significantly more negative toward plaintiff than
reporter's initial draft and failed to verify allegations); Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp.
1005, 1010 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (denying summary judgment for defendant when editor made
deletion rendering story misleading and defamatory), aff'd, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970);
McHale v. Lake Charles Am. Press, 390 So.2d 556, 565 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming verdict
for plaintiff when, among other things, editor deliberately inserted false and defamatory
term into editorial), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981).
259. 596 F. Supp. 1170, 1174-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
260. 599 F. Supp. 538, 572-73, 576, 578-79, 584-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
261. 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
262. 596 F. Supp. at 1174-77. Plaintiff's evidence suggested that: (1) defendant edited
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this evidence was sufficient to raise a factual question for the jury,
it refrained from deciding whether such proof would constitute
clear and convincing evidence of reckless disregard if the jury re-
solved all of the disputed issues in plaintiff's favor.2 s Likewise in
Sharon the district court found that reckless disregard might be
inferred from defendant editor's failure to question an apparent
incongruity between the story and source relied on by the re-
porter.64 In addition the court also found that the editor's failure
to verify independently information received from a reporter who
had been disciplined previously for providing false information
also might provide some support for an inference of reckless disre-
gard.265 Finally, in Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co. 2 66 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found evi-
dence of reckless disregard when one of defendant's copy editors
wrote a memorandum concluding that the allegations contained in
the article did not seem significant and that "[i]t's impossible to
believe that [plaintiff] alone could put together such a scheme for
the sake of his son's business career, or that he would want to. '267
The court noted that the evidence did not tend to support the dis-
trict court's finding that the copy editor lacked responsibility for
the article's content, however, it concluded that even if she did not
have such authority, the very fact that her doubts were brought to
the attention of and discussed by three editors who did have such
responsibility provided support for an inference of reckless disre-
a statement of an interviewee to imply that he considered an estimate of enemy strength
that he had supported on behalf of plaintiff to be "crap" when during the interview he
actually was referring to a different set of figures; (2) defendant identified an interviewee
who provided some information that was arguably critical of plaintiff as a member of plain-
tiff's staff and therefore privy to inside information when in fact the interviewee did not
have access to such information; (3) defendant indicated that a witness was referring to
falsification of information by plaintiff when, in fact, he was responding to a hypothetical
question; and (4) defendant indicated that a cable under discussion was sent by plaintiff
when in fact it was not. Id.
263. Id. at 1177.
264. 599 F. Supp. 538, 576, 579, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The reporter based in Israel had
assured his editors that a source had informed him and had subsequently confirmed that
the secret appendix to a report by an Israeli government commission investigating the mas-
sacre of Palestinian refugees, stated that plaintiff, an Israeli general, had discussed the
"need for revenge" with leaders of the Lebanese faction responsible for the massacre. The
defendant's editors failed to question this assertion despite the fact that they had read the
report and were aware that it referred to several items appearing in the confidential appen-
dix and knew that it did not make reference to the incident in issue. Id.
265. Id. at 570-72, 579, 583-84.
266. 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
267. Id. at 115.
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gard.26s Standing alone the plaintiff's editorial process evidence in
Tavoulareas may not have been sufficient to establish reckless dis-
regard by "clear and convincing" evidence, however, such evidence
is more than adequate when coupled with the other evidence de-
tailed in the court of appeals opinion.2 69 These cases indicate that
editorial process evidence can aid the plaintiff on occasion. 7°
Judicial reliance on editorial process evidence in the case of
Braig v. Field Communications2 71 seems misguided, however. In
Braig, plaintiff complained to defendant's station manager about
the alleged inaccuracy of statements made during a panel discus-
sion. The court concluded that a jury could have inferred reckless
disregard because the station manager viewed the tape of the panel
discussion several times prior to rebroadcast, after speaking with
plaintiff.272 If anything, this evidence should have demonstrated
defendant's concern for accuracy rather than its doubts as to the
truth. Braig is unlike Tavoulareas in that there was no apparent
268. Id. at 116-17.
269. Along with the issue of reckless disregard, the parties also hotly contested the
issue of falsity. See Brill, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington Post Libel Trial, AM.
LAW., Nov. 1982, at 1, 92.
270. In Akins v. Altus Newspapers, Inc., the Supreme Court of Oklahoma heavily re-
lied on editorial process evidence in affirming a verdict for a public official plaintiff against a
newspaper, its publisher, its editor, and its reporter. 609 P.2d 1263 (Okla. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1010 (1980). In Akins the reporter wrote a story containing allegations that
all defendants recognized as quite serious based almost exclusively on bits and pieces of
overheard conversations. Id. at 1266. The reporter falsely represented to the editor that he
had "checked it out" and the publisher decided to run the story after having been assured
by the editor that it could be verified. Id. at 1267. In concluding that there was sufficient
evidence of reckless disregard, the court emphasized that "[t]here was no detailed discussion
between the editor and the reporter . . . [and] [n]o other checking occurred prior to the
publication of the. . . story." Id. The Akins facts amply support a finding of reckless disre-
gard against the reporter. The case against the editor and publisher, however, is troubling.
The editorial process was perfunctory and probably inadequate, but that tends to suggest
negligence not serious doubt of the truth. Absent any facts suggesting that the editor and
publisher had reason to believe that the reporter had misrepresented his efforts at verifica-
tion, there is no basis for inferring that they published with reckless disregard for the truth.
Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157-58 (1967) (sufficient evidence of highly
unreasonable conduct to support jury verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, editors
made little effort to discuss story between themselves or determine whether it could be
verified); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 394 (1967) (finding sufficient evidence of reckless
disregard in false light privacy action when editor deleted phrase indicating that incident
was "somewhat fictionalized" in view of his knowledge that it was but reversing verdict due
to inadequate jury instruction); Durso v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 33 Ill. App. 3d 300, 306, 337
N.E.2d 443, 448 (1975) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when publisher failed to investigate
expose despite knowledge that several other publishers had rejected it).
271. 310 Pa. Super. 569, 586-89, 456 A.2d 1366, 1376-77 (1983) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2341 (1984).
272. Id.
MEDIA DEFAMATION LITIGATION
evidence in the record that anyone within defendant's organization
had doubted the truthfulness of the defamatory statements made
during the panel discussion.
At a general level, evidence of the defendant's critical analysis
during the editorial process presents a dilemma. Presumably, the
press should be encouraged to subject articles to a rigorous and
skeptical review prior to publication in the hope that this review
will lead to greater accuracy. To the extent that courts consider
critical evaluations as evidence of serious doubt of the truth of the
article, however, the courts may create a disincentive for this type
of scrutiny, or at the very least for committing such efforts to writ-
ing.27 3 Moreover, an executive editor should be able to reject the
doubts of an editorial staff member after careful consideration
without necessarily laying the predicate for proof of reckless disre-
gard. Still, evidence of critical evaluation may be, in a particular
case, the best possible evidence that the defendant published the
article with a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity. The
Supreme Court has considered the effect of permitting judicial
evaluation of editorial process evidence. In Herbert v. Lando,7 4 af-
ter emphasizing plaintiff's need for editorial process evidence
under the New York Times standard, the Court concluded that
whether or not there is liability for the injury, the press has an obvious inter-
est in avoiding the infliction of harm by the publication of false information,
and it is not unreasonable to expect the media to invoke whatever procedures
may be practicable and useful to that end. Moreover, given exposure to liabil-
ity when there is knowing or reckless error, there is even more reason to re-
sort to prepublication precautions, such as a frank interchange of fact and
opinion. Accordingly, we find it difficult to believe that error-avoiding proce-
dures will be terminated or stifled simply because there is liability for culpa-
ble error and because the editorial process will itself be examined in the tiny
percentage of instances in which error is claimed and litigation ensues. Nor is
there sound reason to believe that editorial exchanges and the editorial pro-
cess are so subject to distortion and to such recurring misunderstanding that
they should be immune from examination in order to avoid erroneous judg-
ments in defamation suits. The evidentiary burden [plaintiff] must carry to
prove at least reckless disregard for the truth is substantial indeed, and we
are unconvinced that his chances of winning an undeserved verdict are such
that an inquiry into what Lando learned or said during the editorial process
must be foreclosed.
27 5
273. See generally Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 H~Av. L. REv.
1083 (1983) (referring to the chilling effect of disclosure of self-critical analyses as a princi-
ple behind development of privilege of such analyses).
274. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
275. Id. at 173-74. Two dissenting Justices disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that the absence of an editorial process privilege would not chill conversations and inquiry
during the course of the editorial process. See id. at 193-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 208-09
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The balance struck by the Court is defensible given that the press
has not been granted an absolute privilege in public official/public
figure cases. The press, however, still may be more cautious in de-
termining which critiques it commits to writing.276 As Lando and
Bose suggest, however, the press may receive sufficient protection
for the editorial process through conscientious application of the
clear and convincing evidence standard.
Often, a plaintiff's editorial process evidence will fall to raise
an inference of reckless disregard. For instance, evidence that an
editor made a mistake,2 77 or that he rewrote portions of a story for
legitimate journalistic reasons278 will not show serious doubt for
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
276. There is some indication the press already is taking a more guarded approach to
recording information. See Eugene Roberts, Jr., Executive Editor, Philadelphia Inquirer,
Remarks at Lawyers Defense Research Council Steering Committee Dinner, reprinted in
LDRC Bulletin No.9:
Look at the Tavoulareas case. The worst strike against the Washington Post was that a
copy editor had questioned the thrust of the Tavoulareas story in a note to another
editor. Never mind that this is precisely what we hire copy editors to do-raise ques-
tions again and again, over and over, all night long if necessary, to ensure accuracy. In
the juror's minds the Post got no credit for setting up the procedure that allowed the
copy editors to be heard. It got only blame for deciding against the copy editor and
printing the story ....
Written challenges from copy desks can help ensure accuracy, internal reports can help
ensure fairness. But neither written reports nor written challenges will long endure
when they result in multi-million dollar libel verdicts.
Id.; see also Brill, Redoing Libel Law, AM. LAw., Sept. 1984, at 1, 10 ("the fact that the copy
editor's memo caused the Post so much trouble with the jury can't help but chill future
memo writers, or, for that matter, editors or broadcast producers who would otherwise en-
courage prior internal debate about articles").
277. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, 754 F.2d 1072, 1090 (3rd Cir. 1985) (reversing verdict
and punitive damage award for plaintiff when editors failed to catch misreading of docu-
ment); Rood v. Finney, 418 So. 2d 1, 2 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant when wording of story was inexplicably altered during editorial process to pro-
duce defamatory meaning), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983); Glover v. Herald Co., 549
S.W.2d 858, 860 (Mo.) (en banc) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when editor inadvertently
transposed names received over telephone from reporter), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977);
Donaldson v. Washington Post, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1436, 1438 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1977)
(granting summary judgment for defendant when the word "not" was inadvertently omitted
prior to the word "guilty" after the article was transmitted to the typesetter); McCarney v.
Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 239 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Iowa 1976) (reversing denial of
summary judgment for defendant when editor changed wording after confusing story with
another article).
278. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 197 (1st
Cir. 1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when editorial staff altered wording of allegedly
defamatory statement), aff'd, 104 S.Ct. 1949 (1984); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108,
1133 (6th Cir. 1978) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when defendant rewrote A.P. story in
order to run story under its own byline), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 958 (D.D.C. 1976) (granting sum-
mary judgment for defendant when editor modified story because of doubts of accuracy);
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the truth. At least one court has recognized that the defendant's
refusal to permit the plaintiff to play a role in the editorial process
prior to publication is not evidence of reckless disregard. In James
v. Gannett Co. 2 79 plaintiff interviewee argued that defendant re-
porter's refusal to permit her to review his notes prior to publica-
tion demonstrated reckless disregard. The New York Court of Ap-
peals quite correctly disagreed noting that:
[A] requirement that persons mentioned in proposed newspaper accounts or
articles be permitted a first instance, prepublication review, including a re-
view of direct quotations, would, in effect, impose the equivalent of censor-
ship traditionally anathema in our society. Outsiders have no right to sit in
the editor's chair; to insist that an interviewee should be assured an opportu-
nity with the benefit of reflection and hindsight to revise spontaneous state-
ments would be equally to strike at the vitality of news reporting. Moreover,
a quick glance at any major daily newspaper would reveal the impracticabil-
ity of such a requirement. Countless persons, corporations, associations and
businesses are mentioned in publications every day and a publication could
scarcely remain timely if publication had to await a review and confirmation
by every person or entity whose name is mentioned.
2 0
Evidence that the defendant conformed to standard editorial
procedures may indicate that a story was not published with reck-
less disregard for the truth. 8' Presumably, if the editors followed
LaBruzzo v. Associated Press,353 F. Supp. 979, 986 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (granting summary
judgment for defendant for insufficient evidence of reckless disregard when editor changed
draft to confirm more closely with information provided by source); Readers' Digest v. Ma-
rin County Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 344, 208 Cal. Rptr. 137, 147, 690 P.2d 610, 620 (1984)
(reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant when editor deleted phrase that was
arguably favorable to plaintiffs).
279. 40 N.Y.2d 415, 423-24, 353 N.E.2d 834, 840, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871, 877 (1976).
280. Id. The James court also observed:
A newspaper is a private enterprise and there is certainly no absolute right on the part
of citizens to insist upon the right to inspect newspaper accounts, files or notes in the
absence of legal process .... Moreover, although such a review might alert the pub-
lisher to a potential difficulty, the newspaper would be under no requirement to accede
to the suggestions or demands of those mentioned in its reports.
Id. at 423-24, 353 N.E.2d at 840-41, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 877. The court's conclusions endorsed
accepted journalistic procedure. See infra note 430 and accompanying text.
281. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 197 (1st
Cir. 1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when magazine followed "normal editorial proce-
dures"), af'd, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984); National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555
F. Supp. 1299, 1318 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (granting summary judgment for defendant when
newspaper "did not deviate from accepted, normal procedures"); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Bar-
ron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting summary judgment for defendant
when editors applied "their usual editing procedures to the article, including discussions
with the author, stylistic and copy editing, spot checking of some of the sources cited by the
author, and reviewing drafts and redrafts in consultation with the author and other edi-
tors"); cf. Baldine v. Sharon Herald Co., 280 F. Supp. 440, 442-43 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when newspaper deviated from policy of not accepting
controversial poltical ads shortly before election but did so only after review and discussion
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normal procedures, they would have taken care to ensure accuracy
and alarming information would be discovered. Prepublication
consultation between editor and writer also may undermine an in-
ference of reckless disregard because such procedures may suggest
that the editor was able to satisfy himself as to the accuracy of the
allegations. 2  While the editorial process is not off limits, it is yet
to provide a particularly fruitful source of evidence for plaintiffs on
the issue of reckless disregard.
8. Reliance on Counsel
Some segments of the media commonly have counsel review
material that could give rise to defamation litigation prior to publi-
cation.2 8s The role of counsel may vary from one instance to an-
other. Often the attorney will attempt to determine whether any
statements in the article are potentially defamatory, whether they
are accurate, whether any privileges exist, or whether the publisher
could prevail on the issues of reckless disregard or negligence if
litigation were to ensue. The courts should encourage the press to
seek review of an article by an objective and legally trained party,
at least when there is some reason to believe that the article con-
tains potentially defamatory statements as a means of avoiding po-
tential litigation.28 4 Because the involvement of counsel at the pre-
between ad manager and editor), a'fld, 391 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1968).
282. See Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 268, 276 (3d Cir. 1980) (af-
firming verdict for defendant when editor discussed story with reporter); Joseph v. Xerox
Corp., 594 F. Supp. 330, 335 (D.D.C. 1984) (granting summary judgment for defendants
when, among other things, editor received assurances from author that allegations were sup-
portable); Handelman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(denying punitive damages to plaintiff when, among other things, editor relied on assurances
of author); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, editor discussed article in de-
tail with author); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947,
958 (D.D.C. 1976) (granting summary judgment for defendant when, among other things,
editor reviewed details of article with author prior to publication).
283. See Riley, Lawyers Who Look for Libel, NAT'L L.J., May 27, 1985, at 1, 30-31.
284. See Pre-Publication Review Emphasized by ABA Forum, MEDIA L. REP. (BNA),
News Notes, 1984 (Remarks of Robert Sack and Barbara Mack). Some commentators have
argued that independent journalistic decision-making will be undermined if too much au-
thority in the editorial and publication process is delegated to legal counsel, especially be-
cause the attorney is trained to err on the side of caution. See H. GOODwiN, GROPING FOR
ETHics IN JOURNALIsM 284 (1982) (quoting Lyle Denniston of the Baltimore Sun) ("Our law-
yers have scared the bejesus out of us .... Having lawyers in the newsroom is as great a
threat to the First Amendment as having reporters in jail"); Anderson, supra note 22, at
428-441; Note, The Editorial Function and the Gertz Public Figure Standard, 87 YALE L.J.
1723, 1742 (1978); Letter from Professor Ellen Solender to the Editor, 2 CohL LAw. 26 (1984)
(criticizing press spokesmen for admitting that they can live with lawyers in the newsroom).
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publication stage tends to show that the publisher conscientiously
was attempting to avoid publishing a false and defamatory article,
use of counsel is another factor that undermines the plaintiff's at-
tempt to establish reckless disregard, especially if the attorney
concluded that the article was accurate based on his own prepubli-
cation inquiry.28
Certainly, as a matter of policy, courts should not conclude
that the very decision to submit an article to counsel for prepubli-
cation review is in itself evidence that the editor seriously doubted
its truth. Whether review by counsel is used as a standard practice
or only in an isolated instance, such review does not suggest that
the editor had reason to doubt the truth of the article. Rather, the
decision to seek legal review is more probably an acknowledgement
that the editor is incapable of evaluating the legal risks and that he
While there is obviously some reason to fear a chilling effect as the result of reliance on
counsel, seeking the advice of counsel does not require delegation of the decision to publish
to the lawyers any more than it would require delegation in other areas in which a course of
action is predicated to a certain extent on an evaluation of potential legal consequences. For
an editor to fight against an arguably unsympathetic publisher for publication of a contro-
versial story when the risks are apparent and the economic costs of killing the story seem
negligible, at times may be difficult; responsible journalists nevertheless must wage this bat-
tle as a matter of professional integrity. So long as there is a possibility of defamation litiga-
tion, the courts should encourage legally informed decision-making even at the risk of sacri-
ficing a certain degree of journalistic purity. But cf. F. BAsKETrE, J. SissoRs & B. BROOKS,
THE ART OF EDrMNG 137 (3d ed. 1977) ("On extra sensitive stories in which the precise
wording has been dictated by an attorney, the desk should not make any change.").
285. See Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir. 1972) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant when, among other things, "one researcher, four editors and three
lawyers spent countless hours corroborating and evaluating [the] data."), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973); Handelman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1053, 1059 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (denying punitive damages to plaintiff when material in issue was reviewed by au-
thor's and publisher's counsel); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 425 F. Supp.
1075, 1081-82 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (granting summary judgment for defendant when, among
other things, outside counsel questioned reporter in detail and received supporting docu-
ments), aff'd, 557 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Konigsburg v. Time,
Inc., 312 F. Supp. 848, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (granting summary judgment for defendant
when, among other things, article was independently checked and verified by attorney fa-
miliar with subject matter); Beli v. Curtis Publishing Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 384, 393, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 122, 128 (1972) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when, among other
things, legal department reviewed article critically for accuracy); Licovoli v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc., 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1833, 1837 (Ind. Cir. Ct. 1978) (granting summary
judgment for defendant when, among other things, allegations were reviewed by three attor-
neys); cf. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 73, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 36 (partially af-
firming judgment n.o.v. for defendant when "editor knowledgeable in the field of libel" re-
viewed book prior to hardback publication), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979); Torres v.
Playboy Enters., Inc., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1182, 1184, 1186 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (granting
summary judgment for defendant when, among other things, counsel reviewed item but did
not make independent investigation).
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desires to act carefully. All sides would suffer if the courts created
a disincentive to a procedure that offers both to ensure accuracy
and to decrease the risk of litigation. When counsel questions the
accuracy of the article, however, and the editor decides to publish
it anyway, as with an expression of internal editorial skepticism, an
inference of reckless disregard may be warranted. Even when there
is evidence that counsel objected to publication, however, such evi-
dence provides only an inference of serious doubt, subject to expla-
nation by the defendant and rejection by the factfinder. e In any
given instance, truth may be a legal question but it is always a
journalistic query. The decision whether to publish ultimately
must be made by the editor and not by counsel.8 7 The defendant
can rebut the inference of reckless disregard that arises from coun-
sel's warning so long as the editor can explain why he disagreed
with counsel's assessment of the accuracy of the article. Moreover,
an inference of reckless disregard should not arise when the editor
published in spite of legal advice that was based on an issue other
than accuracy, such as the likelihood or costs of prevailing should
litigation ensue. Finally, a court should not permit an inference of
reckless disregard because the editor failed to have counsel review
an article, even if such review is standard practice with that pub-
lisher or in that particular segment of the industry.28 While review
by counsel is an important protective procedure that should be
given its due on the issue of reckless disregard, a publisher cannot
insulate itself from liability simply by running its drafts past an
attorney. In a given case, a plaintiff still should be able to establish
reckless disregard despite the fact that an article was read and ap-
proved by counsel prior to publication.
286. See Doubleday & Co. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex. 1984) (reversing ver-
dict for plaintiff when publisher's attorney expressed concern about defamatory potential of
allegation, thereby causing author to falsely change story).
287. See D. McHAm, LAW AND THE PRESS IN TEXAS: A HANDBOOK FOR JOURNALISTS 72
(4th ed. 1982) ("Reporters and editors make constant evaluations that are subjective, but
professional. The profession demands an expertise. But too often news managers use the
legal standard as a scapegoat: If it's legal, use it.")
288. See Hensley v. Life Magazine, Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 50, 54 (N.D. Cal. 1971)
(granting summary judgment for defendant despite editors' failure to have attorneys review
table of contents of magazine). But cf. Hellman v. McCarthy, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1789,
1795 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (denying summary judgment for defendant when television pro-
ducer failed to have counsel review potentially defamatory remarks despite lapse of three
months prior to broadcast).
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9. Retraction
Courts disagree on the evidentiary significance of a retraction
or of a failure to retract on demand. New York Times v. Sullivan
strongly suggested that a failure to retract a defamatory allegation
does not constitute evidence of reckless disregard. 289 Because the
reckless disregard inquiry focuses on the state of the defendant's
mind at the time of publication, subsequent inaction arguably is
irrelevant.2 90 The failure to retract reveals nothing about the de-
fendant's state of mind when no reliable party has brought the fal-
sity of the statement to the defendant's attention.29 1 Although a
failure to retract does not prove directly that the defendant
doubted the truth of the allegation at the time of publication, it
may provide some additional evidence that the defendant was pre-
pared to publish despite an awareness of falsity, at least when the
demand to retract is accompanied by proof that the allegation is
false.292 On the other hand, a prompt retraction or correction can
289. 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964) ("It may be doubted that a failure to retract which is
not itself evidence of malice can retroactively become such by virtue of a retraction subse-
quently made to another party." (emphasis added)).
290. See Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 822 (N.D.
Cal. 1977) (granting summary judgment for defendant when newspaper republished original
article despite demand for retraction by plaintiff's attorney); Pelzer v. Minneapolis Tribune,
7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2507, 2509 (Minn. D. Ct. 1981) ("failure to retract has no bearing on
the issue of malice"); cf. Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967, 975 (D.
Minn. 1967) (granting summary judgment for defendant when newspaper's retraction did
not comply with statutory prerequisites), aff'd, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968); Dupler v.
Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St. 2d 116, 125, 413 N.E.2d 1187, 1194 (1980) (affirming
reversal of verdict for plaintiff when newspaper's retraction failed to comply with statutory
prerequisites), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981).
Recently in Travoulareas v. Washington Post Co., the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit recognized that in "certain circumstances, a refusal to retract may pro-
vide some evidence that a statement was not published with reckless disregard in that it
may confirm that the defendant believed and continues to believe in the truth of the state-
ment." 759 F.2d 90, 132 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1985). As the court recognized, however, the
factfinder must determine whether such an inference is warranted in a given case. Id. A
publisher may not automatically defeat a potential libel verdict merely by refusing to
retreat.
291. Rood v. Finney, 418 So. 2d 1, 2 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming summary judgment
for defendant when wire service did not retract but plaintiff did not request retraction),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983).
292. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 759 F.2d 90, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (reversing
judgment n.o.v, for defendant when, among other things, defendant refused to retract or
print letter from plaintiff); Golden Bear Distrib. Sys., Inc. v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944,
950 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when magazine failed to retract despite
plaintiff's efforts to prove that allegations were false); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
538, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying summary judgment for defendant when subsequent to
publication editor ignored report from reliable source that defamatory allegations in article
were false); Church of Scientology v. Dell Publishing Co., 362 F. Supp. 767, 770 (N.D. Cal.
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provide evidence that the defendant did not publish the article
with serious doubts for truth.29 3 While a subsequent retraction
reveals little about the defendant's state of mind at the time of
publication, it does suggest that the defendant was concerned with
publishing the truth, and that he was not predisposed toward pub-
lishing a defamatory falsehood despite serious doubts concerning
its accuracy. A newspaper, of course, might publish an allegation
with an awareness of potential falsity and then subsequently re-
tract the allegation to cover itself. This scenario is fairly unlikely,
however, because the retraction should defuse whatever effect the
initial article may have had and, more importantly, the retraction
might undermine the publisher's reputation for accuracy by draw-
ing attention to publishing errors. On balance, courts properly can
consider a prompt retraction or correction for some evidentiary
value in undercutting an inference of reckless disregard. Still, be-
cause a subsequent retraction only is related tangentially to the
defendant's state of mind at the time of publication, a subsequent
retraction should not be sufficient, in itself, to negate an inference
of reckless disregard that otherwise is supported by credible
evidence.294
1973) (denying summary judgment for defendant when publisher republished after denial
and demand for retraction); Durso v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 33 IlM. App. 3d 300, 305-06, 337
N.E.2d 443, 448 (1975) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, publisher
failed to retract and continued to publish defamatory statement despite knowledge of its
falsehood); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 104 Mich. App. 59, 64-65, 304 N.W.2d 814,
816 (1981) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, newspaper refused to
retract after demand by plaintiff).
293. Bryant v. Associated Press, 595 F. Supp. 814, 818 (D.V.I. 1984) (granting sum-
mary judgment for defendant when newspaper published prompt retraction); Logan v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1330, 1332 (D.D.C. 1978) (granting partial summary
judgment for defendant when, among other things, newspaper published correction explain-
ing that plaintiff was improperly listed as illicit drug user); Hoffman v. Washington Post
Co., 433 F. Supp. 600, 605 (D.D.C. 1977) (granting summary judgment for defendant noting
that publication of retraction was "significant" and tended to negate any inferences of ac-
tual malice), af'd, 578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ross v. News-Journal Co., 228 A.2d 531,
534-36 (Del. 1967) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when newspaper promptly
corrected misstatements about plaintiff); Lexington Herald Leader v. Graves, 9 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1065, 1068 (Ky. 1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff when newspaper published
story explaining that article concerning plaintiff was wrong), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2342
(1984); Gulf Publishing Co. v. Lee, 434 So. 2d 687, 697 (Miss. 1983) (reversing verdict for
plaintiff when newspaper "took every reasonable step to correct any error in the article"
concerning plaintiff).
294. See Kerwick v. Orange County Publications, 53 N.Y.2d 625, 627, 420 N.E.2d 970,
970, 438 N.Y.S.2d 778, 778-79 (1981) (reversing summary judgment for defendant despite
prompt retraction); Deloach v. Beaufort Gazette, - S.C. , 316 S.E.2d 139 (1984)




A retraction will not aid the defendant who knowingly contin-
ued to distribute the original defamatory article after publishing
the retraction.95 In Di Lorenzo v. New York News, Inc.,296 the
publisher included a false and defamatory statement in an article
that was intended to appear in a Sunday supplement.297 Because
the supplement already had been distributed to news vendors by
the time the publisher learned that the allegations in the article
were false, it printed a retraction insert to be collated with the
supplement so that both the defamatory article and the retraction
would be published together. On these facts, the Court held that
the jury could decide whether the decision to publish the retrac-
tion simultaneously, rather than recalling the initial article, consti-
tuted evidence of reckless disregard itself as opposed to constitut-
ing only proof of the defendant's concern for the truth .29  Allowing
this issue to reach the jury is troubling. While technically, simulta-
neous publication of the defamatory statement and the retraction
does show that the defendant published the initial article with a
high degree of awareness of falsity, simultaneous publication also
shows that the defendant attempted to publish the truth. Although
a fully developed record might suggest otherwise, given the practi-
cal and economic difficulties of recalling the already distributed
section before the paper was to be sold publicly, the defendant's
response was both reasonable and conscientious. Consequently, the
defendant arguably satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of New
York Times. Finally, a retraction will not undermine an inference
of reckless disregard299 and may even bolster it, if the retraction is
equivocal or if it compounds the original defamatory charge.300
295. Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 679-81,
586 P.2d 572, 578-79, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 264-65 (1978) (denying summary judgment for
defendant when, among other things, there was evidence that newspaper reprinted and dis-
tributed original defamatory article subsequent to retraction), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961
(1979).
296. 78 A.D.2d 669, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1981).
297. Id. at 669-70, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85.
298. Id. at 672, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 487. Arguably, the combination of failure to verify
serious charges with obvious sources and the reporter's ill will still could support an infer-
ence of reckless disregard, even in the absence of the retraction evidence. Id. at 671-72, 432
N.Y.S.2d at 485-87.
299. Burnett v. National Enquirer, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 1011-12, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206,
219 (1983) (affirming reduced punitive damage award for plaintiff when, among other
things, purported retraction was "evasive, incomplete and by any standard, legally insuffi-
cient"), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984).
300. Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 416, 664 P.2d 337, 345
(1983) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, retraction insinuated that




The courts have developed the law for proof of actual malice
quite extensively in the two decades following New York Times v.
Sulivan. Although the Supreme Court has played a relatively mi-
nor role, state and lower federal courts have provided guidance in
many well-known and frequently cited cases.30 1 As several studies
have shown and as the preceding review of cases should reaffirm,
defendants ultimately prevail in the vast majority of defamation
cases in which the plaintiffs are required to prove actual malice.302
In many of the cases won by defendants, the plaintiff's proof sim-
ply failed to raise an inference of reckless disregard, or if it did,
plaintiff's proof failed to surmount the clear and convincing evi-
dence barrier. In a remarkable number of cases, however, the de-
fendants thoroughly have refuted any suggestion of reckless disre-
gard through the introduction of affirmative evidence of due
care.3 03 This result is not surprising because the press primarily is
motivated by its professional obligation to achieve accuracy rather
than by the threat of legal sanction. 04 To the extent that the pros-
pect of potential litigation or liability does influence behavior, the
press ordinarily will attempt to conform to the less protective neg-
ligence standard because it is difficult to determine with any cer-
tainty whether a prospective plaintiff will be considered a public
figure.30 5 The presentation of evidence pertaining to the investiga-
tive procedures employed by defendants has not misled the courts
into concluding either that the defendant must prove due care or
that the plaintiff can prevail by establishing negligence. Rather, it
is quite apparent from a review of the cases that, in accordance
with St. Amant v. Thompson, lower courts, in the overwhelming
majority of cases, clearly have understood that the question of
reckless disregard turns ultimately on the subjective beliefs or
301. See, e.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976); Goldwater v.
Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Washington Post
Co. v. Keough, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967); Martin
Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976); Rinaldi v.
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
302. See, e.g., Franklin Winners and Losers and Why; A Study of Defamation Litiga-
tion, supra note 28, at 491.
303. See supra notes 182-208 and accompanying text.
304. See infra note 407 and accompanying text.
305. See, e.g., Branson, The Public Figure-Private Person Dichotomy-A Flight
from First Amendment Reality, 2 COM. LAW. 13, 18 (1984); Christie, Underlying Contradic-
tions in the Supreme Court's Classification of Defamation, 1981 DuKE L.J. 811, 820.
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doubts of the publisher. At the same time, however, but still in
accordance with St. Amant, courts quite properly have refused to
permit the intent issue to dissolve into nothing more than a swear-
ing match over the defendant's state of mind. Instead, as St.
Amant seems to require, courts have recognized that, in most in-
stances, proof of the defendant's awareness of probable falsity will
depend on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. Conse-
quently, most opinions that discuss the reckless disregard issue in
any detail engage in an analysis of the circumstantial evidence that
has been presented, regardless of whether the courts ultimately de-
cide for the plaintiff or for the defendant.
As a general rule, plaintiffs seldom prevail without establish-
ing several of the evidentiary factors discussed above. Conse-
quently, defendants tend to prevail when the plaintiff attempts to
establish reckless disregard on the basis of a single evidentiary fac-
tor.0 6 This weighting in favor of the defendant probably results
because the plaintiff must prove his case by clear and convincing
evidence. Plaintiffs most frequently have received jury verdicts or
defeated defendants' motions for summary judgment when they
have been able to establish at least two, and often several, of the
factors discussed above, including at least one factor which rather
strongly shows that the defendant was aware that the allegations
probably are false. Plaintiffs frequently have prevailed upon show-
ing either publication of apparently defamatory information in the
absence of a reliable source, or publication without further verifica-
tion in the face of contradictory information or denial.0 7 Many of
306. See, e.g., Brown v. Herald Co., 698 F.2d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming sum-
mary judgment for defendant when reporter ignored information favorable to plaintiff); Ed-
wards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120-21 (2d Cir.) (reversing verdict for
plaintiff when reporter published charges despite plaintiff's denial), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1002 (1977); Seymour v. A.S. Abell Co., 557 F. Supp. 951, 958 (D. Md. 1983) (granting sum-
mary judgment for defendant when writer used arguably imprecise language); Loeb v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp. 481, 486-87 (D. Mass. 1980) (granting summary judgment for
defendant when reporter allegedly bore ill will toward plaintiff); Otepka v. New York Times
Co., 379 F. Supp. 541, 544 (D. Md.) (granting directed verdict for defendant when reporter
failed to verify charges in newspaper's clipping file), af'd, 502 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1973);
DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806, 815 (R.I. 1980) (affirming verdict for defendant when
newspaper exaggerated seriousness of charges against plaintiff); Rye v. Seattle Times Co., 37
Wash. App. 45, 678 P.2d 1282 (1984) (reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant
when reporter relied on sources biased against plaintiff).
307. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 169-70 (1967) (Warren,
C.J., concurring) (incorporating by reference Harlan's discussion of the record and affirming
verdict for plaintiff when there was denial, unreliable source, lack of expertise, sensationalis-
tic tone, serious charges, and sufficient lead time); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 759
F.2d 90, 134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (reversing judgment n.o.v. for defendant when there was
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the leading cases that have sustained findings of reckless disregard
unreliable source, ill will, imbalance, contradictory information, doubt in editorial process,
sensationalistic tone, serious charges, refusal to retract and sufficient lead time); Hunt v.
Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 642-46 (l1th Cir. 1983) (finding sufficient evidence of reckless
disregard but reversing on other grounds when there was unreliable source, inherent im-
probability, sensationalistic tone, failure to contact obvious source, serious charges, and suf-
ficient lead time); Golden Bear Distrib. Sys., Inc. v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944, 950 (5th
Cir. 1983) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when there was no source and failure to retract);
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 671-72 (4th Cir. 1982) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant when there was unreliable source and failure to contact plaintiff),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024 (1983); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 563-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (denying summary judgment for defendant when there was contradictory information,
inadequate editoral process, failure to verify following denial, bias, failure to contact obvious
source); Beech Aircraft v. National Aviation Underwriters, 11 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1401,
1416 (D. Kan. 1985) (denying summary judgment for defendant when there was unreliable
source, contradictory information, no source, sensationalistic tone, imbalance, and inade-
quate editorial process); Pep v. Newsweek, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1000, 1001-1003 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (denying summary judgment for defendant when there was an unreliable source and
failure to contact obvious source); Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351,
1361-62 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (reinstating verdict for plaintiff when there was an unreliable
source, misleading language, and sufficient lead time); Holter v. WLCY T.V., Inc., 366 So.
2d 445, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (reversing directed verdict for defendant when there
was no source, unreliable source, and denial); Cape Publications, Inc. v. Adams, 336 So. 2d
1197, 1199-1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when there was
unreliable source, denial, serious allegation, and ill will), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977);
Mehau v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 66 Hawaii - , - , 658 P.2d 312, 321-22 (1983) (reversing
verdict for defendant when there was unreliable source and sensationalistic tone); Cochran
v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 548, 561-62, 372 N.E.2d 1211, 1221 (1978)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant when there was unreliable source, misleading
language, and ill will); McHale v. Lake Charles Press, 390 So. 2d 556, 561-68 (La. Ct. App.
1980) (affirming judgment for plaintiff when there was denial, contradictory information,
misleading language, imbalance, and inadequate editorial process), cert. denied, 542 U.S.
941 (1981); Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Co. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 416, 664 P.2d 337, 344-45
(1983) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when there was contradictory information, failure to
verify with obvious source, misleading language, sufficient lead time, and equivocal retrac-
tion); Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 91 N.M. 250, 572 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App.
1977) (reversing summary judgment for defendant when there was unreliable source and
denial), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio App. 2d
143, 147-49, 416 N.E.2d 662, 666-67 (1979) (reversing directed verdict for defendant when
there was contradictory information and failure to verify by obvious source), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 996 (1980); Akins v. Altus Newspapers, Inc., 609 P.2d 1263, 1266-67 (Okla. 1977)
(affirming verdict for plaintiff when there was an unreliable source and inadequate editorial
process), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1010 (1980); Braig v. Field Communications, 310 Pa. Super.
569, 586-89, 456 A.2d 1366, 1376-77 (1983) (reversing summary judgment for defendant
when there was denial by plaintiff, imbalance, and inadequate editorial process), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 2341 (1984); Stevens v. Sun Publishing Co., 270 S.C. 65, 70-71, 240 S.E.2d
812, 815 (affirming verdict for plaintiff when there was unreliable source, denial, ill will, and
sufficient lead time), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978); Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wash.
2d 37, 44, 515 P.2d 154, 158 (1973) (en banc) (reversing summary judgment for defendant
when there was denial and misleading language); Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 79 Wash.
2d 816, 823-32, 490 P.2d 101, 111 (1971) (en banc) (finding reckless disregard but reversing
on other grounds when there was unreliable source, denial, serious charge, and sufficient
lead time); Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 688-92 (W. Va.) (af-
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were decided on the basis of records replete with circumstantial
evidence indicating that the defendants must have realized the
probable falsity of the allegations in issue. 08
Occasionally, proof that the defendant based defamatory alle-
gations on an unreliable source, or no source whatsoever, or pub-
lished in the face of contradictory information, may be sufficient to
raise an inference of reckless disregard with little or no further
supporting evidence.309 In Shockley v. Cox Enterprises,3 1 0 for in-
firming verdict for plaintiff when there was no source and sensationalistic tone), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975); cf. Burnett v. National Enquirer, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 1011-12,
193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209-10, 219 (1983) (affirming award of punitive damages for plaintiff
when there was contradictory information, unreliable source, no source, and equivocal re-
traction), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984); Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc.,
280 Minn. 328, 339-44, 160 N.W.2d, 1, 9-11 (1968) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiff argua-
bly applying objective standard when there was unreliable source, sufficient lead time, seri-
ous charges, and ill will).
308. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 210-13 (7th Cir. 1976) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for plaintiff when there was no source, contradictory information, and suffi-
cient lead time); see also Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 332-33, 336-37, 339-40 (2d
Cir. 1969) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when there was no source, contradictory informa-
tion, imbalance, ill will, lack of expertise, serious charges, sufficient lead time, and inade-
quate editorial process), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Alioto v. Cowles Communica-
tions, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363, 1369-71 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (granting judgment for plaintiff
when there was unreliable source, no source, failure to verify with obvious source, contradic-
tory information and denial), aff'd, 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102
(1982); Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 315, 317-19 (Colo. 1981) (en
banc) (reinstating verdict for plaintiff when there was no source, failure to contact obvious
source, misleading language, and sufficient lead time).
309. See Appleyard v. TransAmerican Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (4th Cir.
1976) (affirming punitive damage award for plaintiff when there was contradictory informa-
tion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Machleder v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp. 1364, 1372-73
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (denying summary judgment for defendant when there was contradictory
information); Church of Scientology v. Dell Publishing Co., 362 F. Supp. 767, 769-70 (N.D.
Cal. 1973) (denying summary judgment for defendant when there was denial); Airlie Found.,
Inc. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 337 F. Supp. 421, 425-26 (D.D.C. 1972) (affirming ver-
dict, subject to remitittur, for plaintiff when there was denial and misleading language);
Green v. Northern Publishing Co., 655 P.2d 736, 742 (Alaska 1982) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant when there was contradictory information), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3539 (1983); Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 51-53 (D.C. 1979) (reversing summary judg-
ment for defendant when there was contradictory information), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078
(1980); Beamer v. Nishiki, 66 Hawaii _ 670 P.2d 1264, 1273-76 (1983) (denying summary
judgment for defendant when there was no source); Gleichenhaus v. Carlyle, 226 Kan. 167,
168-69, 597 P.2d 611, 613 (1979) (reversing summary judgment for defendant when there
was denial); Lyons v. Mass Media, Inc., 390 Mass. 51, 58, 453 N.E. 2d 451, 456 (1983) (deny-
ing summary judgment for defendant when there was an unreliable source); Rinaldi v. Vi-
king Penguin, Inc., 52 N.Y.2d 422, 437, 420 N.E.2d 377, 383, 438 N.Y.S.2d 496, 502 (1981)
(affirming denial of summary judgment for defendant when there was contradictory infor-
mation); Rinaldi v. Village Voice, Inc., 47 A.D.2d 180, 182, 365 N.Y.S.2d 199, 201 (affirming
denial of summary judgment for defendant when there was contradictory information), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 497 Pa. 163, 182-84,
439 A.2d 652, 661-62 (1981) (partially reversing summary judgment for defendant when
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stance, the plaintiff was able to reach the jury on the reckless dis-
regard issue almost solely because defendant failed to identify a
source for the defamatory allegations.3 11 A failure to consult an ob-
vious source or the use of sensationalistic or misleading language
are also factors that may play a significant role in supporting an
inference of reckless disregard,3 12 as in Rebozo v. Washington Post
Co.,313 in which both were present. Generally, however, these fac-
tors do not appear to carry as much weight as reliance on an un-
trustworthy source or disregarding contradictory information.
No single evidentiary factor leads inevitably to an inference of
reckless disregard. In view of the emphasis on the publisher's state
of mind and the clear and convincing evidence standard, defen-
dants often have prevailed despite plaintiff's production of circum-
stantial evidence from which an inference arguably could have
been drawn.3 14 In Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 15 for instance, the court of
appeals affirmed defendant's motion for summary judgment de-
spite that prior to rebroadcast plaintiff's attorney denied the
there was contradictory information); Deloach v. Beaufort Gazette, - S.C. -, 316
S.E.2d 139, 142 (1984) (affirming verdict for plaintiff when there was no source), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 384 (1984); O'Brien v. Tribune Publishing Co., 7 Wash. App. 107, 499 P.2d
24 (1972) (reversing summary judgment for defendant when there was denial), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 906 (1973).
310. 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1222 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
311. Id. at 1223.
312. See Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 630-31 (10th Cir. 1977) (affirming
verdict for plaintiff when there was misleading language, failure to contact obvious source,
and imbalance); Carey v. Hume, 390 F. Supp. 1026, 1029-30 (D.D.C. 1975) (partially denying
summary judgment for defendant when there was distortion and failure to contact obvious
source), aff'd, 543 F.2d 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45
Cal. App. 3d 938, 945-47, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 191-93 (affirming verdict for plaintiff when
editor created misleading impression), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975); DiLorenzo v. New
York News, Inc., 78 A.D.2d 669, 670-72, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485-87 (1981) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for defendant when there was failure to contact obvious source, ill will, in-
sufficient retraction, and serious charges); Sills v. New York Times, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1460, 1461, 1464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 90 A.D.2d 1004 (1982) (denying summary judg-
ment for defendant when there was failure to contact obvious source and ill will).
313. 637 F.2d 375, 381-82 (5th Cir.) (reversing summary judgment for defendant), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 964 (1981).
314. See, e.g., Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting
summary judgment for defendant despite reliance on arguably unreliable source and denial
by plaintiff); Lexington Herald Leader v. Graves, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1065, 1066-71 (Ky.
1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff despite biased sources and lack of expertise), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 2342 (1984); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 382-
84, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1307-08, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 951-52 (reversing denial of summary judg-
ment for defendant despite bias, imbalance, and contradictory information), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 969 (1977); Padgett v. Sun News, 278 S.C. 26, -, 292 S.E.2d 30, 30-32 (1982)
(reversing verdict for plaintiff despite biased sources and denial).
315. 583 F.2d 1221, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978).
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charges, the source refused to produce documentation, and one of
defendant's reporter's expressed concern about the credibility of
the source.316
The actual malice standard set forth in New York Times and
elaborated in St. Amant seems to be operating in practice as it was
intended. The standard provides the press with a large degree of
protection. For plaintiffs to prevail is quite difficult though hardly
impossible. While some, perhaps many, deserving plaintiffs have
and will continue uncompensated in order to promote a vigorous
press, the plaintiff who is able to present persuasive proof, either
through direct or circumstantial evidence, that a defendant pub-
lished defamatory allegations with serious doubts for truth can ob-
tain and retain a verdict.
III. NEGLIGENCE AND GROSS IRRESPONSIBILITY
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.3 '7 required state courts to decide
the type of fault standard to employ in defamation actions involv-
ing private figure plaintiffs. The great majority of courts that have
addressed the issue to date have adopted a negligence standard.
New York, which is a very significant jurisdiction in the area of
defamation law because it is the center of publishing and broad-
casting industries, however, has adopted a standard of gross irre-
sponsibility with respect to matters argubly of public concern. 8
Cases are beginning to accumulate that attempt to flesh out the
dimensions of negligence and gross irresponsbility in the area of
reporting and publishing. Approximately forty-two published opin-
ions have addressed the issue of journalistic negligence to date and
another twenty-three have spoken to the question of gross irre-
sponsibility. For the most part, these opinions tend to address the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's attempt to prove fault at the summary
judgment or motion to dismiss stage. Consequently, the analysis is
often cursory. Nevertheless, the courts gradually are beginning to
provide guidance in this area.
The large body of case law that has developed about proof of
reckless disregard often will prove useful in defining the scope of
negligence and gross irresponsibility. As the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit noted recently on remand in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., "evidence of actual malice subsumes a breach of duty
316. Id. at 1223-24.
317. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
318. See supra note 14.
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which satisfies the negligence standard."31 9 Proof that a defendant
published allegations with "a high degree of awareness as to their
probable falsity" would inevitably suffice to establish failure to use
reasonable care in attempting to discover the truth. Consequently,
cases in which sufficient evidence of reckless disregard exists to
sustain a jury verdict for plaintiff or to deny summary judgment
for defendant should provide examples of the type of journalistic
conduct that by definition constitutes negligence. This conclusion
is especially true to the extent that the court has judged the con-
duct in issue sufficient to give rise to a high degree of subjective
doubt for the truth by clear and convincing evidence. Reckless dis-
regard cases can be relevant to the negligence issue even when the
plaintiff has failed to meet the New York Times standard. Because
negligence is a lower standard than reckless disregard, courts fre-
quently have observed that the evidence presented by "public fig-
ure plaintiffs" probably would satisfy the former, though not the
latter, applicable standard. Although clearly dicta, this type of lan-
guage does provide insight into judicial thinking concerning jour-
nalistic negligence. Finally, cases in which the courts have rejected
an inference of reckless disregard in large part on the basis of the
defendants' affirmative showing of due care also are helpful in the
negligence context. Judicial dicta that the publisher's conduct was
consistent with the highest standards of professionalism, based on
a lengthy review of the record in the course of an actual malice
case, provide some indication of how the courts are likely to react
to similar conduct when the standard is negligence.
Legal standards of due care and responsibility in journalism
should not and will not develop without careful consideration of
the profession's customs and practices. Although debate exists
whether a professional standard should apply in journalistic negli-
gence cases and whether expert testimony ordinarily should be re-
quired,3 20 evidence of the customs, practices, and standards of
journalism has been employed on the proof of fault issue in defa-
mation litigation and doubtlessly will play a major role in the fu-
ture. Despite a great deal of diversity,321 many well-accepted prac-
319. 680 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
320. See infra notes 333-47 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., S. CRUMP, NEWSGATHRING: REPORTING FOR THE 1980s AND BEYOND, TiE
NEW FUNDAMENTALS OF JOURNALISM 57 (1981) ("Journalistic ethics, exempt from legislative
control,. . . have an immense range of differences .... The nature and intensity of jour-
nalism ethics varies among individuals, employers, by geographic area, and by the news me-
dium."); see also Daniels, Public Figures Revisited, 25 Wh. & MARY L. Rav. 957, 959-60
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tices and standards of conduct exist in journalism with respect to
what a reasonably prudent publisher does to achieve accuracy.32 2
The generally agreed upon objectives of the profession are often
stated in nonbinding ethical codes.3 23 The more specific standards,
practices, and customs frequently have been set forth in training
manuals for journalism students as well as working journalists.3 24
(1984) (argument by Vice President and Counsel of Newsweek that there are no agreed
upon objective standards in journalism). But see News Publishing Co. v. Deberry, 321
S.E.2d 112, 114-115 (Ga. App. 1984) (where the court permitted a professor of journalism to
testify to "certain generally recognized minimum standards in journalism for the reporting
of stories" and rejected the argument "that there are no recognized journalistic standards"
in an actual malice case).
322. See W. AGEE, P. AULT & E. EMERY, REPORTING AND WRITING THE NEWS 10 (1983)
("Although today's reporters work with the aid of fascinating electronic technology, they
carry on a tradition of recording human activities and natural disasters rooted deep in his-
tory. The journalistic rules and ethical standards that guide them have evolved through
many generations of newsgatherers."); E. BROUSSARD & J. HOLGATE, WRITING AND REPORTING
BROADCAST NEWS 17 (1982) ("The principles of accuracy, balance, objectivity, clarity and
conciseness are widely known to all good journalists even though they may not be men-
tioned very often in the newsroom."); J. HOHENBERG, THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNALIST 323-24
(5th ed. 1983) ("There is general agreement within the profession on the basic obligations of
journalists. Briefly stated, they are as follows:. . .To cover the news fairly, thoroughly and
accurately.").
323. Several press organizations have adopted codes of ethics. They tend to be brief,
general, and largely aspirational. Nevertheless, they provide some evidence of the values and
goals that are widely shared within the journalistic profession. Among the more widely
known codes are: ASSOCIATED PRESS MANAGING EDITORS, CODE OF ETHICS FOR NEWSPAPERS
AND THEIR STAFFS (1975) [hereinafter cited as APME, CODE OF ETHICS]; AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1975) [hereinafter cited as ASNE, STATE-
MENT OF PRINCIPLES]; SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, SIGMA DELTA CHI, CODE OF
ETHICS (1973) [hereinafter cited as SPJ, CODE OF ETHICS]; RADIO TELEVISION NEWS DIREc-
TORS ASSOCIATION, CODE OF BROADCAST NEWS ETHICS [hereinafter cited as RTNDA, CODE OF
ETHICS]; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, CODE OF PROGRAM STANDARDS [hereinaf-
ter cited as NAB, CODE]. In addition, several newspapers have adopted their own codes of
ethics and standards; see, e.g., WASHINGTON POST, STANDARDS & ETHICS (1977) [hereinafter
cited as WASHINGTON POST STANDARDS]; CHICAGO SUN-TIMES & DAILY NEWS, CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL STANDARDS (1974) [hereinafter cited as CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, CODE].
324. Litigants frequently will introduce principles of due care in journalism into defa-
mation litigation through expert testimony. In addition, recognized journalism textbooks
and manuals provide a wealth of information regarding the practices of the reasonably pru-
dent reporter and editor. See, e.g., W. AGEE, P. AuLT & E. EMERY, REPORTING AND WRITING
THE NEWS (1983); D. Anderson & B. Itale, Contemporary News Reporting (1984); F. BAS-
KErE, J. SISSORS & B. BROOKS, THE ART OF EDITING (3d ed. 1982); J. BIrNER & D. BITTNER,
RADIO JOURNALISM (1977); E. BLISS & J. PATTERSON, WRITING NEWS FOR BROADCAST (2d ed.
1978); J. BOLCH & K MILLER, INVESTIGATIVE AND IN-DEPTH REPORTING (1978); J. BRADY, THE
CRAFT OF INTERVIEWING (1977); B. BROOKS, G. KENNEDY, D. MOEN & D. RANLEY, NEWS RE-
PORTING AND WRITING (1980); E. BROUSSARD & J. HOLGATE, WRITING AND REPORTING BROAD-
CAST NEWS (1982); W. BURROW, ON REPORTING THE NEWS (1977); A. CROWELL, CREATIVE
NEWS EDITING (2d ed. 1975); S. CRUMP, NEWSGATHERING AND REPORTING FOR THE 1980s AND
BEYOND: THE NEW FUNDAMENTALS OF JOURNALISM (1981); D. DARY, How To WRITE NEWS FOR
BROADCAST AND PRINT MEDIA (1973); E. DENNIS & A. ISMACH, REPORTING PROCESSES AND
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Members of the profession recognize that these standards and
practices often have developed to help ensure accuracy and that
failure to abide by them sometimes will result in error.3 25 This
analysis will attempt to provide a basic framework for considering
claims of negligence in defamation litigation. As in the section on
actual malice, this section will review the existing case law and will
attempt to consider each factor that the courts take into account
in analyzing the negligence issue. When useful, reference will be
made to principles developed in actual malice litigation. In addi-
tion, this section will cite provisions of the various ethical codes of
PRACTICES: NEWSWRITING FOR TODAY'S READERS (1981); F. FEDLER, REPORTING FOR THE PRINT
MEDIA (2d ed. 1979); W. Fox, WRITING THE NEWS: PRINT JOURNALISM IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE
(1977); R. GARST & T. BERNSTEIN, HEADLINES AND DEADLINES (4th ed. 1982); D. GARVEY & W.
RIVERS, NEWSWRITING FOR ELECTRONIC MEDIA (1982); M. GIBSON, EDITING IN THE ELECTRONIC
AGE (1984); H. GOODWIN, GROPING FOR ETHICS IN JOURNALISM (1983); G. HAGE, E. DENNIS, A.
ISMACH & S. HARTGEN, NEW STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORTING (2d ed. 1983) [here-
inafter cited as G. HAGE]; J. HOHENBERG, THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNALIST (5th ed. 1983); G.
HOUGH, NEWSWRITING (3d ed. 1984); J. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIVES ... Ethical
Problems of the News Media (1976); C. LEWIS, REPORTING FOR TELEVISION (1984); C.
MAcDOUGAL, INTERPRETATIVE REPORTING (8th ed. 1982); D. MCHAM, LAW AND THE PRESS IN
TEXAS: A HANDBOOK FOR JOURNALISTS (4th ed. 1982); M. MENCHER, NEWS REPORTING AND
WRITING (3d ed. 1984); K METZLER, NEWSGATHERING (1979); J. NEAL & S. BROWN, NEW-
SWRITING AND REPORTING (1976); A. PLOTNICK, THE ELEMENTS OF EDITING: A MODERN GUIDE
FOR EDITORS AND JOURNALISTS (1982); W. RIVERS, NEWS IN PRINT* WRITING & REPORTING
(1984); D. SHAW, JOURNALISM TODAY (1977); M. STEIN, REPORTING TODAY: THE NEWSWRITER'S
HANDBOOK (1971); H. SHULTE, REPORTING PUBLIC AFFAIRS (1981); M. STEPHENS, BROADCAST
NEWS - RADIO JOURNALISM AND AN INTRODUCTION TO TELEVISION (1980); H. STONECIPHER, ED-
ITORIAL AND PERSUASIVE WRITING: OPINION FUNCTION OF THE NEWS MEDIA (1979); H.
STONECIPHER, E. NICHOLLS & D. ANDERSON, ELECTRONIC AGE NEWSEDITING (1981); J. STOVALL,
C. SELF & L. MULLINS, ON LINE EDITING (1984); THE EDITORIAL PAGE (Babb ed. 1977); C.
WARREN, MODERN NEWS REPORTING (3d ed. 1959); J. WEAVER, BROADCAST NEWSWRITING AS
PROCESS (1984); T. WHITE, A. MEPPEN & S. YOUNG, BROADCAST NEWS WRITING, REPORTING
AND PRODUCTION (1984); P. WILLIAMS, INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND EDITING (1978).
325. See J. NEAL & S. BROWN, supra note 324, at 278 ("Few libel suits result from
name-calling or what a layman would define as malice. Many, however, are the result of
negligence that at least borders on what the Supreme Court has defined as 'actual mal-
ice'-reckless disregard of whether a story is true or false. A man named Hunter is accused
of a felony, and the reporter writes 'Fisher'. Fisher sues. Or the reporter omits 'Jr.' after a
man's name. His father sues. Or somebody switches the complaining witness's name with
the defendant's in a minor police story. Or the identifications under a photograph are trans-
posed. Or the address comes out wrong in a story on a vice raid. Or a reporter accepts
something defamatory from a previously reliable source and fails to check it. The list of
possibilities is endless, but they all add up to the same thing: failure to check names, ad-
dresses and other second-hand information."). See also D. DARY, supra note 324, at 65 ("In
news writing, inaccuracy is usually caused by carelessness."); H. GOODWIN, supra note 324,
at 303 ("Competence may be the number one ethical problem in the field .... Every news-
room in the country has incompetent people. Errors and misinterpretations continue to be a
major problem in every news medium we have."); M. STEIN, supra note 324, at 183 ("Most
libel suits result from careless reporting .... In almost all libel cases, the reporter did not
check his facts thoroughly enough.").
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the profession along with a representative sample of the vast body
of learning on professional standards and practices when they bear
on the issues under discussion. Because negligence case law has not
developed to the same extent as case law on actual malice, some of
the suggested guidelines are based on custom and practice as re-
ported in the journalistic literature.
A. The Standard of Care
1. Negligence Analysis
Although several elements of the defamation tort, including
defamatory character, publication, control of the communciation,
or reference to the plaintiff,3 26 may constitutionally require the
plaintiff to prove fault, or negligence, in the great majority of cases
proof of negligence will relate solely to the question of falsity. The
discussion in this section will be restricted to the latter question.
The application of negligence principles by the courts in the
area of defamation should not differ markedly from other areas of
tort law. In the context of defamation, as with other torts, the
Restatement of Torts defines negligence as "conduct that creates
an unreasonable risk of harm. ' 327 The Restatement elaborates that
"the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of
such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility
of the act or the particular manner in which it is done. 3 28 Thus
determining whether a risk is unreasonable requires balancing the
likelihood and severity of the risk against the utility of the defen-
dant's conduct. In the context of defamation, however, at least one
adjustment should be made to the basic negligence calculus in def-
erence to first amendment values. Gertz abandoned the public in-
terest standard in part to avoid placing the judiciary in the diffi-
cult and dangerous position of having to determine whether one
speaker's message is of greater value than another's.32 9 To revital-
326. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 580B comment g, at 227 (1976). In developing
standards in this area state courts likely will be influenced by the Restatement. See, e.g.,
Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 820 n.15 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1123 (1977); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 976 (Utah 1981); Jacron Sales Co. v.
Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 596-97, 350 A.2d 688, 697-98 (1976). See generally Franklin & Bussel,
The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 835
(1984) (discussion of proof of fault in contexts other than falsity).
327. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 580B comment g (1976).
328. Id. § 291; see also United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.
1947).
329. 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
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ize such a process by requiring courts to engage in comparative
evaluations of speech in the course of analyzing the utility of the
defendant's conduct under the negligence standard would be un-
fortunate. One commentator has argued that this process is inevi-
table, noting that "the traditional formula for determining negli-
gence liability cannot be meaningfully employed in an action for
defamation without plugging in some measure of social utility of
the subject matter of the defamatory communication."330 Although
the value of uninhibited speech must be considered, a comparative
evaluation of the subject matter of the article in issue is not re-
quired necessarily. Rather than attempt to distinguish political
speech from other forms of speech, for instance, the courts should
presume that there is a high and relatively constant interest in
protecting the defendant's right to publish whatever he chooses. 1
This generalized interest should be balanced against the potential
for harm to the plaintiff's reputation along with the costs of avoid-
ing the error.
In addition to the value of free communication, an application
of negligence principles in the defamation context will require con-
sideration of a variety of relatively obvious factors including the
likelihood of defamatory harm, the seriousness of the potential
harm, the effectiveness of precautionary measures taken, and the
cost and practicality of additional precautionary measures. Disre-
garding momentarily the possibility of a professional standard of
care, a publisher theoretically has employed reasonable care in at-
tempting to ensure the truth of the published material if, in view
of the likelihood of error and the seriousness of defamatory harm
in the event of falsity, the cost of further precautions would impair
330. Smolla, supra note 28, at 82. Recognizing the constitutional problem, Professor
Smolla observed that "[a]ny weighing of the utility of speech must be done cautiously, to
nimimize the potential for offending first amendment values, because it apparently contem-
plates content-sensitive priorization of speech." Id. at 84.
331. No reason exists to believe that the press is generally less careful when reporting
on a matter of great public importance such as public corruption; indeed, the opposite is
more likely to be true. That a particular subject would appear to be of unusual significance
to the citizen and voter suggests that the interest in accurate information is that much
greater. Moreover, the subject of great public significance often presents the gravest risks to
reputation and hence the greatest threat of litigation in the event of error. To the extent
that the press does follow different standards in verifying a story concerning government
policies, for instance, as opposed to one regarding Hollywood gossip, to avoid confusion, the
press should receive the benefit of the most speech protective standard across the board.
Timing is a different matter, however. A lesser degree of verification may be consistent with
due care when the reporter is working on a "hot news story" as opposed to a leisurely fea-
ture story. See infra notes 410-18 and accompanying text. This differing standard does not
entail necessarily a substantive evaluation of the nature speech in issue.
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the important societal interest in free communication. This defini-
tion is theoretical in that it states the inquiry in terms that are
more complex or abstract than ordinarily would be presented in a
jury charge. The central question for the factfinder usually will be
phrased in terms of what the reasonable person or publisher would
do under similar circumstances or as the Restatement states the
inquiry, "whether the defendant acted reasonably in checking on
the truth or falsity ...of the communication before publishing
it.'')3 2 Presumably, the court will provide the primary line of pro-
tection for first amendment values by factoring in the potential im-
pact on free communication in determining whether a sufficient
case of negligence has been presented for submission to the jury. If
a plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, however, defense coun-
sel may argue, and the court may instruct the jury, that, in assess-
ing the cost and practicality of requiring further precautions, con-
sideration should be given to the potential impact that such a
requirement might have on free communication. Obviously, a jury
would not be equipped to measure potential chilling effect with
any precision considering that neither scholars, attorneys, nor me-
dia have been able to do so yet. The first amendment interest,
however, could be factored in the decision in at least a rough, com-
mon sense manner. More significantly, the potential threat to free
press values can, and presumably will, be considered more analyti-
cally on a motion for summary judgment, a motion for directed
verdict, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or an
appeal.
2. Professional or an Ordinary Standard of Care
A jurisdiction adopting a negligence standard eventually must
decide whether to adopt a professional or an ordinary standard of
care. A choice between these alternatives determines whether the
plaintiff should be required to prove that, in publishing a defama-
tory falsehood, the defendant failed to act like a reasonable "per-
son" under the circumstances or that the defendant failed to be-
have like a reasonable journalist for the particular medium in
issue. If a jurisdiction adopts a professional standard, a plaintiff
generally would need to produce expert testimony to establish the
standard as well as the defendant's deviation therefrom.333 A pro-
fessional standard would not be necessarily lower or higher than an
332. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment (1976).
333. W. KEETON & W. PROSSER, supra note 1 § 32.
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ordinary person standard. In a given instance, a professional jour-
nalist arguably might investigate more or less thoroughly than the
layperson, depending on professional practice and custom.23 Jour-
nalists would find adoption of a professional standard very desira-
ble, however, because it would provide guidance and reassurance.
A reporter or an editor would be able to proceed on the assump-
tion that a plaintiff would find presenting a viable libel claim diffi-
cult if the standards of the profession were honored.3 5 Contrast-
ingly, an ordinary person standard would offer journalists no such
assurance.
No uniform basis appears to exist for determining whether a
particular group qualifies as a profession for purposes of applying a
separate standard of care. s33 As with other recognized professions,
such as law and medicine, journalism requires its members to ap-
ply intellect and skill acquired through training. Unlike other pro-
fessions, however, the first amendment prohibits the state from re-
stricting access at least to nonbroadcast journalism through
licensing or enforcement of a code of conduct by administrative
sanction.3 37 Journalism, however, does have recognized codes and
standards, even though they are nonbinding in nature.3 38 The
Restatement would apply a specialized standard to "skilled
trades" as well as to professions.3 3 9 This intelligent approach cer-
tainly would encompass journalism.
Courts that have considered the question have split on
whether to apply a professional or an ordinary person standard.
334. If the professional custom in a particular context proved to be less rigorous than
the ordinary standard of care, this would redound to the defendant's benefit if the jurisdic-
tion adopted a professional standard and if the court did not conclude that the particular
custom was negligent in itself. See, e.g., Northern Barge Corp. v. Eastern Transp. Co., 60
F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
335. See Note, In Defense of Fault in Defamation Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1735, 1738
(1979).
336. See generally Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 627, 631-32
(1973) (concluding that the exercise of intellectual judgment as a special skill and historic
social status are the two primary determinants of the professional).
337. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974).
338. See supra note 323 and accompanying text. In certain legal contexts, courts have
held that journalism is not a profession. See, e.g., Express-News Corp. v. San Antonio Typo-
graphical Union 172, 223 N.L.R.B. 627, 629 (1976) (journalism is not a profession under the
National Labor Relations Act); Frye v. Commissioner of Fin., 62 N.Y.2d 841, 466 N.E.2d
151, 477 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1984) (journalist not professional within New York City Administra-
tive Code for purposes of tax exemption).
339. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment a (1965). The Restatement
emphasizes the acquisition of skill through learning and "aptitudes developed by special
training and experience." Id.
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Some jurisdictions expressly have rejected a professional standard
on the ground that it unfairly would permit the defendant class to
prescribe its own standard of care,340 while other jurisdictions have
concluded that a professional standard is appropriate . 41 The
Restatement, which has adopted the professional standard, pro-
vides that:
[t]he defendant, if a professional disseminator of news, such as a newspaper,
a magazine or a broadcasting station, or an employee, such as a reporter, is
held to the skill and experience normally possessed by members of that pro-
fession. .... Customs and practices within the profession are relevant in ap-
plying the negligence standard, which is, to a substantial degree, set by the
profession itself, though a custom is not controlling .... 34
Given the peculiar demands of journalism, the existence of a
body of professional standards and the need for predictability, a
professional standard should be applied in media defendant defa-
mation cases. Expert testimony, however, may not be required nec-
essarily in every journalistic negligence case. As a New York appel-
late court recognized in Greenberg v. CBS, Inc.4 3  "[t]he
elementary standards of basic news reporting are common knowl-
edge. News articles and broadcasts must contain the answers to the
essential inquiries of who, what, where, when, why and how.''3 4
When the procedures at issue are complex or technical, however, a
340. See, e.g., Troman v. Wood, 62 IlM. 2d 184, 197-98, 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1975);
McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 975 (1982); Schrottman v. Barnicle, 386 Mass. 627, -, 437 N.E.2d 205, 215
(1982); Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, 693 P.2d 35, 43 (Or. 1985); Memphis Publish-
ing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 418 (Tenn. 1978); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 657-
58, 318 N.W.2d 141, 151, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982). Other courts have adopted an
ordinary care standard without necessarily denigrating the professional standard. See, e.g.,
Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 590 S.W.2d 840, (Ark. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076
(1980); Embers Supper Club v. Scripps-Howard Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 22, _, 457 N.E.2d 1164,
1167 (1984); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 445-47, 546 P.2d 81, 85
(1976). Other jurisdictions that have adopted a negligence standard have not clearly indi-
cated whether they will apply a professional or an ordinary standard of care. See, e.g., Fos-
ter v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 818-19 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1123 (1977); Gazette v. Harris, - Va. -, _, 325 S.E.2d 713, 724-25 (1985).
341. See Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, 114 Ariz. 309, 315, 560 P.2d 1216, 1222
(1977); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 232-33, 531 P.2d 76, 83-84 (1975);
Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 595-96, 350 A.2d 688, 697 (1976); Martin v. Griffin
Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla. 1976); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 974
(Utah 1981); see also Anderson, supra note 22, at 466-67 (recommending adoption of a pro-
fessional standard that would take account of the publisher's medium, school of journalism,
resources, deadline pressure, space limitations and technological capabilities).
342. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 580B comment g (1976).
343. 69 A.D.2d 693, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1979).
344. Id. at 710, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 998 (1979); see also Schrottman v. Barnicle, 386 Mass.
627, -, 437 N.E.2d 205, 214 (1982); supra note 485.
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plaintiff should have to present expert testimony to reach the
jury.3 45 In simpler cases concerning nontechnical issues, expert tes-
timony should be considered helpful, though not necessarily
essential.
As a practical matter, whether a jurisdiction adopts an ordi-
nary or a professional standard of care may be inconsequential.
Under an ordinary care standard, the fact-finder must determine
how the reasonable person would behave under the circumstances.
Placing the reasonable person in a vacuum would distort analysis.
Therefore, the demands of a functioning news room should qualify
as circumstances that the reasonable person would consider rele-
vant in a media defendant case. The factfinder could and should
consider the factors that essentially dictate the content of profes-
sional standards such as the cost and efficacy of further verifica-
tion, the overall reliability of a particular type of source, for exam-
ple, a wire service, and the necessity for prompt publication of a
particular story. Expert testimony would be admissible to establish
these factors. This testimony would provide the factfinder with the
professional benchmark, even in an ordinary care case. Presuma-
bly, however, professional custom would not be decisive under an
ordinary care standard and hence predictability of the outcome
would not be as great. Well-marshalled evidence that the defen-
dant behaved like a reasonably prudent professional journalist,
however, often would prove persuasive, especially at the appellate
review stage. 48 In contrast, evidence that a media defendant
breached professional standards could prove damning to a media
defendant even when an ordinary care standard was applicable.4 7
345. See Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, Inc. 65 Hawaii 584, 589-90, 656 P.2d 79, 83
(1982) (court noting "[A]lthough we recognize that there may conceivably be certain circum-
stances where expert evidence is necessary in a private figure defamation case, we refrain
from adopting a rigid rule requiring expert testimony in all such defamation cases. The
determination of whether expert evidence is required. . . should be made on a case-by-case
basis, depending on the nature of the issue to be decided and the evidence actually adduced
on that issue); Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue Is Control of Press
Power, 54 Tax. L. R.v. 271, 276 n.21 (1976) (argument that the processing and dissemina-
tion of news today is a technologically complex enterprise with which the jury needs to be
familiarized).
346. See Horvath v. Ashtabula Tel., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1657, 1663 (Ohio App.
1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff because of insufficient evidence of negligence when a
comparison of procedures used by defendant reporter with "those used by other similar
news reporters" indicated defendant's "procedures were well within the bounds of profes-
sionalism"); Spencer, supra note 32, at 383 [as of 1977], ("[p]revailing state judicial atti-
tudes seem to indicate a willingness to absolve the press of liability for reported falsehoods
which could not have been avoided by standard practices of good journalism").




As noted earlier s4 New York has concluded that when "the
content of [an] article is arguably within the sphere of legitimate
public concern, which is reasonably related to matters warranting
public exposition," the plaintiff may recover only by proving "by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the publisher acted in a
grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration of the
standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily
followed by responsible parties. '3 49 Basically a gross negligence
standard, the focus of the New York test is objective, like a negli-
gence standard and unlike the New York Times actual malice ap-
proach.38 0 This standard appears to be similar to the one advo-
cated by Justice Harlan in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, which
would have permitted public figures to recover only on "a showing
of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure
from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily ad-
hered to by responsible publishers." 351 Although closely related,
the negligence and gross irresponsiblity standards are not the
same. Both use an objective measure of care as the benchmark.
Professional customs and practices will be quite relevant to both
standards.3 52 Both will require consideration of the same type of
factors such as amount of lead time, degree of verification, and re-
liability of sources.
Presumably, New York will require a greater departure from
the standard of due care in the journalism profession than will
simple negligence jurisdictions because the term "gross irresponsi-
bility," on its face, suggests error of a more egregious nature than
Super. Ct. 1982) (granting judgment n.o.v. for plaintiff where court found "defendants vio-
lated the standard of care existing in the industry"); cf. Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, 65
Hawaii 584, 589-90, 656 P.2d 79, 83 (1982) (affirming denial of directed verdict for defen-
dant when there was evidence that newspaper deviated from its own verification proce-
dures); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, - Va. _ -, 325 S.E.2d 713, 731 (1985) (sufficient evi-
dence of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, defendant
deviated from its own custom of listing only the defendants and not the complaining wit-
nesses names in summarizing docketed criminal proceedings).
348. See supra note 14.
349. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d 569,
571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975). New York retains the negligence standard when the plain-
tiff is a private figure and a matter of public concern is not implicated.
350. Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531, 544, 416 N.E.2d 557, 563, 435
N.Y.S.2d 556, 562 (1980).
351. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
352. The New York gross irresponsibility standard expressly uses the professional
practice as the benchmark.
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mere negligence. In Gaeta v. New York News, Inc.,3 53 the appellate
division of New York was presented with a persuasive case in
which to find an inference of negligence when a reporter falsely
published that the plaintiff was charged with serious offenses, de-
spite failure to contact obvious sources in the absence of deadline
pressure. Applying the gross irresponsibility standard, however,
the New York Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, observing
that the reporter had been told that its source was reliable and
that it had no reason to doubt the truth of the allegedly defama-
tory allegations. 54 Whether the difference between the analysis
and conclusions of the appellate division and the court of appeals
illustrates the difference between the respective standards applied
or whether the court of appeals would have rejected the lower
court's negligence analysis solely on the record is not clear. As in
actual malice cases, the New York courts doubtlessly win reject at-
tempts to prove gross irresponsibility when the defendant is able
to establish behavior of a responsible and professional journalist.3 55
These cases can provide insight to how courts will assess profes-
sional care in the journalism profession, and with a certain amount
of caution, they may provide guidance in the ordinary negligence
area.
B. Proof of Negligence/Gross Irresponsibility
As in studying actual malice cases, the development of negli-
gence principles in the area of defamation may be understood
more readily by isolating and examining the various considerations
that courts have found relevant.
353. 95 A.D.2d 315, 327, 466 N.Y.S.2d 321, 328-29 (1983), rev'd, 62 N.Y.2d 340 (1984).
354. 62 N.Y.2d 340, 351, 465 N.E.2d 802, 806, 477 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (1984). That defen-
dants prevail with far greater frequency under the gross irresponsibility standard than
under negligence would seem to indicate that there is a significant difference. See supra
notes 511-15 and accompanying text.
355. See, e.g., Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531, 541-42, 416 N.E.2d 557,
561, 435 N.Y.S.2d 556, 561 (1980) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because of
insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility when "there is not the slightest suggestion that
[the managing editor's] own behavior was anything but responsible and in accord with ac-
cepted journalistic practices"); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y. 2d 196,
200, 341 N.E.2d 569, 572, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 65 (1975) (affirming summary judgment because
insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility exists when "it appears that the publisher exer-
cised reasonable methods to insure accuracy")-
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1. Reason to Doubt the Accuracy of the Statement
Whether a publisher exhibited reasonable care in failing to
discover the falsity of the allegations in question often will depend
to a large degree on whether the publisher had reason to suspect
that those allegations might not be true. Several factors may bear
on whether a publisher should have doubted the truth of poten-
tially defamatory statements prior to publication.
(a) Inconsistent Information
A publisher is negligent by definition if it publishes potentially
defamatory information with actual awareness that such informa-
tion is false.3 58 Even when there is considerable support for an alle-
gation, however, a publisher may fail to exercise reasonable care if
it prints the material in the face of contradictory information and
in the absence of further efforts at verification. In Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Ane, s7 for instance, the Florida Court of Appeals
found sufficient evidence of negligence to affirm a jury verdict for
plaintiff, when a reporter published a story implicating the plain-
tiff in a major drug arrest despite the fact that two reliable sources,
the police and the department of vehicles, had indicated that a
truck seized by the police did not belong to the plaintiff and that
the sheriff's office had informed the reporter that the plaintiff was
not a suspect in the case.35 8 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held in a
recent case3 59 that there was sufficient evidence of negligence to
356. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
357. 423 So. 2d 376 (Fla. App. 1982), afl'd, 458 So.2d 239, 242 (1984).
358. Id. at 390-91; see also Newell v. Field Enters., 91 III. App. 3d 735, 739-40, 756,
415 N.E.2d 434, 439, 450 (1980) (sufficient evidence of negligence to reverse summary judg-
ment for defendant when reporter published story about legal proceeding that was inconsis-
tent with complaint on which it was based); Slocum v. Webb, 375 So. 2d 125, 130 (La. App.
1979) (sufficient evidence of negligence to reverse dismissal of plaintiff's complaint when
defendant's notes regarding name of arrestee referred to plaintiff "Jerry Slocum, Jr.," and
plaintiff's son "Jerry Slocum"); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 414,
418 (Tenn. 1978) (sufficient evidence of negligence to reverse directed verdict for defendant
when reporter wrote that woman was shot by another woman while she was with the latter's
husband at night although police reports which reporter apparently relied on indicated that
the incident took place during the day and that other people were present); cf. Street v.
National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1236 n.6 (6th Cir.) (affirming directed verdict for
defendant on insufficient evidence of reckless disregard but noting in dicta that there argua-
bly would have been sufficient evidence of negligence for a jury when defendant rebroadcast
film after plaintiff complained that it was inaccurate), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 815 (1981);
Liquori v. Republican Co., 396 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Mass. App. 1979) (sufficient evidence of
negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, reporter failed to alert
sister newspaper to fact that story was incorrect prior to republication of article).
359. Levine v. CMP Publication, 738 F.2d 660, 673 (5th Cir. 1984).
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support a jury verdict for the plaintiff when a reporter wrote that
plaintiff had been "convicted" of an offense despite knowledge that
the litigation in issue was civil rather than criminal, that the plain-
tiff had "disappeared" although he had been contacted with little
difficulty, and that law enforcement officials were investigating the
plaintiff although the reporter was aware that the police had little
interest in the case.
The reasonable journalist presumably would be reluctant to
publish a potentially defamatory allegation in the face of reliable
contradictory information.3 60 A reporter's awareness of inconsistent
information, by itself, should not give rise automatically to an in-
ference of negligence. Consideration also must be given to the reli-
ability of the sources of the contradicting information and the ease
of further verification.
Additional verification also may be called for in the face of a
denial by a plaintiff or his representative, especially if other rea-
sons exist to question the accuracy of the information such as a
basis to believe that the source of the denial is creditable.3 1 As
with reckless disregard, 6 however, a plaintiff should not be able
necessarily to "stop the presses" simply by denying the truth of
the allegations, at least when good reason remains to believe that
the charges are accurate and supportable.363
360. Cf. B. BROOKS, supra note 324, at 202 (in covering criminal incidents "seldom can
the reporter resolve conflicting reports, so the best answer ... may be to acknowledge the
conflict and to publish both versions of the story"); J. HOHENBERG, supra note 324, at 289.
Although publishing both sides of a dispute and attributing the allegations to their respec-
tive sources may be prudent journalistic practice, it would not necessarily protect the jour-
nalist against liability for defamation in the absence of the doctrine of neutral reportage,
which apparently would not be applicable in the negligence context. See Edwards v. Na-
tional Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
361. Levine v. CMP Publications, 738 F.2d 660, 673 (5th Cir. 1984) (sufficient evidence
of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, defendant republished
defamatory charges following denial by plaintiff); Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 476,
446 N.Y.S.2d 836, 840-41 (sufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility to affirm denial of
summary judgment for defendant when reporter failed to credit flat denial by plaintiff's
father and relied on ambiguous answer to casual question), aff'd per curiam, 58 N.Y.2d 630,
444 N.E.2d 1002, 458 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1982).
362. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
363. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, 188 Colo. 86, 99, 538 P.2d 450, 458 (reversing
verdict for plaintiff because of insufficient evidence of "objective" reckless disregard when
conversation with plaintiff failed to convince reporter that allegations were untrue), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); overruled by Diversified Management v. Denver Post, Inc.,
653 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Colo. 1982) (extending "subjective approach" to "matter of public in-
terest" cases); Campo Lindo for Dogs v. New York Post Corp., 65 A.D.2d 650, 409 N.Y.S.2d
453, 455 (1978) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence
of gross irresponsibility when defendant published article critical of plaintiff despite denials
348
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(b) No Source
A strong inference of negligence also may arise when the de-
fendant publishes potentially defamatory information without any
source support.36 Indeed this inference is little more than a chari-
table method for concluding that the defendant fabricated the alle-
gations. Furthermore, this activity generally would be sufficient to
support an inference of gross irresponsibility or reckless disregard.
Presumably, professional journalists would not condone the publi-
cation of apparently defamatory factual matter beyond the writer's
own personal knowledge in the absence of a source for the
information. 6 5
(c) Unreliable Source
Reliance on an apparently unreliable source can be a very sig-
nificant factor in creating an inference of negligence. In the reck-
less disregard context, such reliance may suggest an awareness of
and explanations by its president).
364. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1982) (sufficient evi-
dence of reckless disregard and negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff, when, among other
things, defendant editor added further defamatory material to article based on author's
"facts"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Meadows v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 98 A.D.2d
959, 960, 470 N.Y.S.2d 205, 208 (1983) (sufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility to affirm
denial of summary judgment for defendant when reporter had little or no recall concerning
source of charge that plaintiff might be implicated in murder); cf. Rancho La Costa v. Pent-
house, Int'l, Ltd., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1865, 1867-68 (Cal. App. Ct. 1982) (granting judg-
ment n.o.v. for plaintiff when there were no facts in source document on which defendant
could reasonably rely in publishing defamatory charges). The cases in which the courts have
found sufficient evidence of reckless disregard when a defendant published defamatory alle-
gations with no apparent source, such as Carson v. Allied News Co. and Goldwater v. Ginz-
burg, provide clear instances of journalistic conduct that definitely would constitute negli-
gence. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
365. See SPJ, CODE OF ETHIcs, supra note 323, Accuracy and Objectivity, No.1
("Truth is our ultimate goal."), No. 6 ("Partisanship in editorial comment which knowingly
departs from the truth violates the spirit of American journalism."); W. BuRRows, supra
note 324, at 18 ("Reporters ought to be wary of libel, not because some judge might rule
against them in court, but because lying is morally wrong. Libel is, in essence, an ethical, not
a strictly legal problem."); F. FEDLER, supra note 324, at 135 ("Never create or manufacture
information; repeat only the facts you obtain from reliable sources."); J. HOHENBERG, supra
note 324, at 327 ("Either an interview is real and honest and true or it is not. Either people
in the news are real or they are not. You can't make things up to prove a point unless you
are writing something clearly labeled fiction."); At the New Yorker, Editor and a Writer
Differ on the 'Facts', Wall St. J., July 5, 1984, at 1, 27, col. 3 (editors of New Yorker maga-
zine and journalism critics disapprove of writer's practice of inventing background facts in
feature article). In several highly publicized incidents recently, respected publications in-
cluding the Washington Post and New York Times have discovered, to their great embar-
rassment, that published articles have contained information that reporters knew to be false
or fictionalized. J. HOHENBERG, supra note 324, at 321.
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falsity. 6 This type of evidence is even more pertinent when the
issue is negligence because the reasonable reporter or editor gener-
ally would not publish a potentially defamatory allegation in sole
reliance on an obviously unreliable source, even though the partic-
ular defendant may have failed to recognize the probable falsity of
the allegations.3617 An inference of negligence can arise when the
source of information is obviously biased or has demonstrated a
lack of credibility in the past. For example, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., the publisher was aware that the author previously
had identified Richard Nixon, John Foster Dulles, and Hubert
Humphrey as communists or persons under communist control.368
In other cases369 courts have permitted an inference of reckless
disregard attributable in part to the defendant's reliance on an ob-
viously untrustworthy source. These cases illustrate conduct that
almost certainly would give rise to an inference of negligence if the
reporter failed to verify the information with more reliable
sources.3 70 In McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 7 1 the
Supreme Court of Kentucky apparently concluded that a jury issue
on negligence arose when a newspaper accurately reported that a
woman charged with drug offenses had alleged that an attorney
366. See supra notes 122-37 and accompanying text.
367. See P. WmL.IAMs, supra note 324, at 15.
Equally important is evaluation of the tipster, if she or he is known. Is it reasonable to
assume that this person knows the facts? Is there any information about the tipster in
the morgue? Is the tipster known by other members of the news staff? What ax does
this person have to grind? If a story develops as a result of this tip, will the informant
personally benefit through job promotion, financial gain, advancement of political in-
terest? Is he or she trying to 'get' somebody? An ex-boss? An ex-lover?
Id.; see also B. BROOKS, supra note 324, at 320 ("Never trust a lawyer unless you know him
or her very well. Although most lawyers are honest, every lawyer is an advocate. Conse-
quently, everthing he or she writes or says must be interpreted as being designed to help a
client or hurt an opponent."); E. DENNIS & A. ISMACH, supra note 324, at 68; K. GALVIN,
MEDIA LAw: A LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR THE WRITING JOURNALIST 15 (1984); M. MENCHER,
supra note 324, at 49 ("Good reporters learn to discriminate between reliable and unreliable
sources and to check material from the latter."); H. SCHULTE, supra note 324, at 294 ("No
source should be underestimated in keeping track of the inner workings of the political
parties, but the reporter should take care to assure that information supplied by dissidents
is not unduly colored by natural bias"); T. WHITE, A. MEPPEN & S. YOUNG, supra note 324, at
268.
368. 680 F.2d 527, 538 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
369. See, e.g., Pep v. Newsweek, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (re-
porter relied on a source reputed to be a "pathological liar"); Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broad-
casting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1361-62 (Colo. 1983) (reporter relied on an estranged spouse);
Cape Publication, Inc. v. Adams, 336 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. App. 1976) (reporter relied on plain-
tiff's political enemies), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977).
370. See supra notes 122-37 and accompanying text.
371. 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982).
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had offered to fix the case, even though an independent investiga-
tion by the newspaper had failed to confirm that the attorney was
prepared to bribe a judge.7 2 Similarly, placing sole reliance on an
anonymous source probably would establish an absence of due care
because of the difficulty in assessing the source's credibility.373
Aside from bias or inherent lack of credibility, a source also
may be unreliable when the reporter should realize that there is a
significant likelihood for misunderstanding the transmitted infor-
mation. For instance, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, the
court quite properly found sufficient evidence of negligence when,
along with other proof a reporter based a statement implicating
plaintiff in criminal activity almost exclusively on hearsay from an
individual who was not necessarily in a position to obtain accurate
information s.3 7 Occasionally, a reporter may not be in a position to
perceive events reliably, in which case his or her own senses may
not constitute a trustworthy source. For example, the Arkansas
Supreme Court found sufficient evidence of negligence when a
broadcaster based a story concerning a purported robbery on an
''eyewitness" account by a reporter who arrived on the scene late
and who could obtain no corroboration from the police or other
eyewitnesses.37 5 Both common sense and the journalist's profes-
sional training and experience counsels skepticism toward informa-
tion obtained from sources whose perceptions may be distorted for
any of a number of reasons.3 76
372. 623 S.W.2d at 884-85. The court did not explain exactly why it reversed and re-
manded for trial. Arguably, the court placed more weight on the newspaper's repeated use
of pejorative and sensationalistic language than its inability to verify the information ob-
tained from the woman charged with the drug offenses. See id..
373. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court cited reliance on an anonymous source as
pertinent evidence of reckless disregard in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). See
supra note 136 and accompanying text. Journalists are aware of the hazards of relying on an
anonymous tip. See C. MAcDOUGALL, supra note 324, at 49 ("No reporter should write a
story supplied by an anonymous source, which means that practical jokers and persons with
grievances who telephone and write to newspapers in the hope of giving news without re-
vealing their identity seldom are successful.").
374. 423 So. 2d 376, 379, 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), aff'd, 458 So.2d 239, 242 (Fla.
1984); see also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157-58 (1967) (sufficient evi-
dence of "highly unreasonable conduct" to affirm verdict for plaintiff when publisher relied
on source who had criminal record and was not football expert but who purportedly over-
heard phone call in which plaintiff coach allegedly fixed game).
375. KARK-TV v. Simon, 280 Ark. 228, 332-33, 656 S.W.2d 702, 704 (1983) (verdict
reversed on other grounds). But see Benson v. Griffin Television, Inc., 593 P.2d 511, 514
(Okla. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient
evidence of negligence when reporter learned that police raided a house described as plain-
tiff's and assumed plaintiff was a suspect).
376. See C. MAcDOUGALL, supra note 324, at 26 ("It is human to distort an impression
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Simply because reasons exist to doubt a primary source does
not mean that a journalist should hesitate to cover a story. Even
the most disreputable source may prove correct in a given in-
stance. 7 One, however, should make further efforts at verification
in such a situation.3 78
(d) Ambiguity
Time, Inc. v. Pape e79 established that a plaintiff cannot pre-
vail on the issue of reckless disregard by clear and convincing evi-
dence simply by showing that the defendant relied on a source of
information that was inherently ambiguous.380 When a defendant
relies on ambiguous information there generally is no way of know-
ing whether the defendant perceived the potentially nondefama-
tory interpretation and therefore recognized that a defamatory
reading was possibly false. In negligence actions, however, the de-
fendant's protection should not be as great. In a negligence case,
the ultimate question is not whether the reporter perceived the
ambiguity and therefore doubted the truth of the defamatory im-
plication, but whether the reasonable reporter should have per-
ceived the ambiguity and should have questioned the more damag-
ing interpretation. Moreover, because the plaintiff need not
establish fault by clear and convincing evidence, it is not inappro-
priate to permit the factfinder to determine what the reasonable
to conform to one's preconceived notions, prejudices and experiences."); M. MENCHER, supra
note 324, at 37 ("After the information has been filtered once or twice, only the most fool-
hardy journalist would stake his reputation on the accuracy of the report."); D. McHAM,
supra note 324, at 9 ("Reporters should remember that witnesses who are not trained to
observe details may see them inaccurately.").
377. J. BOLCH & K. MILLER, supra note 324, at 25 (" 'I would take a tip from the devil
himself if it was a story,' says an experienced political reporter."); B. BROOKS, supra note
324, at 394 ("A person's enemies usually are the best sources when you are trying to find out
anything bad about him or her."); W. BuRRows, supra note 324, at 138 ("[E]ven the most
personally embittered and spiteful persons can bring solid material to reporters.").
378. In a given instance, a journalist may assess the credibility of a potentially biased
or mistaken source and conclude that the source is telling the truth without further verifica-
tion. In Ortiz v. Valdescastilla, 102 A.D.2d 513, 478 N.Y.S. 895, 901 (1984) (reversing denial
of summary judgment for defendant), a New York court found that a reporter did not act in
a grossly irresponsible manner by relying, without further verification, on a source who was
emotionally distraught and embittered against the plaintiff. As with Gaeta, the opposite
conclusion might arguably be reached under a negligence standard. In Ortiz the dissent
argued that placing sole reliance on a emotionally disturbed source should be sufficient to
give rise to an inference of gross irresponsibility. Id. 102 A.D.2d at -, 478 N.Y.S. at 902,
903.
379. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
380. See supra notes 156-81 and accompanying text.
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reporter should have understood. Thus, the principle of Pape is
inappropriate in the negligence context.
The above analysis was recognized implicitly in Melon v.
Capital City Press.3 81 In Melon, a reporter read a sheriff's office
press release which stated that four persons, including the plain-
tiff, had been arrested and in the next sentence listed a series of
charges that had been filed .3 2 The reporter incorrectly interpreted
the release as stating that each defendait had been arrested and
had been charged with each of the specified offenses."s Plaintiff,
who had been arrested and charged with only two of the three of-
fenses, sued for defamation.3 84 Because the reporter apparently
misunderstood an inherently ambiguous document, within the
Pape holding summary judgment for the defendant would have
been warranted if the plaintiff were a public figure. The court
found, however, that the plaintiff was a private figure. The court
properly concluded that because the jurisdiction had adopted a
negligence standard, the jury should determine whether the news
release was ambiguous and, if ambiguous, whether the defendant
should have perceived the ambiguity and recognized that further
investigation was necessary.3 85 A breach of the professional stan-
dard could arise readily under these circumstances because the
journalist is trained to search for ambiguities in information re-
ceived and to obtain clarification prior to publication. 6
Misinterpretation of an ambiguous source, however, does not
constitute negligence automatically. The defendant often may ar-
gue persuasively that the ordinary person or the reasonably pru-
dent journalist would not have perceived the ambiguity or recog-
381. 407 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 1981).
382. Id. at 86.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 87; see also Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 476, 446 N.Y.S.2d 836,
839-41 (sufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility to affirm denial of summary judgment for
defendant when, among other things, reporter asked judge an ambiguous question about
charges against plaintiff, received an ambiguous answer, and drew an incorrect conclusion
that proved to be defamatory), aff'd per curiam, 58 N.Y.2d 630, 458 N.Y.S.2d 538, 444
N.E.2d 1002 (1982).
386. See B. BROOKS, supra note 324, at 103 ("Accuracy is a major problem in all inter-
views. Both the question and the answer may be ambiguous."); E. BROUSSARD & J. HOLGATE,
supra note 324, at 135 (In interviewing "[ble certain that you understand exactly what was
said and exactly what was meant. Recheck what was said if you have any doubt in your
mind as to the accuracy of what you think you heard and what was actually said. Never take
anything for granted."); F. FEDLER, supra note 324, at 121 ("If you do not understand a
topic, never try to write about it. Instead, go back to your source and ask for a better expla-
nation."); see also W. RwVERs, supra note 324, at 172.
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nized a need for further investigation. Summary judgment for the
defendant still may be appropriate to the extent that additional
support for the defendant's interpretation exists. The United
States Supreme Court faced similar facts in Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone.3 87 In Firestone, a "stringer" for the defendant read the judg-
ment in a highly publicized divorce case which, among other alle-
gations, stated: Mrs. Firestone had filed for divorce on grounds of
extreme cruelty and adultery; there was testimony of adultery by
both Mr. and Mrs. Firestone; the parties were not domesticated;
the marriage was dissolved; the equities were with Mr. Firestone;
and Mr. Firestone would be required to pay alimony.388 The defen-
dant ultimately published a news brief stating that a divorce had
been granted to Mr. Firestone on the basis of "extreme cruelty and
adultery."3 89 The Florida Supreme Court found that the trial court
apparently had intended to grant the divorce on the nonexistent
ground of "lack of domestication," but affirmed the decision on the
ground that there was sufficient evidence of extreme cruelty in the
record.3 90 Mrs. Firestone sued for defamation alleging that the re-
port in Time magazine falsely stated that the state supreme court
had found against her on grounds of adultery. In affirming a judg-
ment in her favor, the Supreme Court of Florida stated that
Time's "erroneous reporting is clear and convincing evidence of
the negligence" because under current Florida law, "a wife found
guilty of adultery could not be awarded alimony, [and therefore a]
careful examination of the final decree, prior to publication would
have clearly demonstrated that the divorce had been granted on
the grounds of extreme cruelty .... -"31 The United States Su-
preme Court vacated and remanded on the ground that whether
the Florida Supreme Court actually had made a finding of fact on
the issue of negligence was unclear.3 92
In a concurring opinion that is quite important for negligence
analysis, Justice Powell argued persuasively that the Firestone rec-
ord contained significant support for the conclusion that Time did
not breach a duty of reasonable care.393 In reaching that conclusion
he noted that the "opaqueness" of the divorce decree was one fac-
387. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
388. Id. at 450-51.
389. Id. at 452.
390. Id. at 458-59.
391. 305 So. 2d 172, 178 (1974).
392. 424 U.S. at 464.
393. Id. at 464-70. Justice Stewart concurred in Justice Powell's opinion.
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tor to be considered, but Powell placed more emphasis on the de-
fendant's relatively thorough attempt to verify the accuracy of the
statement.3 9' This analysis is quite different from the contention of
Justice Marshall in dissent 95 that, pursuant to Pape, reliance on
an inherently ambiguous document is in itself a sufficient defense
to a negligence claim. As Justice Rehnquist properly recognized in
the majority opinion, however, Pape is concerned with proof of
reckless disregard and does not provide an outright defense when
the issue is negligence.3 96
(e) Inherent Improbability
As with actual malice,3 9 7 an inference of negligence could arise
if a reporter published inherently improbable charges absent verifi-
cation because, almost by definition, the reasonably prudent re-
porter would not publish allegations that were highly questionable
on their face without some assurance of truth.398 To date, however,
this factor has not played a role in litigated negligence cases.
(f) Lack of Expertise
Reason to doubt the truth of statements in an article may ex-
ist if the article concerns a complex or technical matter clearly be-
yond the expertise of the reporter or editor. Reporters recognize
that to cover adequately stories concerning complex or technical
information, they either must develop expertise themselves or
must seek the assistance of those who hold expertise.3 99 In Gazette,
Inc. v. Harris,°0
the Supreme Court of Virginia held that there was sufficient evi-
dence of negligence to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff when a
reporter wrote a story based on a judicial docket sheet although he
394. Id. at 464-68, 470 n.9.
395. Id. at 484, 490-91.
396. Id. at 459 n.4.
397. See supra notes 101-112 and accompanying text.
398. See C. MAcDOUGALL, supra note 324, at 40 ("when a story contains something
that seems improbable it is safer to miss an edition than use the story before checking").
399. See J. HOHENBERG, supra note 324, at 284 ("Most professional police and court
reporters have an excellent practical knowledge of the law, and some even have law degrees.
It is virtually impossible to cover police and court news intelligently without acquiring a
basic legal background."); H. ScHuLTE, supra note 324, at 404-05 (investigative reporters
must obtain expertise from bankers, lawyers, brokers, and accountants on technical stories);
see also F. BAsKrra, J. SissoRs, B. BROOKS, supra note 324, at 146; B. BROOKS, supra note
324, at 307; G. HAGE, supra note 324, at 42; R. IZARD, supra, note 324, at 63, 76.
400. - Va. -, 325 S.E.2d 713 (1985).
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was aware that he did not understand what the sheet meant. °1 In
a contrasting decision,40 2 a New York appellate court refused to
find sufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility to create a jury is-
sue when a reporter with little training or expertise regarding po-
lice or legal procedures misstated the effect of a particular legal
plea in reliance on a conversation with a police officer.403 This case
may illustrate the difference between the gross irresponsibility and
the negligence standards. Although the reporter's conduct would
not rise to the level of "gross irresponsibility," especially given that
he was misled by the officer,40 4 his obvious lack of legal expertise
should have put him on notice of the likelihood of error and thus
should have provided evidence of negligence. An inference that the
defendant failed to use reasonable care may be stronger when the
defendant knowingly proceeds in awareness of his own ignorance.
This inference still may be warranted, however, if a reporter bliss-
fully was unaware of his lack of expertise so long as the reasonable
reporter should have realized that assistance was needed.0 5
2. Investigation and Verification
That a reporter or editor had reason to question whether an
assertion in an article might be untrue does not show, in itself, that
the reporter or editor was negligent in publishing the assertion; it
may suggest, however, a need for further verification. The journal-
ism profession places extreme emphasis on the need for thorough
investigation and verification.406 The potential for inaccuracy is
401. Id. at -, 325 S.E.2d at 729-30; See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 158 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (sufficient evidence of "highly unreasonably con-
duct" when, among other things, defendant published an article charging the plaintiff with
fixing a football game despite the writer's lack of football expertise and failure to consult an
expert); Charlottesville Newspaper, Inc. v. Matthews, - Va. , ., 325 S.E.2d 713, 732,
734 (1985) (sufficient evidence of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when, among other
things, defendant assigned "part time reporter. . . [with] no training, guidance or instruc-
tion in covering the 'courthouse beat'" to cover rape trial).
402. Grobe v. Three Village Herald, 69 A.D.2d 175, 420 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1979), af'd, 49
N.Y.2d 932, 406 N.E.2d 491, 428 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1980).
403. Id. at 176-77, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5.
404. But see id. at 177-79, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 5-6 (Gulatta, J. dissenting) (argument that
the record supported an inference of gross irresponsibility).
405. Cf. H. GOODWIN, supra note 324, at 277
("The streak of antiintellectualism that has been part of the history of American journalism
from its beginning has not dissipated . . . Ignorance and incompetence will continue to
pollute the news process unless news media owners and executives recruit and retain better
educated and smarter journalists.").
406. E. BROUSSARD & J. HOLGATE, supra note 324, at 50 ("There is only one effective
way to prevent errors of fact-verification. You must verify your facts with s many sources
[Vol. 38:247
1985] MEDIA DEFAMATION LITIGATION 357
greatly minimized if reporters and editors check facts and consult
reliable sources. Interestingly, the profession itself demands much
more than the law because of its emphasis on accuracy' 0 7 and not
simply on reasonable care. A superficial investigation of serious
charges when some reason exists to doubt accuracy and sufficient
time to verify is available often will lead to a jury issue on negli-
gence.40 8 In contrast, when a reporter or editor has undertaken ver-
as practicable before you use them and don't make assumptions."); S. CRUMP, supra note
324, at 50 ("the best safeguards against libel when dealing in controversies are double-
checking sources and backing them up with 'second' sources and documents"); F. FEDLER,
supra note 324, at 121 ("Most factual errors . .. are caused by carelessness. After finishing
a news story, reporters must learn to recheck their notes to be certain that the story is
accurate. If reporters lack some information, they should recontact their source. If the
source is unavailable, or unable to provide the information, reporters may have to delete
portions of their story, or in extreme cases, kill the entire story."); D. GARvEY & W. RIVERs,
supra note 324, at 131 ("Electronic news editing begins, like all news editing, with the care-
ful checking of facts in the story ... . Even under the tightest deadlines, a good writer
checks the copy."); J. HOHENBERG, supra note 324, at 83 ("The only way to insure accuracy
is to check all sources continually and leave nothing to guesswork or chance."); G. HOUGH,
supra note 324, at 27 ("Checking, crosschecking and verifying are basic steps in the report-
ing process . . . . Careful reporters check everything. They take nothing for granted."); Y.
METZLER, supra note 324, at 116 ("By checking a wide variety of sources, you can compare,
verify, corroborate, cross check, contrast, fill in missing details. . . ."); see J. BOLCH & K
MILLER, supra note 324, at 94; A. CROWELL, supra note 324, at 35; R GARST & T. BERNSTEIN,
supra note 324, at 39; C. MACDOUGALL, supra note 324, at 40; D. McHAM, supra note 324, at
67; M. MENCHER, supra note 324, at 29, 33; H. SCHULTE, supra note 324, at 167; K. STE-
PHENS, supra note 324, at 194; C. WARREN, supra note 324, at 224.
407. SPJ, CODE OF ETHICS, ACCURACY AND OBJEcTrlvTy, supra note 323, No. 3 ("There
is no excuse for inaccuracies or lack of thoroughness."); APME, CODE OF ETHIcs, supra note
323, Accuracy ("The newspaper should guard against inaccuracies, carelessness, bias or dis-
tortion through either emphasis or omission."); ASNE, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra
note 323, art. iv ("Every effort must be made to assure that the news content is accurate
.... "); B. BRooKS, supra note 324, at 307 ("Above all, be accurate. An inaccurate reporter
is worse than useless. . . . The best way to assure accuracy is to check and double-check."
(emphasis in original)); H. GOODWIN, supra note 324, at 11 ("Although the history of Ameri-
can journalism contains some colorful lapses in the accuracy standard, accuracy has been an
undisputed goal of virtually all journalists in this country for at least a century."); G.
HOUGH, supra note 324, at 175 (" 'Accuracy always' has long been the slogan of the journal-
ist. The careful professional checks and crosschecks the facts."); W. RwRs, supra note 324,
at 21 ("It is customarily maintained in some newspaper offices that there are three rules in
journalism: accuracy, accuracy and accuracy."); M STEPHENS, supra note 324, at 132 ("Accu-
racy is the journalist's religion; an error of fact is a professional sin."); P. WmLAMs, supra
note 324, at 31 ("Write only what you know. Write with conservative accuracy."); see also
W. AGEE, P. AULT & E. EMERY, supra note 324, at 55-56; J. BrrrNER & D. BrrTNER, supra
note 324, at 17; C. MACDOUGALL, supra note 324, at 38.
408. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 158-59 (1967) (sufficient evidence of
highly unreasonable conduct to affirm verdict for plaintiff when defendant published serious
allegations by questionable source "without substantial independent support"); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1982) (sufficient evidence of negligence to
affirm verdict for plaintiff when publisher "made virtually no effort to check the validity of
statements that were defamatory per se"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); General
358 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:247
ification, any inference of negligence may be dispelled, despite the
initial doubts concerning the charges.
Although some publishers attempt to verify every factual
statement that is printed as a matter of procedure, 0 9 many pub-
lishers, including daily newspapers and broadcast stations, find
this extreme degree of thoroughness unattainable. 410 For many
publishers, the amount of verification undertaken will depend
upon a variety of factors including the amount of lead time, the
Prods. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546, 552 (E.D. Va. 1981) (sufficient evidence of
negligence to deny summary judgment for defendant when author relied on memory and did
not recheck sources); KARK-TV v. Simon, 280 Ark. 228, 230, 656 S.W.2d 702, 704 (1983)
(sufficient evidence of negligence when reporter was unable to corroborate information re-
garding alleged arrest but reversing verdict for plaintiff on other grounds); Newell v. Field
Enters. Inc., 91 Ill. App. Ct. 2d 735, 755, 415 N.E.2d 434, 450 (1980) (sufficient evidence of
negligence to reverse summary judgment for defendant when reporter failed to investigate
charges in legal complaint); Meadows v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 98 A.D.2d 959, 960, 470
N.Y.S.2d 205, 208 (1983) (sufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility to affirm denial of
summary judgment for defendant when reporter made serious charges with "little or no
effort" to authenticate [their] veracity"); Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 476, 446
N.Y.S.2d 836, 840-41, aff'd per curiam, 58 N.Y.2d 630, 444 N.E.2d 1002, 458 N.Y.S.2d 538
(1982) (sufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility to affirm denial of summary judgment for
defendant when reporter accepted ambiguous response after casual questioning); Greenberg
v. CBS, Inc., 69 A.D.2d 693, 710, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988, 998 (1979) (sufficient evidence of negli-
gence to affirm denial of summary judgment for defendant when reporter failed to ask basic
questions of "who, what, where, when, why and how" about story); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris,
- Va. -, -, 325 S.E.2d 713, 730 (1985) (sufficient evidence of negligence to affirm ver-
dict for plaintiff when reporter failed to verify information from docket sheet that he did
not understand); Port Pack Corp. v. Lewis, - Va. _ -, 325 S.E.2d 713, 735, 740 (1985)
(sufficient evidence of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when editor failed to verify
serious charges despite absence of deadline pressure); see also Robertson, supra note 26, at
263 (argument that before publishing a potentially defamatory story, the reasonably pru-
dent reporter will either ensure that the information is accurate or that the source is relia-
ble); cf. McCarney v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 239 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Iowa 1976)
(reversing verdict for plaintiff due to insufficient evidence of reckless disregard but noting
that failure to investigate serious charges constituted negligence); Lawrence v. Bauer Pub-
lishing & Printing, Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 467, 446 A.2d 469, 477 (1982) (reversing judgment for
plaintiff because of insufficient evidence of reckless disregard, although failure to investi-
gate allegations was "careless and perhaps irresponsible").
409. See At the New Yorker, Editor and a Writer Differ on the 'Facts', Wall St. J.,
July 5, 1984, at 1, 27, col. 3 (New Yorker magazine attempts to verify every statement of
fact it publishes); Machalara, Does Saul Bellow Stand on His Head? Ask a Fact Checker,
Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1981, at 1, col. 4 ("People spends $800,000 a year on its fact checking
department which employs 18 people plus free-lancers ... ." (emphasis added)); see also J.
HOHENBERG, supra note 324, at 252 ("The first rule for staying out of trouble with the libel
law is to check for accuracy everything you write or broadcast.").
410. A. PLOTNICK, supra note 324, at 36 (" 'If you have a rule that makes an editor
check every single fact ... you are going to be putting out a monthly newspaper.' ") (quot-
ing Benjamin Bradlee, Executive Editor, Washington Post); see also J. STOVALL, C. SELF &
L. MULLINS, supra note 324, at 123 (time pressure will not allow an editor to check every
fact even if the resources are available).
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seriousness of the allegation, the cost, practicality and efficacy of
further verification, and the reliability of verification efforts al-
ready undertaken. Not surprisingly, these common sense factors
play a significant role in judicial analysis of journalistic negligence.
(a) Lead Time
The existence or lack of deadline pressure is a factor of some
importance. As discussed above,41' Justice Harlan emphasized the
contrast between the "hot news" situation in Walker and the ab-
sence of any deadline pressure in the publication of the feature
article in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, which enabled a finding
of sufficient evidence of highly unreasonable conduct in the latter
but not the former instance. 412 The public interest in prompt pub-
lication of news should and doubtlessly will be considered by the
courts.1 3 Whether a reasonably prudent journalist would continue
to investigate a story when there may be some concern for accu-
racy will depend in part on whether time to do so is available. Fail-
ure to verify when sufficient time exists to do so may provide some
proof of negligence. 414 Likewise, deadline pressure on a "hot news"
story may preclude exhaustive verification without breaching the
standard of reasonable care." 5 Excuse of failure to verify will de-
411. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
412. 388 U.S.130, 158-59 (1967).
413. See Benson v. Griffin Television, Inc., 593 P.2d 511, 514 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978)
("The need to report matters as quickly as possible is not merely good competition but
serves a paramount concern of society to have access to information of public concern as
soon as possible. [This consideration is] ...relevant in determining the standard of care
for the media in reporting about private persons."). But see Daniels, supra note 320, at 962
(author expresses concern that the courts and juries may give inadequate consideration to
deadline pressure after the fact).
414. Jones v. Sun Publishing Co., 278 S.C. 12, 13, 292 S.E.2d 23, 24, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 944 (1982) (sufficient evidence of negligence to reverse judgment n.o.v. for defendant
when reporter failed to verify name of individual pleading guilty to criminal charges with
public records despite six day hiatus prior to publication); Re v. Gannett, 480 A.2d 662, 666
(Del. Super. Ct. 1984) (finding sufficient evidence of negligence but remanding for new trial
on damages when defamatory paragraph "involved background information only peripher-
ally related to current news article").
415. See F. FEDLER, supra note 324, at 121 ("Some errors may be inevitable. Because
of the need to meet strict deadlines, reporters must work quickly and often lack the time
needed to perfect their stories."); H. GooDwIN, supra note 324, at 11 ("Many newsrooms in
an earlier day posted the old International News Source admonition, 'Get It First, But Get
It Right.' Fine, but every journalist soon learns that getting it first sometimes means you
don't get it right, and taking the time to get it right often means you don't get it first."); J.
HOHENBERG, supra note 324, at 29-30 ("Making the deadline is journalism's most inflexible
rule ... . [I]nevitably there comes a moment when fact-gathering must end and writing
must start."); M. MENCHER, supra note 324, at 50 ("[o]n some occasions, adequate verifica-
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pend on the nature of the story and the need for immediate cover-
age. For instance, in a factual situation as was presented in
Associated Press v. Walker, in which the press was covering a ma-
jor riot during the attempted integration of a state university, the
public interest in prompt publication was obviously quite great. On
the other hand, a story about an ongoing grand jury investigation,
while also of great public significance, in a particular instance
might permit more deliberate development because the news value
may not depend to such a large degree on immediate dissemina-
tion. Other factors also will play a role including the seriousness of
the charge and the risk of inaccuracy. Although deadline pressure
may excuse a failure to doublecheck or to verify by official records,
deadline pressure rarely, if ever, would justify a complete failure to
investigate or to proceed solely in reliance on an untrustworthy
source.416 Finally, deadline pressure must be attributable to the ex-
igencies of the news itself and not simply the predilections of the
publisher. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,417 a publisher, for purposes of negli-
gence analysis, may not transform a feature story into "hot news"
simply by shortening the verification period from several weeks to
four hours to squeeze the article into an earlier issue.41 8
(b) Seriousness of the Allegation
The seriousness of the allegation will play a major role in de-
termining the extent of verification that a reasonably prudent pub-
lisher should engage in prior to publication. The fact that a charge
is serious, or even defamatory on its face does not suggest that it is
likely to be false and therefore in need of support.4 9 Grave allega-
tions should, however, alert the publisher to the possibility that
tion is virtually impossible even when data and records exist. When reporters are out on a
story and under the pressure of a deadline, verification is a difficult task."); id. at 244 ("It is
the clock that is the journalist's major obstacle to truth-telling.").
416. See A. CROWELL, supra note 324, at 50 ("In an occasional deadline emergency, it
may be necessary to move to composing copy containing unverified names. These should be
verified immediately thereafter, for under no circumstances should unverified names be al-
lowed to run unchecked in subsequent editions."); 1K MENCHR, supra note 324, at 31 ("Al-
though the reporter works under severe space and time limitations, he or she is never too
pressed or rushed to allow the dubious, much less incorrect, material to pass through the
typewriter.").
417. 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
418. Id. at 538.
419. Geiger v. Dell Publishing Co., 719 F.2d 515, 518 (1st Cir. 1983) ("[w]e do not
agree with appellant that the injurious nature of the statements is itself a 'substantial rea-
son' to question their accuracy").
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the charge may seriously injure the reputation of the plaintiff and
that litigation and liability may follow if the charge proves to be
false. Common sense, along with journalistic custom, suggests,
therefore, that the reasonable publisher should take greater pains
to ensure the accuracy of a potentially defamatory charge than of a
relatively innocuous assertion; this reasoning will follow as a mat-
ter of negligence analysis. 20 That a defamatory assertion, however,
may have appeared relatively harmless at the time of publication
will provide strong evidence toward establishing that a very mini-
mal investigation was sufficient.421 Indeed, as the Supreme Court
suggested in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., a defamation action now
may be constitutionally impermissible when the defamatory poten-
tial is not apparent from the face of the article.422
(c) Cost and Practicality
Under a negligence calculus, a court will not require verifica-
tion for its own sake. The reasonable journalist will continue to
420. See Levine v. CMP Publications, 738 F.2d 660, 674 (5th Cir. 1984) (sufficient
evidence of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, plaintiff's
and defendant's language experts testified that phrase was potentially libelous); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983)
(sufficient evidence of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when, among other things,
publisher failed to verify charges that plaintiff was a communist); Hogan v. Herald Co., 84
A.D.2d 470, 446 N.Y.S.2d 836, 840, aff'd per curiam, 58 N.Y.2d 630, 444 N.E.2d 1002, 458
N.Y.S.2d 538 (1982) (sufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility to affirm denial of summary
judgment for defendant when allegations involved "serious charges of criminal activity and
political impropriety"); K. GALVIN, supra note 367, at 69 ("anything having to do with
crimes, sex, communism, etc. should always be double checked"); M. MENCHER, supra note
324, at 243 (it is necessary, when possible, to check "strong quotations with the source and
others if the reporter is unsure of what has been said."); Smolla, supra note 28, at 85 ("More
duty to investigate is required as the allegations become more damaging, because the law
should encourage greater expense on prevention of damages as the potential harm from
defamation increases.").
421. Cefau v. Globe Newspaper Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 77, 391 N.E.2d 935, 938
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980) (affirming summary judgment for defendant be-
cause of insufficient evidence of negligence when little reason existed to assume that the
person pictured in a line to receive an unemployment check would be offended); Pollnow v.
Poughkeepsie Newspapers, 11 Med. L. Rptr. (BNA) 1528, 1532 (N.Y.A.D. 1985) (dismissing
complaint due to insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility when editors failed to verify
letter to editor that did not seem defamatory or identify specific individual); Torres-Silva v.
El Mundo, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1508, 1511 (P.R. 1977) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant because of insufficient evidence of negligence when, among other things, charge
that person was son of plaintiff was not defamatory on its face).
422. 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974). Recently in Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, the Virginia Su-
preme Court held that a private figure plaintiff must prove actual malice in order to recover
when substantial dangers to reputation is not apparent from the face of the statement in
issue. __ Va. - -, 325 S.E.2d 713, 725 (1985).
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investigate and verify only if to do so would likely improve the
accuracy of the article without being prohibitively expensive. The
need to consider the costs of verification, in view of the first
amendment interest in free dissemination of information, has been
recognized. In the influential actual malice case of Washington
Post Co. v. Keough,2 s the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit observed:
Verification of syndicated news reports and columns is a time-consuming pro-
cess, a factor especially significant in the newspaper business where news
quickly goes stale, commentary rapidly becomes irrelevant, and commercial
opportunity in the form of advertisements can easily be lost. In many in-
stances considerations of time and distance make verification impossible.
Thus the newspaper is confronted with the choice of publication without ver-
ification or suppression. Verification is also a costly process, and the newspa-
per business is one in which economic survival has become a major problem,
made increasingly grave by the implications of this fact for free debate. We
should be hesitant to impose responsibilities upon newspapers which can be
met only through costly procedures or through self-censorship designed to
avoid the risks of publishing controversial material.424
423. 365 F.2d 965, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
424. Id. at 972. This point has been echoed in several negligence and gross irresponsi-
bility cases. In Torres-Silva v. El Mundo, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1508, 1512 (P.R. 1977), for
instance, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico recognized that "[t]he corroboration of news is
an expensive step in terms of money, time and personnel, which can be only demanded
when from the face of the information there exists doubt as to its veracity or when the
information can be easily corroborated due to special circumstances." Id. The Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit recently made a similar observation in Geiger v. Dell Publishing
Co.:
Although it is true that book publishers are not often under the sort of time pressure
that requires them to commit a story to print within the space of a few hours, we note
that they operate under economic constraints that prevent their conducting the kind of
routine check appellant wishes us to impose on them. A non-fiction work often details
events that are long past and describes people who are unavailable to verify the au-
thor's statements. To require a book publisher to check, as a matter of course, every
potentially defamatory reference might raise the price of non-fiction works beyond the
resources of the average man.
719 F.2d 515, 518 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Re v. Gannett, 480 A.2d 662, 666 (Del. Super. Ct.
1984) ("Applying the standards of a reasonable and careful reporter and newspaper takes
into consideration the pressures under which current news is assembled and published.");
Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 77, 391 N.E.2d 935, 938 (1979) (requir-
ing reporter to interview everyone appearing in news photograph would encourage self cen-
sorship), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980); Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531,
543, 416 N.E.2d 557, 562, 435 N.Y.S.2d 556, 561 (1980) (requiring editors to recheck report-
ers' work when no reason exists to doubt accuracy "would dampen free exercise of rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment"); Greenberg v. CBS, Inc., 69 A.D.2d 693, 711, 419
N.Y.S.2d 988, 998 (1979) ("[p]ressures of time, staff and budget self created or otherwise,
are some of the factors which must be considered" in applying negligence standard);
Horvath v. Ashtabula Tel., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1657, 1664 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (degree
of verification urged by plaintiff "would all but prevent the publication of news in this
country").
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As Keough points out, first amendment considerations must be
factored in the equation directly because courts must encourage
publishers to avoid the very real costs of potential self-censorship.
Without providing a simple rule of thumb, case law empha-
sizes that cost and practicality definitely are relevant factors that
must be considered in determining whether the defendant exer-
cised reasonable care. These factors obviously play a very impor-
tant role in determining how news organizations behave because
such organizations are similar to all businesses that attempt to
publish a product in a timely manner while ensuring a profit.
The potential cost of further verification is a relative matter.
Presumably, a news organization with great resources, such as a
television network or wire service, reasonably may be required to
shoulder a greater burden than a rural gazette.42 5 The question,
however, is not whether additional verification in the particular
case before the court would have been affordable but whether ver-
ification procedures of the type in question would impose an undue
burden and expense on publishers. Because costs and practicality
of verification are matters beyond the competence of the average
juror, expert testimony ordinarily will be required on this issue.
(d) Examples of Inadequate Investigation and Verification
The decision whether a reasonably prudent publisher would
verify or attempt further verification will be influenced by a vari-
ety of factors, including the ease with which verification could be
accomplished and the likelihood that it would increase the poten-
tial for accuracy. Several common fact patterns reveal situations in
which professional practice and the reasonable care standard may
require greater efforts at verification than publishers sometimes
undertake.
(1) Failure to Contact an Obvious Source
A reporter may have failed to utilize due care by neglecting to
contact an obvious source of verification,2 6 including the plain-
425. Cf. W. RivsRs, supra note 324, at 183 ("Most of the great newspapers spend large
sums to try to purge their columns of errors.").
426. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 539 n.19 (7th Cir. 1982) (sufficient
evidence of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when reporter failed to interview par-
ticipants in litigation discussed in article and failed to consult documents pertaining to de-
famatory charges), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 453 F. Supp.
541, 547 (D. Md. 1979), af'd, 644 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1981) (sufficient evidence of negligence
to deny summary judgment for defendant when reporter failed to interview source who
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tiff.427 For example, a federal district court found evidence of negli-
gence as a matter of law when, among other abuses, the defendant
published an article alleging that the plaintiff had been involved in
a corporate extortion scheme, despite the editor's failure to at-
tempt to contact the plaintiff "beyond a perfunctory and futile
telephone call" to plaintiff's former employer and the editor's fail-
ure to interview any of the executives of the company allegedly
implicated in the scheme. 42 8 Recognized professional practice im-
made defamatory allegations) (verdict for plaintiff affirmed on appeal); Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), aff'd, 458 So.2d 239, 242
(Fla. 1984) (sufficient evidence of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when reporter
failed to verify whether plaintiff owned truck involved in smuggling with purported seller of
truck); Liquori v. Republican Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 671, 676, 396 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1979)
(sufficient evidence of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when reporter failed to check
address of individual pleading guilty to criminal charges with court personnel or defense
counsel); Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 476, 446 N.Y.S.2d 836, 840-41, afl'd per
curiam, 58 N.Y.2d 630, 444 N.E.2d 1002, 458 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1982) (sufficient evidence of
gross irresponsibility to affirm denial of summary judgment for defendant when "means to
determine the truth" of serious charges were of "ready accessibility" to reporter); Char-
lottesville Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, - Va. _ -, 325 S.E.2d 713, 732, 734 (suffi-
cient evidence of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when reporter did not attend trial
and failed to speak with participants); cf. Woods v. Hustler, 736 F.2d 1084, 1093, cert. de-
nied, 105 S.Ct. 783 (1985) (5th Cir. 1984) (sufficient evidence of negligence to affirm verdict
in false light privacy action for plaintiff when magazine's procedure for verifying consent of
subjects prior to publication of nude photos was inadequate); Sibley v. Holyoke Transcript-
Telegram, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2497, 2498 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1982), af'd, 461 N.E.2d 823
(1984) (sufficient evidence of negligence when reporter failed to interview four individuals
who made defamatory charges but granting summary judgment for defendant because of
qualified privilege); Mazart v. State, 109 Misc. 2d 1092, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600, 604 (Ct. Cl. 1983)
(sufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility when editor failed to verify that plaintiffs actu-
ally sent letter identifying themselves as members of the gay community but dismissing
because university was not reponsible for conduct of student newspapers).
427. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Frank, 442 So. 2d 982,983-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (sufficient evidence of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when reporter failed to
confirm charges with plaintiff); Jones v. Sun Publishing Co., 278 S.C. 12, 14, 292 S.E.2d 23,
24 (sufficient evidence of negligence to reverse judgment n.o.v. for defendant when reporter
failed to contact plaintiff, with whom he was acquainted, before writing that he had pleaded
guilty to criminal charges), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982); see also Embers Supper Club,
Inc. v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 22, 24, 457 N.E.2d 1164, 1166 (1984)
(apparently finding sufficient evidence of negligence to reverse directed verdict for defen-
dant when reporter failed to contact plaintiff regarding serious charges); Hawks v. Record
Printing, - A.D.2d -, 486 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (1985) (sufficient evidence of gross irrespon-
sibility to affirm denial of summary judgment for defendant when reporter failed to contact
participants in legal proceeding in issue).
428. Lawlor v. Gallagher Presidents' Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721, 733 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). In Horvath v. Ashtabula Tel., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1657, 1663 (Ohio Ct. App.
1982), in the course of reversing a verdict for the plaintiff, the court asked:
Is a reporter required to call an entity such as Horvath Service and determine if said
service is laundering money from a drug business? To ask this question is to answer it!
It is ludicrous to think that such telephone call would produce an answer, let alone an
answer that the Reporter could conclude was reliable.
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poses on the journalist the duty to give the subject of serious
charges an opportunity to comment, preferably prior to initial pub-
lication .42 9 As a general rule, however, journalists refuse to permit
the subject of a story or interview actually to review or approve the
story prior to publication for fear that this review would delay
publication or lead to attempts to pressure the publisher into
changing or omitting some of the details.3 0 As noted earlier,43 ' the
New York Court of Appeals provided legal support for this partic-
ular professional practice in the influential case of James v. Gan-
nett.432 Courts should apply the same approach under a negligence
standard.
To expect a reporter to at least make a good faith effort to
contact a source whom the reporter knows is likely to possess sig-
nificant information pertaining to the accuracy of potentially de-
famatory allegations, especially when the source is readily accessi-
ble, is not unreasonable. If the reporter is not aware of the source's
existence or reasonably cannot discover the source or if the source
cannot be contacted without extensive cost and effort, then, by
definition, the source is not obvious and the reporter probably has
not violated a duty of due care by failing to seek it out. Similarly, a
newspaper may well be negligent for failing to attempt to verify a
potentially defamatory allegation by checking its own files, at least
when some reason exists to believe that they contain the relevant
information and that the information can be located without un-
Id. at 1663. While the failure to make such a call might not constitute negligence by itself,
for a reporter to make such an inquiry before publishing charges of this nature, does not
seem unreasonable, let alone ludicrous. If he is mistaken, the subject of the charge might be
able to explain to the reporter's satisfaction that the charges are false.
429. SPJ, CODE OF ETHics, supra note 323, Fair Play, no. 1 ("The news media should
not communicate unofficial charges affecting reputation or moral character without giving
the accused a chance to reply."); F. FEDLER, supra note 324, at 122 ("If a story contains
information critical of an individual, that person should be contacted and given an opportu-
nity to respond. It is not enough to call the victim after a story has been published. .. .");
J. STOVALL, C. SELF & L. MULLINS, supra note 324, at 236 ("If at all possible, get a comment
from the subject of a story who is being cast in a bad light. Make certain that the subject
talks for the record and include this comment in the story."); see also S. Rosenfeld in The
Editorial Page, supra note 324, at 122.
430. E. BROUSSARD & J. HOLGATE, supra note 324, at 135 ("Never promise the inter-
viewee the opportunity to read your story before you air it. If you do, you're in deep trouble,
for the chances are great that the person will try to change or even 'kill' your story."); W.
RIVERS, supra note 324, at 171 ("Journalists are almost unanimous in insisting that their
stories should never be checked by sources-officials, celebrities, or private citizens-before
publication or broadcast."); see also F. FEDLER, supra note 324, at 122; J. HoHENBERG, supra
note 324, at 219.
431. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
432. 40 N.Y.2d 415, 423-24, 353 N.E.2d 834, 423-24, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871, 877 (1976).
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due cost or effort.433 Checking one's own files is a common method
of verification.43 4
(2) Failure to Consult an Authoritative Source
An inference of negligence also may arise when a reporter fails
to verify a potentially defamatory allegation by consulting an au-
thoritative source such as a public record.43 The Hawaii Supreme
Court recently found 43 6 sufficient evidence of negligence to affirm a
jury verdict for the plaintiff when a reporter apparently disre-
garded the newspaper's own practices and failed to verify a story,
which pertained to a police narcotics search, with the police blotter
that contained correct information.437 Frequently, articles contain-
ing potentially defamatory material concern legal or governmental
proceedings that may be readily verified with official documents.
To the extent that verification is easily accomplished and consis-
tent with prevailing journalistic practices in the particular con-
text,438 failure to verify, at least, should be considered some evi-
433. Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 261 (1964) (newspaper negligent, if
at all, for failing to check accuracy of advertisement against its own files).
434. E. DENNIS & A. ISMACH, supra note 324, at 98 ("Reporters make use of the
morgue regularly in writing about local subjects that have a history of any kind."); see infra
note 473; see also Torres-Silva v. El Mundo, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1508, 1512 (P.R. 1977)
(failure to check files is not evidence of negligence when there is no showing that informa-
tion in issue would be kept in such a file) (citing Robertson, supra note 22, at 261); Robert-
son, supra note 22, at 262 n.387 ("The reasonableness of requiring a newspaper to check the
accuracy of a story against its files turns on the facial defamatory potential of the story and
the type of 'files' the newspaper possesses. If a newspaper maintains indexed, accessible
files, as opposed to unindexed collections of back issues, then the newspaper should check
its files to guard against highly defamatory falsehoods.").
435. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 539 n.19 (7th Cir. 1982) (sufficient
evidence of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff when author, among other things, re-
viewed public records only on a very selective basis), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983);
Melon v. Capital City Press, 407 So. 2d 85, 87 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant when reporter relied on newspaper report of press release pertain-
ing to arrest instead of checking public records); Jones v. Sun Publishing Co., 278 S.C. 12,
17, 292 S.E.2d 23, 25, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982) (sufficient evidence of negligence to
affirm verdict for plaintiff when reporter failed to verify name of person pleading guilty to
criminal charge in public records); cf. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Cholmondelay, 569 S.W.2d 700,
704 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (affirming verdict for private figure plaintiff, though not explicitly
addressing negligence issue, when reporter relied on information obtained from murder vic-
tim's sister and apparently failed to verify in detail with police).
436. Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, Inc., 65 Hawaii 584, 656 P.2d 79 (1982).
437. Id. at 588-89, 656 P.2d at 82-83.
438. See P. WrLIAMS, supra note 324, at 37-38 ("The First and great commandment
of investigative reporting is this: get the record: [The investigative reporter] recognizes that
there is an institutional record of almost everything. . . . [HIe does not limit his search to
public record sources . . . .He knows that records are often the best evidence-far better
than prejudiced recollections of oral accounts-of what happened .... He also realizes
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dence of negligence, especially when the defamatory potential is
great and the information is complex or technical. As will be dis-
cussed,4 39 however, failure to trace an allegation to an official rec-
ord source should not necessarily allow a plaintiff to reach the jury
on the negligence issue, at least, when the reporter did have a reli-
able source or when verification with the primary source would
have been unduly burdensome or costly.440 For example, in Jones
v. Sun Publishing Co. the dissent argued persuasively that a re-
porter's failure to drive either seventy or one hundred forty miles
to verify information, obtained over the telephone by an assistant
United States attorney, should not have supported an inference of
negligence.",
(3) Failure to Update
Frequently, information obtained by a reporter may be correct
as originally published or conveyed but inaccurate by the time it
was obtained or republished by a subsequent reporter. This situa-
tion often arises when convictions are overturned on appeal or in-
dividuals who have been arrested are released without having any
charges filed against them. A failure to update could provide evi-
dence of negligence when a reporter relies on a source that is obvi-
ously not current in an area in which subsequent developments
that no single record-public or private-is certain to be complete or accurate for his pur-
poses. He constantly thinks compare and contrast. He knows that a record may reflect cleri-
cal lapses, typographical errors, erasures, or outright deception. At the very best, a docu-
ment is a record of a situation at a single point in time, usually from a single view point, and
for a single reason."); see also D. McHAM, supra note 324, at 10 ("Reporters should be
careful about taking the law officer's word that a complaint has been filed. This fact should
be checked out."); M. MENCHER, supra note 324, at 233 ("When it is necessary to rely on
second-hand accounts, use high-quality published sources, records and documents and the
most knowledgeable and authoritative human sources available."), at 532 ("The courthouse
reporter regularly checks court papers filed in the clerk's office .... Reporters usually rely
on records and court personnel for information on civil trials."); see supra notes 436-66 and
accompanying text.
439. See infra notes 456-63 and accompanying text.
440. Wilson v. Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393, 398 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (reversing
verdict for plaintiff because of insufficient evidence of negligence when reporter failed to
check public record of persons arrested in drug raid); Salcedo v. El Diario Publishing, 5
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (granting summary judgment for defendant
newspaper because of insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility when reporter and editor
failed to read indictment).
441. 278 S.C. 12, 18, 22, 292 S.E.2d 23, 26, 28 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 944 (1982). An inference of negligence still may have been warranted in Jones,
however, in view of evidence suggesting that the reporter may have incorrectly copied down
the information received from the source. 278 S.C. 12, 14, 292 S.E.2d 23, 24; see infra note
486 and accompanying text.
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likely have rendered the information inaccurate.442 In contrast, to
require the press to ensure that everything that it prints is current
as of the time of publication would be unduly burdensome and ex-
pensive. A diligent attempt, however, to check readily available
sources, when some reason exists to believe that circumstances
may have changed, ordinarily should suffice. 443 This area is doubt-
lessly one in which professional customs and practices could prove
influential in striking a balance between the risks of error and
costs of up to the minute accuracy.444
(4) Failure to Verify Names
An inference of negligence can arise when a reporter or editor
fails to verify that the person identified in a story is actually the
person involved in the underlying event. The press customarily at-
tempts to identify individuals fully and accurately, especially when
an article has defamatory potential, such as in the reporting of an
arrest or an indictment.445 In Liquori v. Republican Co.,446 for ex-
442. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1982) (sufficient evidence
of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff, when among other things, editor failed to update
information obtained from old report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); General Prods. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546,
552 (E.D. Va. 1981) (sufficient evidence of negligence to deny summary judgment for defen-
dant when author relied on memory of book he had read and failed to update).
443. Cf. Torres v. Playboy Enters., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1182, 1187 (S.D. Tex.
1980) (granting summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of reck-
less disregard when reporter relied on assistant U.S. Attorney and failed to contact clerk to
check on further proceedings in criminal litigation immediately prior to publication); Mc-
Quoid v. Springfield Newspapers, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 1050, 1057 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (granting
summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of reckless disregard
when newspaper relied on stories by experienced reporter who broke story and failed to
discover recent developments pertaining to criminal proceedings).
444. See E. BROUSSARD & J. HOLGATE, supra note 324, at 106 ("Be sure to keep updat-
ing your information."); A. CROWELL, supra note 324, at 50 ("Old clippings may contain
errors with libelous implications; titles and addresses have changed."); J. STOVALL, C. SELF &
L. MULLINS, supra note 324, at 152 ("Particularly critical for local editors is the danger that
syndicated copy may be out of date.").
445. See F. FEDIER, supra note 324, at 121 ("Newspapers are particularly careful in
their handling of names. . . [Mlany newspapers require their reporters to verify the spell-
ing of every name that appears in local news stories by consulting a second source, usually a
telephone book or city directory."); D. McHAm, supra note 324, at 15 ("Reporters and edi-
tors should be especially careful of details such as names and addresses. A person does not
necessarily live at the address he or she gives police. And someone else with the same name
may live in the same town or city. Checking is absolutely necessary."); M. MENCHER, supra
324, at 568 ("The reporter who confuses plaintiff and defendant is heading for a libel suit.");
see also E. BROUSSARD & J. HOLGATE, supra note 324, at 87-90; A. CROWELL, supra note 324,
at 50; G. HOUGH, supra note 324, at 180; C. MAcDOUGALL, supra note 324, at 170; K. Mm'z-
LER, supra note 324, at 164; M. STEIN, supra note 324, at 79; J. STOVALL, C. SELF & E. MUL-
LINS, supra note 324, at 9.
446. 8 Mass. App. Ct. 671, 396 N.E.2d 726 (1979).
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ample, the defendant newspaper, to attempt to avoid potential
misidentification, required that its reporters provide a street ad-
dress for participants in judicial proceedings.447 To comply with
this policy, however, the reporter checked a 1974 telephone direc-
tory for the address of an individual named in a 1968 indictment
and failed to verify the address that he discovered with court per-
sonnel.448 On these facts, the court quite properly concluded that
the reporter's careless attempt at verification could support an in-
ference of negligence. 44 9
In Ryder v. Time, Inc. 450 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit suggested, without deciding, that the defen-
dant may have been negligent in failing to identify fully an attor-
ney who had been disciplined by including his middle initial or
address and thereby avoiding confusion with plaintiff, who was
also a practicing attorney in the same jurisdiction.451 While it may
seem harsh that potential liability may turn on whether the defen-
dant printed "Richard Ryder" or "Richard R. Ryder," the court
recognized that the defendant readily obtained the correct and full
identification from the very case it was discussing. 452 Moreover,
providing a middle initial to ensure proper identification is com-
mon journalistic practice.453 As one federal court has observed,
447. Id. at 673, 396 N.E.2d at 728.
448. Id. at 674, 396 N.E.2d at 728.
449. Id. at 674, 396 N.E.2d at 729-730.
450. 557 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
451. Id. at 826.
452. Id.; see also Charlottesville Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, - Va. -, , 325
S.E.2d 713, 732, 734-35 (1985) (sufficient evidence of negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff
when reporter referred to pregnant rape victim as "Miss" although verification would have
revealed that she was married); Slocum v. Webb, 375 So. 2d 125, 130 (La. Ct. App. 1979)
(court found sufficient evidence of negligence to reverse a summary judgment for defendant
in the reporter's confusion of the plaintiff with his son who had been arrested). The Slocum
case is somewhat troubling considering that the son was known as "Jerry Slocum" and the
father's name was "Jerry Slocum, Jr."
453. A. CROWELL, supra note 324, at 50 ("A name should include the middle initial if
the individual customarily uses one"); H. SCHULTE, supra note 324, at 228 ("Carelessness in
identification is one of the chief causes of libel suits against publications. That's why the
police reporter will exercise such care in obtaining middle initials and correct addresses.");
M. STEPHENS, supra note 324, at 134 ("Reporting that John Q. Smith was arrested for rob-
bery, when it was John Z. Smith, is cause for legal action by John Q."); see Frakt, The
Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., and Beyond, 6 RuT.-CM. L.J. 471, 489 (1975) (argument that a "substantial deviation
from accepted journalistic practices' standard as opposed to a negligence test should apply
when the defendant has lost the benefit of the Times test through misidentification; i.e.
substituting the name of the private figure plaintiff when a public figure plaintiff was
intended).
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however, "[standard publishing] procedures do not require a de-
tailed search for persons with similar names whose existence is un-
known to the defendant. . .. [S]uch searches. . . would place an
inordinate burden upon the press. '454
(e) Verification as Evidence of Due Care
Just as superficial investigation or verification can give rise to
an inference of negligence, thorough verification procedures can
defeat such a conclusion. For example, one court found that defen-
dant reporters had acted reasonably in concluding that plaintiff,
the owner of a cafe, was a bookie, when over the course of a week,
defendants attempted to "test and retest" their conclusions
through a series of phone calls and surveillance. 55
In the absence of evidence suggesting that the statements in
an article are likely to be false, an inference of negligence should
not arise when a reporter has based a story on a reliable source. 56
Not surprisingly, many defamation cases involve press coverage of
454. Nesbitt v. Multimedia, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1473, 1477 (W.D.N.C. 1982)
(granting summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of negligence
and reckless disregard when article failed to indicate that plaintiff's son, not the plaintiff,
was arrested); see also Lake Havasu Estates, Inc. v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 441 F. Supp. 489,
493 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Defendant was under no duty when publishing an article to check to
see whether other companies existed which bore the same name as the subject of its article
as claimed by plaintiff").
455. Dwyer v. Globe Newspaper, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2176, 2177-79 (Mass. Super.
Ct. 1980).
456. See Gaeta v. New York News, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 340, 465 N.E.2d 802, 806, 477
N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (1984) (reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant because of
insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility when reporter had been assured that source
was reliable); Fairley v. Peekskill Star Corp., 83 A.D.2d 294, 304, 445 N.Y.S.2d 156, 162
(1981) (reversing denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment because of insufficient
evidence of gross irresponsibility when reporter contacted "responsible officials" at institu-
tions where plaintiff had allegedly submitted his plans); Campo Lindo for Dogs v. New York
Post Corp., 65 A.D.2d 650, 650, 409 N.Y.S.2d 453, 454-55 (1978) (affirming summary judg-
ment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility when reporter
relied on information provided by well-known actress who was head of local humane soci-
ety); DeLuca v. New York News, Inc., 109 Misc. 2d 341, 348, 438 N.Y.S.2d 199, 204 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1981) (granting summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence
of gross irresponsibility when, among other things, reporter read plaintiff's case file and
contacted Board of Education and school where she worked); Horvath v. Ashtabula Tel., 8
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1657, 1661 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff due to
insufficient evidence of negligence when reporter attempted to verify, using statements of
the prosecuting attorney, law enforcement officials, and tape of news conference, charges
that plaintiff was arrested); see also W. AGMa, P. AuLT & E. EMERY, supra note 324, at 194-
95 ("when one of the media receives a news release from a properly identified source, it can
reasonably assume that the routine facts it contains are correct, with accurate names and
addresses.").
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citizens' encounters with the criminal justice system. Media cover-
age of crime, arrests, investigations, indictments and trials is fre-
quent and extensive, prompted by the public interest in the sub-
ject matter. Many stories are "fast breaking" news with intense
deadline pressure. Moreover, the charges against the plaintiff often
are serious and, as a result, the defamatory potential is great.45 7
Given that the plaintiff and witnesses often are unavailable for
comment, law enforcement personnel are frequently the most au-
thoritative, if not the only, available source.4 5s Consequently, a re-
porter's reliance on law enforcement personnel in this context
often will undermine any possible inference of negligence.459 In the
457. See E. BROUSSARD & J. HOLGATE, supra note 324, at 108 ("Crime stories can easily
result in libel suits if the reporter does not choose his/her words carefully. You should never
presume a person is guilty no matter what the circumstances of the crime . . ... "); H.
SCHULTE, supra note 324, at 214 ("Danger of defamation is much greater in law enforcement
than on other public affairs beats, and the reporter must constantly be on guard. Criminal
accusations are particularly sensitive."); M. STEIN, supra note 324, at 183 ("The majority of
libel suits stem from the handling of police and court news."); see also B. BROOKS, supra
note 324, at 214; G. HAGE, supra note 324, at 156; J. HOHENBERG, supra note 324, at 291; M.
STEPHEN, supra note 324, at 134.
458. See G. HAGE, supra note 324, at 156
Because prosecution officials. . . may be more accessible to the court reporter assigned
to cover the courthouse, there is a tendency for the reporter not to interview the defen-
dant. At the very least, the reporter should attempt to contact the defendant's attor-
ney, particularly if the case appears to be one worthy of extended coverage.
459. See Nesbitt v. Multimedia, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1473, 1475 (W.D.N.C. 1982)
(granting summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of negligence
and reckless disregard when reporter relied on information obtained from police detective);
El Amin v. Miami Herald, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1079, 1082 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1983) (granting
summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of negligence when re-
porter relied on police report); Karp v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 359 So. 2d 580, 582
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because of insuffi-
cient evidence of negligence when reporter obtained information from immigration officer);
LeBoeuf v. Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430, 431 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (af-
firming summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of negligence
when reporter relied on police department public information officer); Wilson v. Capital
City Press, 315 So. 2d 393, 398 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (reversing verdict for plaintiff because of
insufficient evidence of negligence when reporter relied on police news release); Chapadeau
v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 200, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61,
64 (1975) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of
gross irresponsibility when reporter relied on police captain and police record); Simonsen v.
Malone Evening Telegram, 98 A.D.2d 905, 470 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (1983) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility when re-
porter relied on telephone conversations with police); Carlucci v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers,
Inc., 88 A.D.2d 608, 450 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55, af'd, 57 N.Y.2d 883, 442 N.E.2d 442, 456 N.Y.S.2d
44 (1982) (reversing denial of defendants motion to dismiss because of insufficient evidence
of gross irresponsibility when reporter obtained information from police barracks); Grobe v.
Three Village Herald, 69 A.D.2d 175, 176, 420 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (1979), af'd, 49 N.Y.2d 932, 406
N.E.2d 491, 428 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1980) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because of
insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility when reporter verified information with police
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leading case of Robart v. Post-Standard8 0 a New York appellate
court concluded that the plaintiff could not make a showing of
gross irresponsibility when an experienced reporter relied on infor-
mation obtained in a conversation with a state police public infor-
mation officer.4 61 Similarly, a recent trial court decision in the
District of Columbia found insufficient evidence of negligence as a
matter of law when a reporter relied on information obtained from
a police "hot-line" that was set up to eliminate the need for report-
ers to interview police detectives personally.462
The rejection of an inference of negligence in these circum-
stances appears correct, at least when a reporter lacks sufficient
time for further verification or when experience has shown that the
information obtained from law enforcement officials generally was
reliable.463 Considering that the journalism profession has coun-
seled its members that law enforcement officials do make mistakes
and that information obtained from them must be verified,64 reli-
officer and court personnel); Sbarbati v. New York Post, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2190, 2191
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (granting summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evi-
dence of gross irresponsibility when reporters relied on prosecutor's press conference);
Horvath v. Ashtabula Tel., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1657, 1662-63 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)
(reversing verdict for plaintiff because of insufficient evidence of negligence when reporter
relied on conversation with sheriff, prosecutor, and court personnel); Benson v. Griffin Tele-
vision, Inc., 593 P.2d 511, 514 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming summary judgment for defen-
dant because of insufficient evidence of negligence when reporter relied on statements by
police suggesting that plaintiff might be suspect in police investigation); Torres-Silva v. El
Mundo, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1508, 1512 (P.R. 1977) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant because of insufficient evidence of negligence when reporter verified information
with police).
460. 74 A.D.2d 963, 425 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1980), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 843, 418 N.E.2d 664, 437
N.Y.S.2d 71 (1981).
461. 74 A.D.2d at 963, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 892; see also H. SCHULTE, supra note 324, at
243 ("The answer for the reporter who insists on thorough coverage [of state police agen-
cies] is to carefully cultivate sources in the beginning and rely heavily on effective telephone
contact.").
462. Phillips v. Washington Post, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1835, 1837 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1982).
463. See, e.g., LeBoeuf v. Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. Ct.
App. 1976).
The uncontroverted affidavits show that this report was given to the paper pursuant to
an established policy. There was no indication of irregularity in the police procedures,
such reports in the past had been accurate and this particular one was routine. The
reporter had never known plaintiff previously and treated this as an ordinary news
item. There is nothing to suggest that the reporter or the paper was placed on guard or
to suggest a finding of "fault" in the publication of the May 9, 1974, article.
Id. at 431.
464. B. BROOKS, supra note 324, at 201 ("Crime stories often are written from the
police report alone. In the case of routine stories many editors view such reporting as suffi-
cient. Good newspapers, however, demand much more because police reports frequently are
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ance on such officials should not constitute reasonable care per
se.465 Although reliance on law enforcement officials often will be
consistent with professional custom and practice, and as such, con-
stitute strong evidence of due care,466 the plaintiff must be allowed
to present his case to the jury if he can show that, in a particular
fact situation, a reasonable journalist would have undertaken fur-
ther attempts at verification.
Many journalists, and investigative reporters in particular,
rely heavily on public records. 67 While a reporter may not be nec-
essarily under a duty to trace an allegation to an authoritative
source such as a public record whenever such a source is available,
doing so effectively may undermine any inference of negligence. 6 '
inaccurate. ... [G]ood reporters do their own reporting and do not depend solely upon a
police officer's account."); J. HOHENBERG, supra note 324, at 288 ("There can be no guaran-
tee of police accuracy; in fact, an impressive body of evidence can be amassed to the con-
trary. That means police versions of names, addresses and other facts must be checked.");
D. McHAM, supra note 324, at 10 ("Too many news organizations rely exclusively on the
police report in building their stories . . . .Reliance on the police report and it alone in
handling the police story may be risky."); see also A. CROWELL, supra note 324, at 43; M.
STEm, supra note 324, at 183-84; M. STEPHEN, supra note 324, at 133.
465. See Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406, 414-15 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (denying summary judgment for defendant when newspaper allegedly obtained photo-
graph of plaintiff from F.B.I. because jury should determine whether reporter's reliance on
information provided by F.B.I. was reasonable).
466. See A. CROWELL, supra note 324, at 43 ("The reporter is advised to accept the
word of the careful policeman who has always given him accurate information."); C. WAR-
REN, supra note 324, at 379 ("Pressed for time and always confronted with the danger of
libel, newsmen rely almost wholly upon tips and statements from policemen, complaint
sheets and official records of arrest.").
467. See F. FEDnER, supra note 324, at 268 ("Court documents, like police reports,
provide all the information needed for routine stories."); J. NmaL & S. BROWN, supra note
324, at 225 (Many editors "argue with considerable justification that the best source is a
written report or document because of its legal status and the care that has been taken in
preparing it."); H. SCHULTE, supra note 324, at 410 ("Documents and information they con-
tain serve as the key to nearly every significant investigative report produced by the
press."); P. W-LLIAMS, supra note 324, at 198 ("The legal system is probably as thorough and
accurate in record keeping as any in American life."); supra note 438 and accompanying
text.
468. Lake Havasu Estates, Inc. v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 441 F. Supp. 489, 491
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence
of negligence when researcher read transcript of hearing and examined land sales records);
Freeze Right Refrigation and Air Conditioner Servs., Inc. v. City of New York, 101 A.D.2d
175, 184, 475 N.Y.S.2d 383, 390 (1984) (reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant
because of insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility when reporter relied on records of
government agency); Ritter v. Matthes, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1744, 1748 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1983) (granting summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of gross
irresponsibility when reporter attended government meetings and reviewed court records);
DeLuca v. New York News, Inc., 109 Misc. 2d 341, 349, 438 N.Y.S.2d 199, 204 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1981) (granting summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of
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Given that professional journalists, however, appear to proceed on
the working assumption that public records frequently are incor-
rect and should be verified when possible,46 9 reliance on public
records should not be conclusive proof of due care.
Frequently, a reporter will obtain information or verification
from the media itself. Obviously, prior or contemporaneous press
coverage of a subject provides a major source of information. From
experience a reporter or editor will know whether a particular
newspaper or magazine generally is trustworthy. Reliance on one of
the major wire services,47 ° or a reputable publication,471 or the re-
search and editorial work of a prior publisher of the particular arti-
gross irresponsibility when, among other things, reporter read plaintiff's case file); see also
Anderson, supra note 22, at 466 (reliance on official records should constitute reasonable
care); cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 464, 466-67 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(arguing that there was insufficient evidence of negligence in the record when, among other
things, magazine's bureau chief read portions of divorce decree over the phone to New York
office).
469. See B. BROOKS, supra note 324, at 319 ("The greatest danger arises from the one-
sideness and frequent inaccuracy of police reports. At best, the reports represent the of-
ficer's viewpoint."); E. BROUSSARD & J. HOLGATE, supra note 324, at 108 ("Always verify the
information contained in police reports. Police officers sometimes make errors in spelling or
errors of fact which you can compound by putting them in your story."); G. HAGE, supra
note 324, at 81 ("[S]ummary arrest records . ..are notoriously incomplete. Often these
records contain an initial entry at the time of arrest or inquiry but do not indicate disposi-
tion. A person may be questioned by police and released, but the latter fact may not be
recorded."); see also E. DENNIS & A. ISMACH, supra note 324, at 90.
470. See Turner v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1437, 1438
(W.D. Ky. 1979) (granting summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence
of negligence when news magazine relied on information obtained from Associated Press
and New York Times); Zetes v. Richman, 86 A.D.2d 746, 747, 447 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779 (1982)
(reversing denial of dismissal of complaint due to insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibil-
ity when newspaper relied on wire service report); Torres-Silva v. El Mundo, 3 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1508, 1511-12 (P.R. 1977) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because
of insufficient evidence of negligence when, among other things, newspaper relied on U.P.I.
news release); see also Robertson, supra note 26, at 202 (a newspaper should be able to rely
reasonably on wire services unless the information received is highly improbable or espe-
cially easy to verify); cf. Time, Inc., v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 464, 466-67 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (arguing that there was insufficient evidence of negligence in the record when,
among other things, news magazine relied in part on dispatch from wire service).
471. Cf. McQuoid v. Springfield Newspapers, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 1050, 1058, 1059 n.10
(W.D. Mo. 1980) (granting summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evi-
dence of reckless disregard and suggesting that there would be insufficient evidence of negli-
gence when local paper followed "customary practice in the newspaper business" by relying
on story in another newspaper); National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F.
Supp. 1299, 1318 n.31 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (when granting summary judgment for the defen-
dant because of insufficient evidence of reckless disregard; the Executive Director of Publi-
cations for the plaintiff testified that "it is customary practice to use information from other
newspapers and publications without independent verification").
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cle,'472 or the newspaper's own files,47s or the expertise of a col-
league 47 4 often should be sufficient to establish due care, especially
in view of the cost and burden of constant verification. Indeed, the
wire services are established and maintained on the assumption
that they will provide an accurate source of information on which
their members may rely.47 Reliance on a prior published source,
however, will not automatically negate an inference of negligence.
Journalists are aware that their own files 471 as well as the files of
the wire services'7 sometimes will contain errors. If the media
472. See Geiger v. Dell Publishing Co., 719 F.2d 515, 517-18 (1st Cir. 1983) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility
when editor was aware that defamatory passage had been published on four prior occasions
without objection); Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531, 550-51, 416 N.E.2d 557,
566, 435 N.Y.S.2d 556, 565 (1980) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because of
insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility when republisher of book relied on work of
original publisher).
473. See W. BURROWS, supra note 324, at 99 ("The 'morgue'-the place near the news-
room where 'clips' are kept-is almost always the starting point."); M. MENCHER, supra note
324, at 41 ("There are, of course, certain routine verifications a reporter must make...
[,for example when] [b]ackground information is taken from clips in the morgue. This kind
of verification is essential to the reporter's work."); H. SToNncPHE, supra note 324, at 74
("The newspaper's morgue, if there is one, should also be of service to the editorialist ....
what better place exists for the editorial writer to begin his research than with his own
newspaper?"); see also W. AGEE, P. AULT & E. EMERY, supra note 324, at 183, supra note
434.
474. See Ortiz v. Valdescastilia, 102 A.D.2d 513, 478 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (1984) (grant-
ing summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibil-
ity when publisher relied on experienced and reputable writer); see also J. BOLCH & K
MILLER, supra note 324, at 47 ("Consider your colleagues as additional or beginning sources,
never as ends in themselves."); A. CROWELL, supra note 324, at 43 ("Unless something is
obviously questionable, the copy editor accepts copy from the reporter who covers the beat
involved, that is, from only the writer who has covered this kind of thing before and is
respected for his accuracy in that area."); S. ROSENFELD, RESEARCH & WRrTNG IN THE EDI-
TORIAL PAGE (1977) ("Our own reporters and editors in the news room are among our best
sources."). But see C. MAcDOUGALL, supra note 324, at 40 ("Verifying a story means more
than checking the statements of different news sources against each other."), 41 ("many an
editor has held up a story until she/he has had a chance to check on even a reliable re-
porter's work").
475. See National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1320, 1317-18
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (In case in which court granted summary judgment for defendant because
of insufficient evidence of reckless disregard, managing editor of defendant testified that
wire services are professional organizations that may be relied on.); supra note 203 and
accompanying text.
476. See A. CROWELL, supra note 324, at 44 ("The clips [in the newspaper morgue] are
notorious for having preserved the newspaper's mistakes; any old clip is out-of-date and
therefore potentially dangerous for use now."); G. HOUGH, supra note 324, at 177; see also
M. MENCHER, supra note 324, at 286.
477. See E. BROUSSARD & J. HOLGATE, supra note 324, at 120 ("[W]ire copy is not
transmitted free of errors. There are mistakes in spelling, facts, and general accuracy. It is
risky just to rip copy off the teletype and air it."); J. STOVALL, C. SELF & L. MULLENS, supra
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source is outdated, or in any other sense apparently unreliable, or
if independent verification is easy and customary, an inference of
negligence still may arise.47 8 Generally, however, reliance on trust-
worthy press sources would be consistent with reasonable care.
3. Writing and Editing
(a) Notation and Transcription
Despite thorough research and use of reliable sources, a re-
porter may be negligent if his careless notation results in inaccu-
rate and defamatory information being published. In Schrottman
v. Barnicle,47 9 for example, a reporter published an article attribut-
ing a racial slur to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, although admitting
to having been interviewed by the reporter, denied having made
the remark in question. 80 The plaintiff testified and the court
found that the reporter had not taken notes in the plaintiff's pres-
ence.4"' The notes on which the reporter relied were introduced
into evidence at the trial. The court observed that these notes cov-
ered seven different interviews and that the defamatory phrase ap-
peared on the third page but was not set off in quotation marks.482
In addition, "[t]he plaintiff's name [was] interlineated just above
the phrase, but appears again several lines below. The balance of
the notes between the plaintiff's name and that of the next inter-
view subject mention some but not all of the statements and infor-
mation attributed to the plaintiff in the article. ' '483 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that sufficient evidence ex-
isted to support a finding of negligence and remanded to the trial
note 324, at 150 (Wire copy "needs the same hard-nosed examination the editor would give
local copy. ... [W]ire copy is written quickly and under pressure .... [T]he medium is
uniquely subject to error, produced when the process is abbreviated by the force of deadline
pressure."); see also E. BLISS & J. PATTERSON, supra note 324, at 86; M. MENCHER, supra
note 324, at 236; M. STEPHENS, supra note 324, at 107.
478. See General Prods. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546, 552 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(sufficient evidence of negligence to deny summary judgment for defendant when reporter
relied on memory of book he had read); Triangle Publications v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179, 317
S.E.2d 534, 537-38 (Ga. 1984) (affirming denial of summary judgment for defendant on libel
claim when TV Guide relied on television station submitting advertisement); Melon v. Capi-
tal City Press, 407 So. 2d 85, 87 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (sufficient evidence of negligence to
reverse summary judgment for defendant when reporter relied on newspaper article).
479. 386 Mass. 627, 437 N.E.2d 205 (1982).
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court for a specific finding on the issue with the observation:
[T]o determine whether [the reporter] was negligent with respect to accuracy,
the judge could consider the testimony concerning [his] notetaking and re-
search methods, as well as the clarity and reliability of the notes themselves.
This evidence should be viewed in light of circumstances including the rela-




This result is correct because to base a story on information ob-
tained from "reliable" sources would be of little use if the reporter
is unable to process the information in a manner designed to en-
sure that it is roughly as accurate when published as when ob-
tained. Moreover, diligent methods of transcribing data are rela-
tively elementary matters with which even the most neophyte
journalist should be familiar.85
A false and defamatory statement sometimes will be published
simply because a reporter was told one thing and inadvertently
484. Id. at-, 437 N.E.2d at 214; see also Slocum v. Webb, 375 So. 2d 125, 130 (La.
Ct. App. 1979) (sufficient evidence of negligence to reverse dismissal of complaint exists
when, among other things, reporter's notes contained inconsistent references to plaintiff and
plaintiff's son, who was actually the subject of the criminal charges in issue); Re v. Gannett,
480 A.2d 662, 666 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984) (finding sufficient evidence of negligence when
newspaper misstated information obtained from its own archives, but remanding for new
trial on issue of damages); cf. Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 414, 418
(Tenn. 1978) (sufficient evidence of negligence to reverse directed verdict for defendant
when reporter wrote inaccurate story, despite apparent reliance on police reports containing
correct information).
485. In Schrottman, for example, the court did not believe that "expert testimony
[was] necessary to enable triers of fact to apply a standard of ordinary negligence to the
methods used by a journalist to record interviews. Due care in gathering information is not a
technical matter for which a jury unaided by experts would have no basis for decision." 386
Mass. at -, 437 N.E.2d at 215; see B. BROOKS, supra note 324, at 103 ("[n]ot taking any
notes at all is risky. Only a few reporters can leave an interview and accurately write down
what was said. Certainly no one can do it and reproduce direct quotes verbatim. You should
learn shorthand or develop a system of your own."); J. HOHENBERG, supra note 324, at 219
("Today's reporters, especially the younger ones, are likely to find that considerable note-
taking will be more useful to them than the casual attitude of veteran reporters. The reason
is that modern reporting must be more careful, more thorough and, if possible, more accu-
rate than the news gathering of 35 or 40 years ago."), 224 ("Don't try to get information out
of records in a hurry. Double check every entry. You can make mistakes by copying too
hastily."); P. WILLIAMS, supra note 324, at 27-28 ("Transcribe your interview notes in clear
English .... At the beginning of the interview notes, write a brief statement of your own
about the color and circumstances surrounding the interview: where it was, who else was
present, how the interviewee acted, one-sided telephone conversations you may have heard,
questions that may not have been resolved in the interview. It may be two or three months
before you write a story. Therefore, make your interview notes as lucid and as solid as possi-
ble so that when it is time to write them into a story, you and your teammates will be able
to understand them."); see also J. BRADY, supra note 324, at 122-35; E. BROUSSARD & J.
HOLGATE, supra note 324, at 106; G. HOUGH, supra note 324, at 28.
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wrote down another.486 Because this type of error often will be the
result of an unavoidable momentary lapse in concentration or a
mental transposition, prevention of its occurrence is difficult if not
impossible. A fair degree of accuracy, however, may be ensured if
the reporter or editor verifies the initial statements prior to publi-
cation. The feasibility of such verification will depend on several
factors including the potential for defamatory harm, the likelihood
of error, the degree of deadline pressure, and the availability of
sources of verification.487
(b) Tone and Language
Although most litigation concerning journalistic negligence has
focused on investigation and verification of the news story, a find-
ing of negligence also may be based on a reporter's choice of lan-
guage. Justice Harlan's opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
applying an objective-oriented gross negligence standard, placed
reliance on the defendant's recently instituted "sophisticated
muckracking" policy. 488 Journalists emphasize that the precise and
accurate use of language is a primary objective of their profes-
sion.489 A reporter's use of language that conveys an impression
486. See, e.g., Charlottesville Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, - Va. .- , -, 325
S.E.2d 713, 732, 734-35 (1985) ("reporter testified that his use of 'Miss' [instead of 'Mrs.']
was 'just a slip of memory' "). In this type of case, the jury often must resolve a credibility
question because the source frequently will testify that he provided the reporter with the
correct information and the reporter will testify that the defamatory information that was
published was correctly quoted. See, e.g., Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp.
1005, 1007 (W.D. Va. 1979) (sufficient evidence of negligence to deny summary judgment for
defendant when source denied conveying defamatory information to reporter); Jones v. Sun
Publishing Co., 278 S.C. 12, 14, 292 S.E.2d 23, 24 (sufficient evidence of negligence to affirm
verdict for plaintiff when, among other things, U.S. Attorney testified that he had read cor-
rect name to reporter over the phone and reporter testified that he had not), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 944 (1982). Reporters realize that, to be able to defend themselves in such a case,
they must make and retain careful notes and, in some instances, tape record source inter-
views if feasible.
487. See infra notes 404-425 and accompanying text.
488. 388 U.S. 130, 158-59 (1967); cf. Levine v. CMP Publications, 738 F.2d 660, 673
(5th Cir. 1984) (in finding negligence, jury could rely on fact that reporter was predisposed
to write story about computer "crime" although plaintiff was only involved in civil ligita-
tion); see supra notes 209-212 and accompanying text.
489. See B. BROOKS, supra note 324, at 253 ("Precisely-that is the way words should
be used. They should mean exactly what you intend them to mean."); E. BROUSSARD & J.
HOLGATE, supra note 324, at 17 ("Your story also must be clear and concise .... Your
words must ba selected very carefully and must convey the correct meaning."); F. FEDLER,
supra note 324, at 20 ("To communicate effectively, reporters must also be precise, particu-
larly in their selection and arrangement of words. Imprecision creates confusion and misun-
derstanding."); D. GARvEy & W. RwvaSis, supra note 324, at 148 ("Each word you choose
carries with it a sort of halo of related ideas. You have to know your language well to under-
[Vol. 38:247
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significantly more sensationalistic and defamatory than the facts
warrant may present a jury question on negligence. For example,
in Forrest v. Lynch the Louisiana Court of Appeals found suffi-
cient fault, presumably negligence, to sustain a verdict for the
plaintiff when a staff member of the defendant newspaper wrote a
headline using the pejorative term "rigged" to describe bid specifi-
cations even though the underlying article merely referred to the
bids as "proprietary."4 90 Conversely, a New York trial court found
that a newspaper's characterization of a disabled teacher as a "no-
show" was insufficient to give rise to an inference of gross
irresponsibility. 91
Determining whether an editor or reporter failed to use due
care in choosing particular language or in creating a certain im-
pression is a difficult and delicate undertaking. A broad spectrum
of literary styles is protected by the first amendment, from the er-
udite and cautious to the blatant sensationalism of the tabloid,
even though the latter may be out of step with the mores of the
profession.492 An inference of negligence should not arise merely
stand the full meanings of the words you select and their connotations for your listeners
. . . .One poorly chosen word can change the meaning of a story."); M. MENCHER, supra
note 324, at 144 ("Without accuracy of language, the journalist cannot make the story match
the event."); H. SCHULTE, supra note 324, at 229 ("Precision is essential to total fairness.
The importance of qualifying information cannot be overemphasized."); see also H.
STONECIPHER, supra note 324, at 127.
490. 347 So. 2d 1255, 1257-58 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978);
see also Lawlor v. Gallagher Presidents' Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(sufficient evidence of negligence to grant judgment for plaintiff when reporter may have
"carelessly distorted the information and magnified the wrong in order to sensationalize the
story; ...or negligently used inaccurate language to describe the true facts"); McCall v.
Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 975 (1982) (reversing summary judgment for defendant apparently because of sufficient
evidence of negligence when newspaper repeatedly used pejorative terms such as "fix,"
"bribe," and "payoff" to describe allegations against plaintiff despite defendant's inability
to verify that plaintiff had engaged in any such conduct). Professor Robertson interprets
Lawlor as establishing the following standard of journalistic conduct. "A publisher is negli-
gent when he extemporizes on the facts known to him for purposes of sensationalism." Rob-
ertson, supra note 26, at 257.
Journalists recognize that they must take care to ensure that headlines are supported
by underlying articles. See F. BASKEIrr, J. SissoRs & B. BROOKS, supra note 324, at 197
("The key to ensuring accuracy is close and careful reading of the story. Erroneous head-
lines result when the copyeditor doesn't understand the story, infers something that is not
in the story, fails to portray the full dimension of the story, or fails to shift gears before
moving from one story to the next.").
491. DeLuca v. New York News, Inc., 109 Misc. 2d 341, 349, 438 N.Y.S.2d 199, 205
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
492. SPJ, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 323, Fair Play, No. 3 ("The media should not
pander to morbid curiosity about details of vice and crime"); W. AGEE, P. AULT, & E. EMERY,
supra note 321, at 68 ("Although sensational 'quotes' taken out of context make eye-catch-
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because the defendant has offended the factfinder's taste or sense
of decorum. Such an inference is permissible only when the tone or
language at issue creates or magnifies the false and defamatory in-
nuendo in a fairly egregious way. Any less extreme basis for the
inference arguably would impose an unduly severe check on the
reporter's task of conveying information in an interesting and
readable manner. Applying this relatively strict approach, fact sit-
uations such as those in Forrest v. Lynch 493 probably should not
warrant an inference of negligence.
(c) Balance and Fairness
The journalism profession places great emphasis on its obliga-
tion of fairness and objectivity.49 4 The law of defamation, however,
focuses on falsity rather than fairness. Although no legal duty cur-
rently exists to present the news in a balanced and unbiased man-
ner, a persistent practice of reporting only the negative and defam-
atory aspects of a controversy arguably could give rise to an
inference of negligence on the theory that such a practice demon-
strates the defendant's unconcern with discovering and reporting
the truth or even reveals an affirmative attempt to ignore the
truth. At present, no case law exists on point. Evidence of this na-
ture should be used with caution because the factfinder could eas-
fly but erroneously assume that proof of unfair selectivity should,
ing headlines, they constitute irresponsible journalism."); A. CROWELL, supra note 324, at 40
("[Tihe modern American newspaper is not a sensational or spicy sheet. It tries to report
the news responsibly and accurately in good taste"); F. FEDLER, supra note 324, at 59 (in
writing a lead "[n]ever exaggerate, sensationalize or belittle."); H. GOODWIN, supra note 324,
at 299-300 ("Hyping news by the use of exciting language, whether the facts justify it or not,
and by taking little shortcuts with the facts, is a more common problem in their field than
journalists like to admit. And the hyping is done not just by the reporters trying to make
their stories sound better than they are but by editors trying to sell those stories for the
front page, or even for prizes.").
493. 347 So.2d 1255 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978).
494. See SPJ, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 323, Accuracy and Objectivity, No. 2 ("Ob-
jectivity in reporting the news is another goal, which serves as the mark of an experienced
professional. It is the standard of performance toward which we strive."); Fairplay No. 1
("The news media should not communicate unofficial charges affecting reputation or moral
character without giving the accused a chance to reply."); APME, CODE OF ETHICS, supra
note 323, Accuracy ("The newspaper should guard against inaccuracies, carelessness, bias or
distortions through emphasis or omission."), Integrity ("The newspaper should strive for
impartial treatment of issues and dispassionate handling of controversial subjects."); ASNE,
STATEmNT OF PmNCIPLES, supra note 323, art. iv ("Every effort must be made to assure the
news content is accurate, free from bias and in context, and that all sides are presented
fairly."); see also WASHINGTON POST STANDrARS, supra note 323 (detailed discussion of the
fairness principle); E. BROUSSARD & J. HOLGATE, supra note 324, at 90. K. METZLER, supra
note 324, at 300.
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in and of itself, give rise to liability rather than merely providing
some support for an inference that the defendant failed to exercise
due care in attempting to discover the truth. Conversely, evidence
that a reporter provided balanced and objective coverage of a con-
troversy or that he presented both sides of the story may demon-
strate a reasonably careful attempt to ascertain and publish the
truth. 95 As a general rule, an inference of due care based on fair-
ness and impartiality would be more probative than a contrary in-
ference grounded on imbalanced coverage.
(d) Editorial Process
An inference of negligence may be based on inadequate edito-
rial procedures. In finding sufficient evidence of negligence to af-
firm a jury verdict for plaintiff the Seventh Circuit in Gertz em-
phasized the editor's cavalier attitude in rushing an article with
obvious defamatory potential into print, absent sufficient verifica-
tion.498 Similarly, the New York Court of Claims recently declared
that the editorial staff of a college newspaper had acted in a
grossly irresponsible manner by proceeding to publish potentially
defamatory letters to the editor without having adopted any guide-
lines or policies for verification although it ultimately found for the
defendant on the ground that the state was not legally responsible
for the tortious conduct of the student newspaper staff.4 97 An in-
ference of negligence could arise if an editor failed to employ the
customary standard of care as by failing to verify a potentially de-
famatory allegation or by failing to question the reporter when
495. Freeze Right Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Servs., Inc. v. City of New York,
101 A.D.2d 175, 185, 475 N.Y.S.2d 383, 390 (1984) (reversing denial of summary judgment
for defendant when, among other things, reporter printed plaintiff's denial and explana-
tion); cf. Riley, supra note 283, at 31.
496. 680 F.2d 527, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); See also
Levine v. CMP Publications, 738 F.2d 660, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1984) (sufficient evidence of
negligence to affirm verdict for plaintiff against publisher when evidence existed that editor
worked closely with negligent reporter and failed to delete false and defamatory charges); cf.
Shutt v. Harte-Hanks, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2559, 2562 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (granting sum-
mary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of reckless disregard but not-
ing that editor "may have been negligent in writing the headline without carefully reading
the story"); McCarney v. Des Moines Register and Tribune Co., 239 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Iowa
1976) (granting summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of reck-
less disregard but noting that editor clearly was negligent in confusing one story with an-
other and failing to investigate); Glover v. Herald Co., 549 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Mo.) (en banc)
(reversing judgment for plaintiff because of insufficient evidence of reckless disregard but
noting that rewrite man may have been negligent in confusing names received over the
phone), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977).
497. Mazart v. State, 109 Misc. 2d 1092, 1098, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600, 604 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
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some reason existed to doubt the accuracy of a statement.49 Pre-
sumably, an inference of negligence also might arise if an editor
significantly changed the content of a story without adequate fac-
tual basis when defamatory potential was apparent.499 In no sense,
however, is an editor an ensurer of accuracy. In the leading case of
Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc.,500 the New York Court of Appeals
held that a managing editor could not be found "grossly irresponsi-
ble" when he had no reason to know that the reporters who wrote
the story apparently fabricated information and cited nonexistent
sources.50 1 The court's approach in Karaduman is sensible and
498. See J. STOVALL, C. SELF & L. MULLINS, supra note 324, at 123 ("Accuracy is the
most important consideration of an editor. Accuracy is the central reason for much of what
an editor does. . . . For an editor, the pursuit of accuracy is a state of mind. An editor must
be willing to check everything he doubts and must be willing to doubt anything. He must
cast a cold eye on the work of his reporters, even those with the most experience and best
reputation; he must demand an accounting from them as much as from his unexperienced
recruits. He must even be willing to doubt his own knowledge and experience and must
occasionally recheck what he knows to be true."); see also F. BAsKETTr, J. SissoRS & B.
BROOKS, supra note 324, at 39 ("Of all of the copyeditor's duties, editing for accuracy is
probably the most important .... Editors ensure accuracy by questioning the reporter
about information obtained and the means of obtaining it, and by checking verifiable
facts."); A. CROWELL, supra note 324, at 11 ("The editor's first job is to check for accu-
racy."); S. CRUMP, supra note 324, at 99, 435; J. HOHENBERG, supra note 324, at 231; A.
PLOTNICK, supra note 324, at 66 ("If one enduring reform emerges from the Year of the
Hoax, it is likely to be that editors will subject staff writing to the same scrutiny usually
applied to outside contributors, especially those unsolicited.").
499. A. CROWELL, supra note 324, at 41 ("In handling potentially dangerous material
the editor takes extra care to make as few alterations as possible. The slightest change can
upset the accuracy of carefully chosen words and produce libel.").
500. 51 N.Y.2d 531, 416 N.E.2d 557, 435 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1980).
501. 51 N.Y.2d at 542-43, 416 N.E.2d at 562, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62. The Karuduman
court observed:
Newspapers, like any other organization, must operate through the delegation of re-
sponsibilities and chores to workers at the appropriate level of the organizational hier-
archy. If a newspaper is to function with a modicum of efficiency and perform its im-
portant task of carrying information to its readers, its editors must feel reasonably free
to rely upon the trustworthiness and integrity of their reporters, at least in the absence
of any indication that the reporters in question are not to be trusted. A rule which,
absent proof to the contrary, would permit an inference against an editor to be drawn
upon a simple showing that his reporters had been "grossly irresponsible" on a single
occasion would indirectly impose upon editors the burden of duplicating their report-
ers' work and rechecking with specificity all of their sources in order to establish a
defense to libel claims arising from the potential misconduct of the reporters. Such a
result would be completely unacceptable, since it would require a far higher degree of
care than has previously been required in our case law. . . and would, more seriously,
operate to dampen the free exercise of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
We do not believe that this conclusion imposes an insuperable or unfair burden
upon plaintiffs who seek to hold the editorial and managerial staff of a newspaper per-
sonally liable for the publication of defamatory material. Where the reporters have ac-
ted irresponsibly, an editor or managerial employee might be held personally liable, for
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should apply when the standard is negligence instead of gross irre-
sponsibility, although a slightly greater duty of verification may
exist under the latter standard even in the absence of reason to
doubt the accuracy of the statement.
While an editor may not be under a duty to verify every state-
ment in an article prior to publication, an inference of negligence
may arise if he fails to proofread his copy prior to distribution.0 2
Proofreading is standard practice and should impose virtually no
significant additional cost or burden on the media. Errors, how-
ever, will slip past even the careful proofreader.50 3 Because the
standard imposed is reasonable care rather than total accuracy, the
fact that a mistake or typo was published should not raise an infer-
ence of negligence so long as the defendant followed procedures
that were designed to catch most errors.0 4 Just as carelessness at
the editorial stage may support an inference of negligence, thor-
ough editorial review should provide strong evidence of due care. 05
example, upon a showing by concrete proof that he knew or had reason to know that
his reporter or his reporter's sources were unreliable or subject to question. Similarly,
proof that the procedures used by the newspaper in checking its stories were generally
slipshod or careless could perhaps support an inference that the particular editor or
manager personally "acted in a grossly irresponsible manner" in allowing a statement
to be publised without making further inquiries about its accuracy.
Id. see also Simonsen v. Malone Evening Telegram, 98 A.D.2d 905, 470 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900
(1983) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of gross
irresponsibility when editor made further inquiries but had no reason to doubt accuracy of
reporter's copy).
502. Pettengill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 88 Mich. App. 587, 591, 278 N.W.2d 682,
684 (1979) (sufficient evidence of negligence to reverse summary judgment for defendant
when editors apparently failed to proofread advertisement copy).
503. See A. PLOTNICK, supra note 324, at 7 ("Murphy's law assures us that no amount
of proofreading will uncover all the errors of a work about to be published. The questions
are, how many re-readings are reasonable and when should compulsiveness be applied? In
my experience I have found that two editorial-level readings of galleys and two of pages will
catch 99 percent of errors. Unfortunately, the remaining one percent are so often the mis-
takes that cause not just embarrassment but trouble. . . . The editor who understands how
people feel about such errors will compulsively check for them in third and fourth readings
of page proofs.").
504. See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 200, 341 N.E.2d
569, 572, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 65 (1975) ("The mere fact that the word trio was mistakenly
substituted for the word duo should not, of itself, result in liability. A limited number of
typographical errors ... are inevitable.").
505. See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 200, 341 N.E.2d
569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 65 (1975) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because of
insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility when article was "checked by at least two per-
sons other than the writer"); Ortiz v. Valdescastilla, 102 A.D.2d 513, 478 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901
(1984) (reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence
of gross irresponsibility when article was reviewed by two editors prior to publication); Sha-
piro v. Newsday, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2607, 2608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (granting
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(e) Review by Counsel
Failure to have an article reviewed by counsel prior to publica-
tion should not give rise to an inference of negligence. Although
many newspapers seek legal advice regarding potential liability on
sensitive stories,50 6 the ultimate assessment of whether a story is
accurate is basically an editorial rather than a legal judgment. If,
however, after careful review, counsel advised an editor that a
story was inaccurate and the newspaper published it regardless of
such advice, an inference of negligence could arise if the editor had
no legitimate reason for disagreeing with the assessment of coun-
sel. In such a case, the relevant fact is the editor's decision to pub-
lish with reason to doubt the accuracy of the statement; that he
disregarded the opinion of a lawyer is irrelevant. Conversely, re-
view by counsel focusing on accuracy should tend to undermine an
inference of negligence as would any systematic verification proce-
dure. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, affirmed
a summary judgment for a record company and individual song-
writers concluding that these defendants "took reasonable precau-
tions to ensure the song's accuracy . . Several individuals, in-
cluding two attorneys, repeatedly reviewed the lyrics. "507
4. Retraction
Evidence that a periodical failed to publish a prompt retrac-
tion should constitute some proof of negligence if the defendant
had been presented with information clearly demonstrating that
the allegations in the story were false. The journalism profession
has accepted an obligation to retract or correct inaccurate informa-
tion.50 8 Although at least one court has taken the position that con-
summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of gross irresponsibility
when editors followed "standard procedures" in selecting photograph to accompany article).
506. B. BROOKS, supra note 324, at 391 ("[M]ost investigative stories require consulta-
tion with the newspaper's lawyer before publication."); S. CRUMP, supra note 324, at 144
("Since many investigative stories are controversial by their nature . . . newspapers often
have an attorney specializing in libel and invasion of privacy read the articles and review the
investigative methods and sources with reporters before publication to determine if a libel
suit could successfully by defended."); J. STOVALL, C. SELF & L. MULLINS, supra note 324, at
237 ("[W]hen in doubt about whether a story is libelous, consult an attorney.").
507. Valentine v. CBS, Inc., 698 F.2d 430, 432 (11th Cir. 1983). The court also appears
to have concluded that the defendants did not recognize the arguable defamatory meaning
and were not negligent in failing to discover it. But see Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 453 F. Supp.
541, 547 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd, 644 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1981) (sufficient evidence of negligence
to deny summary judgment for defendant despite fact that "defendant's editors and attor-
neys carefully scrutinized the articles prior to publication").
508. See SPJ, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 323, Fairplay, No. 4 ("It is the duty of news
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duct following publication has no bearing on whether the publisher
proceeded with due care,50 9 this approach takes an unduly narrow
view of the scope of the defendant's duty. A failure to retract may
provide evidence that, on the whole, the defendant was uncon-
cerned with accuracy, both at the time of the initial publication
and at the point when the defendant learned that the information
was false. Conversely, the defendant could undermine the infer-
ence by proving that it failed to retract because it had grounds to
believe that the allegations were accurate, in spite of the plaintiff's
complaint.
In addition, the plaintiff's reputation may be damaged both by
the defendant's failure to retract and by the initial publication.
The reader may assume that when a newspaper fails to repudiate a
defamatory allegation, the newspaper is reaffirming its belief in the
truth of the statement. To the extent that the defendant does or
should have reason to believe that a previously published state-
ment concerning an individual is false, the defendant may be
under a duty to use reasonable care to correct the inaccuracy.
From this perspective of a continuing duty, a failure to retract can
be quite probative. A publisher quite possibly may not have been
negligent in publishing a statement intially but may have been
grossly negligent in failing to publish a correction after having
learned that the statement was false and defamatory. Although not
disproving that the initial publication was the result of negligence,
a prompt retraction may demonstrate that the defendant main-
tained an overall concern for truth and accuracy that should be
considered as part of the context of the publication. Furthermore,
retractions can mitigate damages.
media to make prompt and complete correction of their errors."); APME, CODE OF ETHICS,
supra note 323, Accuracy ("It should admit all substantive errors and correct them
promptly."); ASNE, A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 323, art. iv. ("Significant errors
of fact, as well as errors of omission should be corrected promptly and prominently."); M.
MENCHER, supra note 324, at 350 ("When a libel has been committed, a retraction should be
published."); F. BASKETTE, J. SissoRs & B. BROOKS, supra note 324, at 139 ("when the de-
fense of truth is not clearly evident, the publisher should make the decision to correct.");
see also H. GOODWIN, supra note 324, at 292; E. BROUSSARD & J. HOLGATE, supra note 324, at
159.
509. Walters v. Sanford Herald, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 233, 236, 228 S.E.2d 766, 767-68
(1976) (granting summary judgment for defendant because of insufficient evidence of negli-
gence and noting that failure to retract is of no probative value on issue of fault).
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C. Summary
Since Gertz was decided by the Supreme Court in 1974, ap-
proximately forty-two written opinions have addressed the issue of
proof of negligence and another twenty-three have discussed proof
of gross irresponsibility.510 In the negligence cases, the defendants
have prevailed in fourteen cases-either on motions to dismiss,
summary judgment or directed verdict at trial, or on appeal.51' The
plaintiffs have obtained or retained verdicts in fourteen cases,512
510. Cases that adopt a negligence standard but do not address the proof of fault issue
or cases which affirm a verdict for a private figure plaintiff with no discussion of the negli-
gence issue have been included.
511. See Valentine v. CBS, Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant); Turner v. Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1437 (W.D. Ky. 1979) (granting summary judgment for defendant); Lake Havasu Estates,
Inc. v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 441 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting summary judg-
ment for defendant); Phillips v. Washington Post Co., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1835 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1982) (granting summary judgment for defendant); Karp v. Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co., 359 So. 2d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (affirming summary judgment for de-
fendant); El Amin v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1079 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. 1983) (granting summary judgment for defendant); LeBouef v. Times Picayune Publish-
ing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (affirming summary judgment for defendant);
Wilson v. Capitol City Press, 315 So. 2d 393 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (reversing verdict for plain-
tiff); Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 391 N.E.2d 935 (1979) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980); Dwyer v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2176 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1980) (judgment for defen-
dant); Walters v. Sanford Herald, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 233, 228 S.E.2d 766 (1976) (granting
summary judgment for defendant); Horvath v. Ashtabula Tel., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1657
(Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (reversing verdict for plaintiff); Benson v. Griffin Television, Inc., 593
P.2d 511 (Okla. 1979) (affirming summary judgment for defendant); Torres-Silva v. El
Mundo, Inc., 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1508 (P.R. 1977) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant); see also KARK-TV v. Simon, 280 Ark. 228, 656 S.W.2d 702 (1983) (finding
sufficient evidence of negligence but reversing verdict for plaintiff on other grounds).
512. See Levine v. CMP Publications, 738 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming verdict
for plaintiff); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming verdict for
plaintiff), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 453 F. Supp. 541 (D.
Md. 1978), aff'd, 644 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1981) (affirming verdict for plaintiff); Lawlor v.
Gallagher Presidents' Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (granting judgment for
plaintiff); Re v. Gannett Co., 480 A.2d 662 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984) (finding sufficient evidence
of negligence to support verdict for plaintiff but remanding for new trial on damages);
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Frank, 442 So. 2d 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming
verdict for plaintiff); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983), afl'd, 458 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1984) (affirming verdict for plaintiff); Kohn v. West
Hawaii Today, Inc., 65 Hawaii 584, 656 P.2d 79 (1982) (affirming verdict for plaintiff); For-
rest v. Lynch, 347 So. 2d 1255 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978) (af-
firming verdict for plaintiff); Liquori v. Republican Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 671, 396 N.E.2d
726 (1979) (affirming verdict for plaintiff); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, - Va. -_, 325 S.E.2d
713 (1985) (affirming verdict for plaintiff); Charlottesville Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, -
Va. -, 325 S.E.2d 713 (1985) (affirming verdict for plaintiff); Port Packet Corp. v. Lewis,
- Va. -, 325 S.E.2d 713 (1985); Jones v. Sun Publishing Co., 278 S.C. 12, 292 S.E.2d 23
(reinstating verdict for plaintiff), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982).
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and have successfully resisted or obtained reversal of defense mo-
tions for summary judgment, directed verdict or judgment not-
withstanding the verdict in fourteen cases. 51 3 Of the gross irrespon-
sibility cases, the defense has prevailed in nineteen actions, 514 and
513. General Prods. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Va. 1981) (denying
summary judgment for defendant); Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005
(W.D. Va. 1979) (denying summary judgment for defendant); Mathis v. Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (denying summary judgment for defendant);
Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1865 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1982) (vacating judgment for defendant and granting new trial); Triangle Publications, Inc.,
v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179, 317 S.E.2d 534 (1984) (affirming denial of summary judgment for
defendant); Newell v. Field Enters. Inc., 91 Ill. App. 3d 735, 415 N.E.2d 434 (1980) (revers-
ing summary judgment for defendant); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.,
623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982) (reversing summary judgment
for defendant); Melon v. Capital City Press, 407 So. 2d 85 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant); Slocum v. Webb, 375 So. 2d 125 (La. Ct. App. 1979)
(reversing dismissal of complaint); Schrottman v. Barnicle, 386 Mass. 627, 437 N.E.2d 205
(1982) (remanding for specific finding on negligence); Pettengill v. Booth Newspapers,Inc.,
88 Mich. App. 587, 278 N.W.2d 682 (1979); Greenberg v. C.B.S., Inc., 69 A.D.2d 693, 419
N.Y.S.2d 988 (1979) (affirming denial of summary judgment for defendant); Embers Supper
Club, Inc. v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 22, 457 N.E.2d 1164 (1984)
(reversing directed verdict for defendant); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d
412 (Tenn. 1978) (affirming reversal of directed verdict for defendant).
514. Geiger v. Dell Publishing Co., 719 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1983) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant); Gaeta v. New York News, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 340, 465 N.E.2d 802, 477
N.Y.S.2d 82 (1984) (reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant); Karaduman v.
Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531, 416 N.E.2d 557, 435 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1980) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341
N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975) (affirming summary judgment for defendant); Poltnow
v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, 11 Med. L. Rptr. (BNA) 1528 (N.Y.A.D. 1985) (affirming dis-
missal of complaint against defendant); Ortiz v. Valdescastilla, 102 A.D.2d 513, 478
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1984) (granting summary judgment for defendant); Freeze Right v. New York
City, 101 A.D.2d 175, 475 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1984) (reversing denial of summary judgement for
defendant); Simonsen v. Malone Evening Telegram, 98 A.D.2d 905, 470 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1983)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant); Carlucci v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 88
A.D.2d 608, 450 N.Y.S.2d 54, aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 883, 442 N.E.2d 442, 456 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1982)
(reversing denial of dismissal for defendant); Zetes v. Richman, 86 A.D.2d 746, 447 N.Y.S.2d
778 (1982) (reversing summary judgment for plaintiff and dismissing complaint); Robart v.
Post-Standard, 74 A.D.2d 963, 425 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1980), af'd, 52 N.Y.2d 843, 418 N.E.2d
664, 437 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1981) (reversing denial of summary judgment for defendant); Fairley
v. Peekskill Star Corp., 83 A.D.2d 294, 445 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1981) (reversing denial of sum-
mary judgment for defendant); Grobe v. Three Village Herald, 69 A.D.2d 175, 420 N.Y.S.2d
3 (1979), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 932, 406 N.E.2d 491, 428 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1980) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant); Campo Lindo for Dogs, Inc. v. New York Post Corp., 65 A.D.2d
650, 409 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1978) (affirming summary judgment for defendant); Sbarbati v. New
York Post, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (granting summary judgment
for defendant); Ritter v. Matthes, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1744 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (grant-
ing summary judgment for defendant); Shapiro v. Newsday, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (granting summary judgment for defendant); DeLuca v. New
York News, Inc., 109 Misc. 2d 341, 438 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (granting summary
judgment for defendant); Salcedo v. El Diario Publishing Co., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2308
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (granting summary judgment for defendant);
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the plaintiffs have resisted summary judgment in three.515
As previously discussed,516 courts finding clear and convincing
evidence of reckless disregard often have relied on several different
evidentiary factors to support their conclusions. The great majority
of courts that have found sufficient evidence of negligence, how-
ever, have relied on only one517 or two51s of these factors. Indeed,
only Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,51 9 which also contains a finding
of reckless disregard to support an award of punitive damages,
515. Hawks v. Record Printing, - A.D.2d -, 486 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1985) (affirming
denial of summary judgment for defendant); Meadows v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 98 A.D.2d
959, 470 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1983) (affirming denial of summary judgment for defendant); Hogan
v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 446 N.Y.S.2d 836, afd per curiam, 58 N.Y.2d 630, 444 N.E.2d
1002, 458 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1982) (affirming denial of summary judgment for defendant); cf.
Mazart v. State, 109 Misc. 2d 1092, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (finding sufficient evi-
dence of gross irresponsibility but reversing on other grounds).
516. See supra notes 306-08 and accompanying text.
517. General Prods. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Va. 1981) (failure
to update); Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 453 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1978), alfd, 644 F.2d 1004 (4th
Cir. 1981) (failure to contact obvious source); Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd.,
8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1865 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1982) (no source); Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Frank, 442 So. 2d 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (failure to contact obvious source);
Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179, 317 S.E.2d 534 (1984) (inadequate ver-
ification); Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, Inc., 65 Hawaii 584, 656 P.2d 79 (1982) (failure to
consult authoritative source); Forrest v. Lynch, 347 So. 2d 1255 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (mis-
leading language), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978) Schrottman v. Barnicle, 386 Mass. 627,
437 N.E.2d 205 (1982) (inadequate notation); Pettengill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 88 Mich.
App. 587, 278 N.W.2d 682 (1979) (failure to proofread); Embers Supper Club, Inc. v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 22, 457 N.E.2d 1164 (1984) (failure to con-
tact obvious source); Greenberg v. CBS Inc., 69 A.D.2d 693, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1976) (inade-
quate verfication); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978) (con-
tradictory information).
518. Lawlor v. Gallagher Presidents' Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(failure to contact obvious source and misleading language); Newell v. Field Enters., Inc., 91
Ill. App. 3d 735, 415 N.E.2d 434 (1980) (contradictory information and inadequate investi-
gation); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982) (unreliable source and misleading language); Melon v. Capital
City Press, 407 So. 2d 85 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (unreliable source and failure to contact au-
thoritative source); Slocum v. Webb, 375 So. 2d 125 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (contradictory in-
formation and inadequate notes); Liquori v. Republican Co., 8 Mass. App. 671, 396 N.E.2d
726 (1979) (contradictory information and failure to contact obvious source); Gazette, Inc. v.
Harris, - Va. _ 325 S.E.2d 713 (1985) (inadequate verification and lack of expertise);
Charlottesville Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, - Va. _, 325 S.E.2d 713 (1985) (inade-
quate verification and lack of expertise); Port Packet Corp. v. Lewis, - Va. _, 325 S.E.2d
713 (1985) (inadequate verification and sufficient lead time); Jones v. Sun Publishing Co.,
278 S.C. 12, 292 S.E.2d 23 (failure to contact obvious or authoritative source), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 944 (1982); see also KARK-TV v. Simon, 280 Ark. 228, 656 S.W.2d 702 (1983)
(unreliable source and inadequate verification) (reversing verdict for plaintiff on other
grounds).
519. 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982) (no source, unreliable source, failure to contact obvi-
ous source, failure to contact authoritative source, failure to update, inadequate editorial
process), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983)
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Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane,520 and Levine v. CMP Publi-
cations 21 rely on a variety of factors. The subjective focus of the
reckless disregard standard coupled with the clear and convincing
evidence requirement probably best explain the more detailed
showings in the reckless disregard cases. Certain types of evidence
seem to prove persuasive in cases in which the plaintiffs are suc-
cessful. Plaintiffs in negligence actions frequently prevail, at least
in defeating defense motions for summary judgment, by establish-
ing that the defendants published false and defamatory material,
despite knowledge of contradictory information, or without a
source, or based on an unreliable source, or after having failed to
contact an obvious source, or after having failed to consult an au-
thoritative source, or after having otherwise failed to verify ade-
quately. 22 The great majority of cases in which the defendant has
prevailed have included affirmative proof of thorough investigation
and verification.2 Verification is the key issue in most negligence
litigation.
In a recent article, Professor Franklin concluded that the
courts have yet to provide clear guidelines regarding the contours
of journalistic negligence, that some of the rules which have devel-
oped are in conflict, and that the media is losing a disproportionate
amount of the litigation.2 4 Consequently, he concluded that the
introduction of negligence principles into defamation law is unsuc-
cessful and should be abandoned.52 5 Based on the study of case
law, this conclusion seems, at the very least, premature and unduly
pessimistic. The obvious reason that a comprehensive set of judi-
cial guidelines for establishing negligence in journalism has not yet
developed is simply that there have not been a sufficient number
of reported negligence cases in the ten year period following Gertz.
Forty-two reported cases have discussed the proof of negligence is-
sue (approximately sixty-five, if New York's gross irresponsibility
cases are included) spread over fifty states, Puerto Rico, and the
federal courts. This small number of cases amounts to an average
of less than one case per jurisdiction, certainly not enough prece-
520. 423 So. 2d 376, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), afl'd, 458 So.2d 239, 242 (Fla. 1984)
(contradictory information, unreliable source, and failure to contact obvious source).
521. 738 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1984) (contradictory information, denial, and serious
charges).
522. See supra notes 518-22.
523. See supra notes 455-78 and accompanying text.




dent to establish a well-developed set of guidelines. Professor
Franklin is correct in suggesting that uncertainty still must exist,
which in turn, could promote press self-censorship. The relatively
limited amount of reported negligence litigation during this period,
however, suggests that the press need not be overly concerned with
the threat of excessive litigation or the frequent imposition of lia-
bility. Presumably, if a far greater number of cases had been re-
ported during the same period, commentators would argue vigor-
ously that the press is "chilled" by the very volume of the
litigation, even if that caselaw resulted in a set of guidelines which
provided greater predictability.
Whether negligence cases will be litigated at an increased rate
in the future is unclear. The great majority of reported cases con-
tinue to be brought by public figures or public officials who must
meet the actual malice standard. During the same ten year period
in which the courts addressed the meaning of journalistic negli-
gence in approximately forty-two cases, they discussed proof of ac-
tual malice in over one hundred and fifty cases. 28 Perhaps public
figures and public officials are defamed by the press with greater
frequency, or perhaps public officials and public figures are more
likely to consider the cost and burden of litigation worthwhile. The
press should consider the surprisingly slow development of prece-
dent in this area more as a blessing than a curse.
No reason exists to believe that reasonably clear standards will
not eventually develop, albeit gradually, as more cases are liti-
gated. Professor Franklin contrasts Wilson v. Capitol City Press,2
in which a Louisiana appellate court found that reliance on an ap-
parently reliable law enforcement source constituted due care as a
matter of law, with Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.,5 25 in
which, on similar facts, a federal district court held that the ques-
tion of due care was for the jury. From this comparison he argues
that the case law is developing contradictory principles.2 9 Cer-
tainly, to expect that a variety of courts developing negligence
principles through the common-law method necessarily would
achieve results that are wholly consistent would be naive, espe-
cially considering that each case will be influenced by its own nu-
ances as well as disagreements among journalists concerning the
526. This figure was derived by counting the cases decided between 1974 and 1984
discussed in section II of this Article.
527. 315 So. 2d 393 (La. Ct. App. 1975); see supra note 459.
528. 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see supra note 465 and accompanying text.
529. Franklin, Negligence, supra note 22, at 267-68.
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type of procedures that should be employed in a given situation.
The press is not in complete agreement on the degree of reliance
that should be placed on law enforcement sources. 3 0 An attorney
would not be able to advise a media client that placing sole reli-
ance on a seemingly reliable law enforcement source inevitably
would result in a favorable decision if litigation ensued. Based on
present case law, however, an attorney could inform his client that
a solid majority of courts would consider such reliance strong evi-
dence of due care and, so long as no apparent reason were present
to doubt the information obtained, the chances of prevailing on
summary judgment at trial, or reversal of a verdict on appeal,
would be quite high.531 Success is not an absolute certainty. Even
the stringent actual malice standard with its clear and convincing
evidence rule cannot provide that degree of protection. The result
is reasonably predictable, however, and should be more than suffi-
cient to check any significant self-censorship. At a minimum, this
new degree of predictability should prove less intimidating to the
press than the certainty that existed under the strict liability rule
prior to Gertz.
Professor Franklin also suggests that the rejection of the pro-
fessional standard by several state courts may lead to ad hoc deci-
sionmaking, and thus further uncertainty.53 2 As previously dis-
cussed,533 a professional standard definitely would be preferable
from the standpoint of predictability. Several courts, however,
have adopted a professional standard, and there is no reason to
believe that courts which have chosen an ordinary care standard
will ignore evidence of relevant professional custom and practice.
Citation to the professional journalism manuals throughout the
latter part of this Article is intended to emphasize that, in addition
to expert testimony, extensive literature is available which often
can prove useful to the parties and courts in efforts to apply negli-
gence principles in this area. Moreover, as a few courts have noted,
many of the issues that will be litigated in journalistic negligence
cases can be resolved quite properly and quite consistently with
professional practice through the application of common sense. 3
If courts consider evidence of professional standards when
presented and articulate their reasoning explicitly, a body of prece-
530. Compare supra note 464 with supra note 466.
531. See supra notes 458-63 and accompanying text.
532. Franklin, Negligence, supra note 22, at 266.
533. See supra notes 333-48 and accompanying text,
534. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
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dent can develop that is relatively consistent both internally and
with professional practice. Despite a few aberrations in the present
case law,5"5 the great majority of decisions, including those in
which the plaintiffs have prevailed, are consistent with common
sense, professional custom as represented in the journalism manu-
als, and standard negligence analysis.
Finally, Professor Franklin expresses concern that the plain-
tiffs are reaching juries and winning and retaining verdicts with far
greater frequency than under the actual malice standard.5 36 As-
suming plaintiffs are prevailing with higher frequency, however,
the very point of the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz was that
private figure plaintiffs deserve a more realistic opportunity to pre-
vail in a defamation litigation than they would receive under the
actual malice standard. Although plaintiffs have been more suc-
cessful under the negligence than under the actual malice stan-
dard, defendants have still prevailed in a significant number of
negligence cases.53 Moreover, under New York's gross irresponsi-
bility standard, defendants have prevailed with virtually as much
frequency as under the actual malice test.5 38 Professor Franklin is
concerned that even if defendants win a substantial number of
cases they still will be forced to litigate most cases through the
appellate stage .5 9 This reasoning builds on Professor Anderson's
argument that the expense of litigation may promote self-censor-
ship.540 Although this analysis is basically sound, a few points
should be considered. Defendants have prevailed at the summary
judgment stage in several of the negligence cases. 541 Furthermore,
defendants who have prevailed at the summary judgment stage in
actual malice cases often must defend their judgments through one
535. See Slocum v. Webb, 375 So. 2d 125 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Forrest v. Lynch, 347
So. 2d 1255 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978); supra notes 358, 484 &
490.
536. Franklin, Negligence, supra note 22, at 272-73. Professor Franklin relied on two
studies that he has conducted, Franklin, Winners, supra note 28, at 492; Franklin, Litiga-
tion, supra note 28, at 824-25, as well as a study by the Libel Defense Resource Center,
Bulletin No. 6, 35, 42 (1983). These studies suggest that plaintiffs tend to be more successful
in negligence cases then in actual malice cases. The number of negligence cases reviewed in
these studies, however, is relatively small.
537. See supra note 511.
538. See supra note 514-15.
539. Franklin, Negligence, supra note 22, at 272, 278.
540. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 430-41; Massing, Libel Chill: How Cold Is It Out
There?, COLUM. J. REv., May/June 1985 at 31; see also supra notes 22-24 and accompanying
text.
541. See supra note 511.
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or more levels of appellate litigation as well. At least to date, with
the exception of Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Penthouse Interna-
tional, Ltd.,542 and the possible exception of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,54 3 which involved proof of both negligence and actual
malice, all of the reported negligence cases appear relatively simple
and straightforward. The large complex defamation cases, such as
Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,544 Herbert v. Lando,545 Tavoulareas v.
Washington Post Co.,546 and Sharon v. Time, Inc.541 that have in-
volved extensive discovery and lengthy trials generally appear to
be brought by public official or public figure plaintiffs who must
meet the stringent actual malice standard. In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 45 the Supreme Court essentially rejected the notion
that the press has a constitutional right to avoid the cost and bur-
den of virtually all private figure defamation cases. Assuming that
private figure plaintiffs will be allowed to reach the jury and to win
and retain judgments with greater frequency than public figure or
public official plaintiffs, this trend will not result necessarily in sig-
nificantly greater press self censorship, given the limited volume
and scope of the litigation that has occurred to date.
As an institution, the press appears vigorously committed to
the professional objectives of accuracy and fairness. On a daily ba-
sis, the press attempts to meet an internal standard that is far
more stringent than that which is imposed by the law of negli-
gence. If a reporter or editor decides to delay or even to kill a story
on account of an inability to verify, the decision more likely will be
based on considerations of professionalism than fear of litigation or
liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
During the twenty-year period since New York Times v. Sulli-
van was decided, courts have addressed proof of actual malice in a
large number of reported cases. While the issue can be complex,
courts have developed principles that provide some guidance. Even
542. 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1865 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1982); see Bruck, The La Costa
Trial: Will Grandstanding Lawyers And Sloppy Journalists Make Bad Law?, AM. LAW.,
Mar., 1982, at 24; Graneli, La Costa Fights for Its Name, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 4, 1982, at 6;
Granelli, The Penthouse Case Aftermath, NAT'L L. J., May 31, 1982, at 3.
543. 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
544. 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
545. 441 U.S. 153 (1979), on remand, 596 F. Supp. 1178 (1984).
546. 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
547. 599 F. Supp. 538 (1984).
548. 418 U.S. 323, 341-49 (1974); cf. Herbert v. Lando, 411 U.S. 153, 176 (1979).
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though the ultimate focus of the standard is subjective in nature,
that the defendant's awareness of probable falsity may be estab-
lished through circumstantial evidence is well recognized. The sub-
jective focus approach coupled with the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard provide a high level of protection for the press.
Although press defendants prevail in most cases, the plaintiff's
barrier is not insurmountable. A plaintiff can prevail if he is able
to establish several objective factors that are highly probative of
reckless disregard. In a large number of cases, press defendants
prevail by establishing affirmatively that they proceeded with due
care. The case law suggests that, in practice, the actual malice
standard operates basically as intended. The vast majority of
courts seem to understand its nature and apply it properly. Al-
though the actual malice standard provides a large measure of pro-
tection to the press and presents a formidable obstacle to public
official and public figure plaintiffs, it certainly does not preclude
recovery in all cases.
In the ten years since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. was decided,
a body of precedent has begun to emerge that fleshes out the stan-
dards of negligence and gross irresponsibility. Even though some
principles have developed, not enough reported cases exist to pro-
vide clear guidelines on all questions that are likely to arise. Under
New York's gross irresponsibility standard, defendants prevail in a
large number of cases. Plaintiffs seem to prevail on the proof of
negligence issue, however, more frequently than do defendants.
Nevertheless, defendants continue to establish due care in a signif-
icant number of cases. In view of the objective nature of the negli-
gence standard and the absence of the clear and convincing evi-
dence rule, plaintiffs need not produce as much affirmative proof
of fault to resist summary judgment or retain a verdict under the
negligence standard as under the actual malice test. So long as
courts take account of professional custom and practice, a body of
precedent defining journalistic negligence eventually should de-
velop with sufficient clarity to provide guidance to journalists, at-
torneys, judges, and juries.
Although the standards for proving fault in media defamation
cases are not wholly free of difficulties, nonetheless when applied,
they work reasonably well. Despite criticism from representatives
of both press defendants and aggrieved plaintiffs, the Sullivan and
Gertz approaches to the proof of fault issue should be retained.
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